The cyborg: a treatise on the artificial man by Caronia, Antonio
www.ssoar.info
The cyborg: a treatise on the artificial man
Caronia, Antonio
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Caronia, A. (2015). The cyborg: a treatise on the artificial man.. Lüneburg: meson press. https://doi.org/10.14619/007
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
  CYBORG  
  CARONIA  
A
n
to
n
io C
aro
n
ia 
 
Th
e Cyb
o
rg: A
 Treatise o
n th
e A
rtificial M
an

The Cyborg
First published in Italian as
Il Cyborg: Saggio sull'uomo artificiale
© ShaKe Edizioni, Milano, ed eredi Antonio Caronia
Bibliographical Information of the  
German National Library
The German National Library lists this publication in the Deutsche 
­National­bibliografie­(German­National­Biblio­graphy);­detailed­biblio-
graphic information is available online at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
Published in 2015 by meson press, Hybrid Publishing Lab,  
Centre for Digital Cultures, Leuphana University of Lüneburg 
www.meson-press.com
Design concept: Torsten Köchlin, Silke Krieg
Coverimage:­Michael­Deistler­(courtesy­of­Dorothea­Schlueter,­Galerie)
The print edition of this book is printed by Lightning Source, Milton 
Keynes, United Kingdom  
ISBN­(Print):­­ 978-3-95796-010-8
ISBN­(PDF):­ 978-3-95796-011-5
ISBN­(EPUB):­ 978-3-95796-012-2
DOI:­­10.14619/007
The digital editions of this publication can be downloaded freely at: 
www.meson-press.com.
Funded by the EU major project Innovation Incubator Lüneburg
This­Publication­is­licensed­under­the­CC-BY-NC-ND­4.0­ 
(Creative­­Commons­Attribution­NonCommercial­NoDerivatives­4.0­
International).­To­view­a­copy­of­this­license,­visit:­ 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
The Cyborg:  
A Treatise on the  
Artificial Man
Antonio Caronia
Translated by 
Robert Booth
With a preface by
Tatiana Bazzichelli
Antonio­Caronia­(1944–2013)­studied­mathematics,­logic,­
and­linguistics­at­the­University­of­Genova,­finishing­it­with­
a­thesis­on­Noam­Chomsky.­Besides­his­studies­he­was­a­
political­activist­in­the­Italian­radical­left.­Further­fields­
in which he conducted research were the study of mass 
culture, especially the interrelation of science, technology, 
and imagination. In addition, he turned to philosophy and 
anthropology,­most­notably­concerning­science­fiction,­
comics, digital images, virtual reality, and telematic net-
works. Caronia worked as a translator, journalist, and 
university teacher. He taught at the Academy of Fine Arts of 
Brera­(Milano),­at­the­New­Academy­of­Fine­Arts­(NABA)­of­
Milano, and was the Director of Studies of M-Node, linked to 
the Planetary Collegium directed by Roy Ascott in Plymouth, 
UK.
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Preface to the English Edition
Tatiana­Bazzichelli
Since­its­first­publication­in­1985,­The Cyborg has gone through 
several­iterations.­Antonio­Caronia­himself­wrote­a­first­preface­
for­the­second­edition­in­2001­and­another­one­for­the­third­in­
2008­(both­published­by­ShaKe­Editions),­which­is­translated­and­
included in this book. In both his prefaces, Caronia points out that 
The Cyborg is written to belong, more than to the author, to the 
readers themselves, who are invited to embody and collectivize 
his­theoretical­reflections­covering­a­period­of­more­than­twenty­
years. According to Antonio Caronia, this means that readers 
should feel free to bend the book’s meaning, start new paths of 
theory and practice that are not necessarily the ones imagined 
by­the­author,­and­most­of­all,­use­his­reflections­as­a­tool­of­
criticism and action able to expand into other unpredictable 
layers of understanding and intervention.
The­author­left­us­in­January­2013,­unfortunately­too­early­to­
see the international edition of The Cyborg published and made 
available to a wider audience. Writing this preface, I will follow 
a “situated perspective,” as Antonio would probably suggest, 
drawing upon Donna Haraway’s concept of situated knowledges 
to contextualize his book for an international public.1 Here, I will 
assume an Italian researcher’s point of view on hacktivism and 
network culture, having lived in northern Europe for some years, 
and having been a colleague and friend of the author in various 
1 The essay, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Fem-
inism­in­the­Late­Twentieth­Century,”­by­Donna­Haraway,­first­published­in­
Socialist Review,­no.­80­(1985):­65–108,­and­later­in­her­book­Simians, Cyborgs 
and Women: The Reinvention of Nature­(New­York:­Routledge,­1991),­deeply­
inspired­the­reflections­of­Caronia­on­the­contamination­between­the­body­
and the machine, and on the need to assume an intellectually situated 
perspective.
8 intellectual and political adventures around the network of AHA: 
Activism-Hacking-Artivism.2 
Following another of Caronia’s suggestions, we should read this 
book keeping in mind its use as a possible “tool for collective 
fights”,­to­uncover­theoretical­and­practical­territories­as­yet­
unimagined. This approach is one of the things I remember 
most strongly from my conversations with Caronia, who was a 
polyphonic person able to generate sparks in your mind, by being 
very intellectually acute, precise, innovative and quite direct and 
critical when necessary. 
Caronia’s­writings­reflect­his­diverse­experiences­in­many­fields­
of study and action: with a university background in math-
ematics,­and­a­final­dissertation­on­Noam­Chomsky,­for­most­
of his life Antonio Caronia studied philosophy, anthropology 
and­linguistics;­he­was­politically­active­in­the­Italian­grassroots­
movement since the seventies, initially as part of the collective 
Un’ambigua utopia­(An­Ambiguous­Utopia),­named­after­the­
subtitle of The Dispossessed,­the­science­fiction­novel­by­Ursula­
K.­Le­Guin­(1974);­he­was­also­an­expert­in­digital­culture,­media­
aesthetics,­science­fiction,­and­virtual­reality­since­its­early­phase;­
a­Professor­of­Communication­Studies­at­the­Brera­Academy­
of Fine Art, and the Research Director of the Ph.D Planetary 
Collegium­M-Node,­affiliated­to­the­University­of­Plymouth,­based­
at­NABA,­the­New­Academy­of­Fine­Arts­in­Milan,­where­he­taught­
Aesthetics­of­Media,­and­Digital­Cultures;­he­was­also­a­writer,­
journalist and professional English-Italian translator, overseeing 
the­Italian­editions­of­books­by­James­G. Ballard­and­Philip­K.­
Dick.3 
2­ AHA: Activism-Hacking-Artivism is the project on hacktivism and net culture 
in­Italy­that­I­started­in­2001,­and­a­community­around­the­aha@ecn.org­
mailing­list­which­is­still­active­today­(http://lists.ecn.org/mailman/listinfo/
aha).
3­ In­addition,­together­with­Domenico­Gallo,­who­was­also­a­member­of­the­
Ambiguous Utopia collective, Antonio Caronia co-wrote the book Philip K. 
Dick: La macchina della paranoia – Enciclopedia Dickiana­(Milan:­Agenzia­X,­
9Since Antonio Caronia worked on The Cyborg for quite some time, 
personally editing its various editions, this publication should 
be considered not only as a way of following his theoretical 
path, but also as a means to get closer to his perspective in the 
development of critical media and political practices in Italy. This 
book is part of a puzzle that is probably only possible to solve 
by reading other works by the same author, and by the network 
around him, but The Cyborg­is­certainly­crucial­to­a­specific­phase­
in the development of digital culture from the eighties until today, 
not only in Italy, but internationally. The Cyborg is a complex book, 
not because of the language used by the author, which is quite 
accessible, but because it needs to be understood as a metaphor 
of the possible,­a­reflection­on­the­development­of­an­emerging­
imaginary in Italian society, politics and culture, that refers to 
personal experiences of the author covering almost thirty years, 
which he shared with a wide network of people, in the city of 
Milan and beyond.
One of Antonio Caronia’s great contributions was to introduce 
Italian­readers­to­writers­like­Philip­K.­Dick,­James­G. Ballard,­
and­William­Burroughs,­and­to­provide­a­critique­of­the­works­
of­science­fiction­authors­from­the­early­thirties­and­forties­
such as Edmond Hamilton and Catherine L. Moore, from the 
sixties and seventies such as Samuel R. Delany, and to facilitate 
a critical understanding of many other writers within the context 
of­the­cyberpunk­literature­of­the­eighties.­But­most­of­all,­the­
peculiarity­of­Caronia’s­approach­to­science­fiction,­and­his­con-
cept­of­the­cyborg,­needs­to­be­situated­in­the­field­of­his­grass-
roots political experiences within the Italian movements between 
the­sixties­and­seventies,­and­beyond.­For­Caronia,­science­fiction­
was a tool with which to analyze society, culture and politics, and 
2006),­which­provides­the­reader­with­essential­tools­to­understand­the­
main concepts described by Dick in his novels. We thank Domenico Gallo for 
his­involvement­in­the­first­phase­of­editorial­mediation­with­the­ShaKe­pub-
lishing house for the English translation of this book.
10 highlight the contradictions and power structures embedded 
within them.
The concept of the cyborg is not to be understood literally, and is 
not solely related to technology and the machine: it is a complex 
organism that embodies the signs of our present, by becoming an 
interface­between­the­past­and­the­future;­it­is­the­coexistence­
of the possible and the impossible, epitomizing the passage 
from modernity to post-Fordist society, while representing the 
end of utopian beliefs, and the inspiration for people to keep on 
believing.
The Politics of the Hybrids
At the end of the seventies, a very crucial moment in the his-
tory of Italian grassroots and radical Left movements, Antonio 
Caronia—who had just abandoned Trotskyism and his political 
engagement in the Fourth International—became involved 
with the collective Un’ambigua utopia (An­Ambiguous­Utopia),­
co-publishing­the­homonymous­magazine­between­1977­and­
1982.­As­Antonio­Caronia­and­Giuliano­Spagnul­point­out­in­the­
introduction to the recently published anthology of the original 
issues, he started his political experience in the collective, 
attracted­by­the­attempt­“to­read­science­fiction­from­the­left,”4 to 
create­an­understanding­of­fiction,­popular­culture­and­entertain-
ment, by including them in a critical political discourse. At the 
roots of this intellectual and political engagement is the idea of 
“estrangement,” referring to the process of making familiar what 
is alien, and vice versa. This perspective is linked to the concept 
of defamiliarization, which was developed by Viktor Shklovsky in 
his­essay­“Art­as­Technique”­(1917),­and­used­extensively­by­the­
avant-gardes, in an attempt to dismantle culture’s hierarchies 
and holistic truths, by making art objects unfamiliar while 
4 Antonio Caronia and Giuliano Spagnul, eds., Un’Ambigua utopia: Fantascienza, 
ribellione e radicalità negli anni ’70, vol.­2,­no.­6–9­(Milan:­Mimesis­Edizioni,­
2009).
11experienced. In rendering the unfamiliar comprehensible, by 
playing with unusual juxtapositions, unexpected combinations, 
and­deconstructions­of­reality,­science­fiction­becomes­a­
methodology of cultural criticism, while generating an under-
standing of power structures embedded in our everyday life. In 
dealing­critically­with­aliens,­cyborgs­and­artificial­organisms,­
Antonio Caronia meant to interpret our society as a collage of 
incongruities, without necessarily solving them, but leaving them 
open­for­reflections­on­possible­political­and­tactical­practices­
derived from encounters with the “alien.”
As Antonio Caronia points out, the idea of politicizing science 
fiction­is­related­to­the­practice­of­transforming­scornfully­
excluded issues and arguments into politics, working upon the 
fractures between public and private, and between the pleasure 
of reading literature and being actively engaged in society. At 
a­time­when­the­movement­of­1977­was­criticizing­many­of­the­
extreme Left’s traditional political practices, the emergence of 
new­needs­and­aspirations­(as­Caronia­remembers,­many­people­
were inspired by the writings of Agnes Heller and the feminist 
approach­of­those­years)­caused­the­consolidated­political­
militancy­all­kinds­of­problems;­the­strategic­use­of­science­
fiction­became­a­way­to­explore­more­experimental­practices,­
generating constructive semantic confusion, ambiguous utopias, 
in­which­the­use­of­the­body­was­central.­Science­fiction­in­this­
sense becomes “a contribution to the understanding of who we 
are, to the development of other forms of sociability, of other 
codes of communication, of some new modest local theory. 
Aware that these paths are rough and inevitably ambiguous.”5
5 Antonio Caronia, “Un’Ambigua Utopia” [An Ambiguous Utopia], in MIR, Men 
In Red,­magazine­edited­by­the­Collective­of­Radical­Ufology,­no.­2­(1999).­
This is a quote from a text entitled “Incarnazioni dell’immaginario” originally 
published in the book Nei labirinti della fantascienza. Guida critica a cura del 
collettivo “Un’Ambigua Utopia”­(Milan:­Feltrinelli,­1979),­15,­my­translation­
from Italian into English.
12 These­paths­were­not­only­followed­on­a­theoretical­level;­they­
also gave space and importance to the role of the body and 
interpersonal communication, trying to connect intellectual 
engagement with elaborations of new forms of expression. At 
the end of the seventies this attitude was put into practice by the 
Italian collectives close to the Indiani metropolitani­(Metropolitan­
Indians),­the­so-called­creative­wing­of­the­movement,­which­
developed within the underground movement and the emerging 
scene of social centers, inspired by representatives of the U.S. 
Beat­Generation­and­its­writers­and­poets­like­Jack­Kerouac­
and Allen Ginsberg, the French Situationists and the Dadaist 
movement. Many members were extremely critical of the prev-
alent strict Marxist doctrines, and strived to dismantle dialectic 
power structures by creating ludic interventions, often based 
on the destructuration of language and communication, and by 
using disguise, playfulness and provocation as tactics.
In­1978,­Antonio­Caronia­and­the­Ambiguous­Utopia­collective­
(along­with­Franco­“Bifo”­Berardi­and­Freak­Antoni)­took­part­in­
Alfabeta­Group’s­“La­produzione­mentale”­(Mental­Production),­
performing an unorthodox speech using the imaginary slang of 
Vega­4.­That­same­year,­the­collective­organized­a­conference­
entitled­Marx/z/iana­(Marx/t/ian),­where­it­tried­to­stage­per-
formative practices using costumes and masks, stressing the 
limits­of­the­traditional­academic­format.­This­art­of­camouflage­
not only showed a playful methodology of intervention, but was 
embedded in the belief that the strange and the extravagant can 
express­hidden­conflicts­in­politics­and­society,­making­the­body­
the main vehicle of a critique of production processes, bringing 
such contradictions into the experience of everyday life. Common 
people are therefore at the center of investigation, and very often 
the people that are “dispossessed”, “aliens” and precarious are 
the ones who embody signs of power, becoming the simulacra of 
the contemporary.
Therefore, when Antonio Caronia writes about the cyborg, he is 
writing about all of us: the cyborg becomes a subject of political 
13reflection­on­the­development­of­contemporary­society,­where­
technology, and its strict relation with the body, assumes a cru-
cial role. We are all cybernetic organisms, in the sense that we all 
experience­hybrid­conditions­of­being,­our­blood­and­flesh­inter-
twining with economic growth and technological development.
The Future of the Im/Possible
The­dismantling­of­science­fiction­realized­by­the­Ambiguous­
Utopia collective aimed to transfer the literary genre into the 
interstices of society and through the concrete practices of 
everyday life, beyond the adventures described in the novels. 
As Caronia points out, the idea was to work on the “cognitive 
potential”­of­science­fiction,­to­better­understand­society­and­
to­act­more­efficiently­within­it.6 Therefore, the objective was 
also to dismantle the concept of utopia itself, and the belief in 
technological­progress,­which­had­characterized­much­sci-fi­
literature­until­the­sixties,­as­described­in­the­first­part­of­The 
Cyborg.­Since­the­seventies,­the­development­of­science­fiction­
has been related to the development of post-industrial society 
and the information economy, reaching a dystopian point 
of narration in which progress is no longer celebrated.7 The 
celebration of the progressive expansion of human potential 
through machines reaches a point of involution with the 
emergence of a global crisis of production, in the transition 
from industrial to post-industrial capitalism. Since the end of 
the seventies, many experimental writers already envisioned 
such­a­transformation­(i.e.­Philip­K.­Dick,­James­G. Ballard,­and­
6 Antonio Caronia and Giuliano Spagnul, “Storia di una cassetta degli attrezzi,” 
in Un’Ambigua utopia: Fantascienza, ribellione e radicalità negli anni ’70, 
ed.­Antonio­Caronia­and­Giuliano­Spagnul,­vol.­1,­no.­1–5­(Milan:­Mimesis­
Edizioni,­2009),­7.
7­ As­Caronia­points­out,­this­interpretation­was­not­only­suggested­by­the­
Ambiguous Utopia collective, but also in Robota Nervoso magazine and in the 
book Fantascienza e comunismo­[Science­Fiction­and­Communism]­­(Milan:­La­
Salamandra,­1979)­by­Diego­Gabutti,­and­internationally,­in­Haraway’s­essay­
“A Cyborg Manifesto.”
14 William­Burroughs),­and­during­the­eighties­the­science­fiction­
genre came to document the crisis, as Caronia suggests, taking 
shape within cyberpunk literature. Caronia states that science 
fiction­dies­when­“society­is­no­longer­capable­of­planning­its­
own future,”8 and when new imaginaries emerge from the con-
tamination of bodies and technologies. The advent of the cyborg 
brings­with­it­the­death­of­science­fiction,­and­according­to­
Caronia,­the­cyberpunk­movement­represents­science­fiction’s­
swan song.9
The­fact­that­cyberpunk­is­defined­as­an­underground­movement­
requires­a­dedicated­reflection,­and­it­is­very­specific­to­the­
Italian­grassroots­context­of­the­eighties­and­nineties.­In­1990,­
the­Decoder­collective,­which­gave­life­to­ShaKe­Edizioni­(ShaKe­
Editions)­in­Milan,­published­the­book­Cyberpunk, Antologia di testi 
politici­(Cyberpunk,­Anthology­of­Political­Essays),­edited­by­Raf­
“Valvola” Scelsi. This book became central to the development of 
a political vision of cyberpunk literature in Italy, a phenomenon 
that­needs­to­be­specifically­situated­among­Italian­radical­
movements, the scene of squatted social centers and the history 
of Italian hacker culture and underground digital networks.10 
As we read in the introduction to the Cyberpunk Anthology, 
“cyberpunk is read essentially as a political phenomenon, such 
as techno-urban writing, mirroring the changes produced on the 
8­ Caronia,­Antonio.­2009.­“La­FS­è­morta,­viva­la­FS!,”­in:­
Hamelin,­Futuro­Presente,­no.­22.­www.academia.edu/298069/
La_fantascienza_e_morta_viva_la_fs_.
9 Ibid.
10 Antonio Caronia wrote extensively on the Italian cyberpunk phenomenon in 
his books, which are at the moment only available in Italian. To get deeper 
into the development of Italian cyberpunk as a political movement, read 
the­chapter­“Towards­the­Cyber­Utopias”­(58–90),­and­in­particular­the­para-
graph­“Cyberpunk­in­Italy”­(68–75)­in­my­book­Networking, The Net as Artwork 
(Aarhus­University:­DARC­Press,­2008).­This­issue­is­later­analyzed­by­Marco­
Deseriis in the chapter “Italienischer Cyberpunk,” in Vergessene Zukunft. 
Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa, ed. Clemens Apprich and Felix Stalder 
(Bielefeld:­Transcript,­2012),­137–143.
15new social subjects by the contemporary”.11 The last paragraph of 
the­introduction­describes­the­core­of­the­editorial­(and­political)­
approach adopted by the Decoder collective: 
Today­Cyberpunk­offers­the­opportunity­to­all­cultural­
operators­and­to­the­movement­to­open­a­huge­new­field­
of production of collective imagination, capable of dis-
rupting the existing imaginative blockade, that has long 
oppressed us. The inspiring themes of Cyberpunk […] belong 
through history, future evocations, and fascinations to the 
countercultural movements. We must reappropriate them 
collectively.12
In­chapter­7­of­this­book,­Antonio­Caronia­describes­the­con-
nections between international cyberpunk literature and the 
development of a new social imaginary based on the intercon-
nection between man and machine, particularly through the 
works­of­William­Gibson,­Bruce­Sterling­and­John­Shirley,­and­
David­Cronenberg­films­like­Videodrome (1982)­and­eXistenZ­(1998).­
Just like the Decoder collective, Caronia also “appropriates” 
cyberpunk literature in this context to describe a deep transfor-
mation­of­society,­the­same­as­that­described­by­Bruce­Sterling­
in the introduction to the Mirrorshades Anthology (1986),­which­
Caronia considers to be the “Manifesto” of cyberpunk literature. 
Here technology’s contamination of the body, and the cyborg’s 
emergence, mirroring the development of the information 
society, appear evident. For Caronia, this means using the cyborg 
to­question­authority­and­to­mix­different­layers,­immaterial­and­
material, in the critical and political understanding of our being 
active subjects in post-industrial society.
11 Raf “Valvola” Scelsi, “Mela al cianuro”, the introduction to the book 
Cyberpunk. Antologia di testi politici [Anthology of Political Essays], ed. Raf 
"Valvola"­Scelsi­(Milan:­ShaKe­Edizioni­Underground,­1990).­My­translation­
from the Italian.
12­ Ibid.,­33.
16 The second part of this book, “The Post-Fordist Cyborg”, was 
added­by­Caronia­in­2001:­here­we­find­his­reflections­on­the­con-
temporary cyborg, when the metaphor of the alien moves from 
the­concept­of­being­external­to­our­body­(well­exemplified­by­
early­science­fiction)­to­inhabiting­the­nerves­beneath­our­skin,­
merging with our post-industrial everyday life. Drawing upon the 
theoretical works of Michel Foucault, the cyborg, a mix between 
the­material­and­immaterial,­the­natural­and­the­artificial,­
becomes the simulacrum of a bio-political body, inscribed with 
information technology and new means of production, power 
mechanisms­and­flows­of­pleasure.13 The techno-imaginary 
becomes­a­tool­for­analyzing­production­flows,­raising­many­
questions related to our becoming, and the dismantling of the 
holistic self, as Donna Haraway suggested, by viewing the cyborg 
as­a­fluid­element­in­constant­transition.
In the last two chapters of The Cyborg,­dated­2001­and­2008­
respectively­(the­latter­was­added­by­the­author­to­the­last­
edition­of­the­book),­Antonio­Caronia­reflects­on­the­most­
recent development of the cyborg imaginary. In the chapter 
“Cyborg Ecstasy” Caronia points out that, in the last decades 
of the twentieth century, openness to the “possible” became 
increasingly more connected to the critical appropriation of 
technology than to the means of production, thus questioning 
the traditional leftist political approach developed by Marxism 
after the mid-twenties. Technology introduces new pos-
sibilities embraced by avant-gardes, such as the development of 
experimental visual languages, and political and social critical 
engagement.­This­affirmation­should­not­be­interpreted­as­a­
techno-utopian determinism, contradicting Caronia’s oft-stated 
critique of technological progress, but rather as a way to imagine 
13 See Antonio Caronia’s teaching documents, Michel Foucault: per una 
genealogia del soggetto. M-Node research seminar series given by Antonio 
Caronia­and­Amos­Bianchi,­NABA,­AA,­2011–2012.­Audio­recordings­at:­http://
archive.org/details/MichelFoucault_PerUnaGenealogiaDelSoggetto.
17political empowerment through the conscious use of technology. 
This aspect is very much present in the development of the 
Italian digital underground movement, in hacker culture and the 
reflection­on­artistic­practices­as­forms­of­critical­understanding­
of everyday life. Antonio Caronia was a perceptive researcher 
from the outset of the emergence of digital culture in Italy, often 
involved in many collective initiatives organized by social centers, 
universities and local artistic and independent political contexts. 
He was also very active in promoting emerging experimental 
artistic initiatives based on the creation of multiple identities or 
multiple-use­names,­from­Luther­Blissett­(1994)­and­Darko­Maver­
(1998),­to­Janez­Janša and his previous project Problemarket (2001),­
and­Anna­Adamolo­(2008).14
As­described­above,­the­first­reflections­on­virtual­reality­and­
digital technologies in Italy were put into practice by many 
activists, artists and hackers in the social center scene and 
DIY­circuits­between­the­eighties­and­the­noughties,­giving­life­
to many independent collectives, groups and artistic projects 
nationwide. Technology was seen as a central element in the 
14 See the essays collected in, Antonio Caronia, Universi Quasi Paralleli. Dalla 
fantascienza alla guerriglia mediatica­(Rome,­Cut-Up­Editions,­2009).­See­also­
Antonio Caronia, “From Multiple Names to Wu Ming,” a four page feature 
from Pulp Libri­#29­[an­Italian­bi-monthly­review­of­books]­( January-February­
2001),­available­at:­http://www.wumingfoundation.com/english/giap/
Giapdigest4.htm;­Caronia­Antonio,­“Darko­Maver­Doesn’t­Exist.­Prank­of­Art,­
Art of Prank,” published in l ’Unità,­14­February­2000,­online­at:­http://www.
nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0003/msg00076.html;­to­know­more­
about the Problemarket project, see: http://www.aksioma.org/problem-
arket;­for­a­reconstruction­of­the­Anna­Adamolo­project,­see:­Tatiana­
Bazzichelli,­Loretta­Borrelli,­and­Antonio­Caronia,­“Anna­Adamolo:­Practical­
Critique of Ideology,” Digimag­41­(February­2009),­online­at:­http://www.
digicult.it/digimag/issue-041/anna-adamolo-practical-critique-of-ideology,­
and the chapter “The Anna Adamolo Multiple singularity” in my book Net-
worked Disruption. Rethinking Oppositions in Art, Hacktivism and the Business 
of Social Networking­(Aarhus­University,­DARC­Press,­2013),­124–135­(available­
in­pdf­format:­http://disruptiv.biz/networked-disruption-the-book).­The­
complete collection of essays written by Antonio Caronia is available at: 
http://naba.academia.edu/antoniocaronia.
18 process­of­liberation,­from­the­use­of­Bulletin­Board­Systems­
(BBSes)­and­independent­servers­and­networks,­to­free­software­
and hacker projects. It becomes a tool of appropriation of infor-
mation capitalism, a means to bend its limits and expose its bugs. 
It­is­among­these­circuits­that­we­should­situate­the­reflections­
of Antonio Caronia—in the analysis of the collective power of 
networks, and the constructive potential of the general intellect. 
But­at­the­same­time,­the­obscure potential of technology to 
reproduce mechanisms of alienation and power structures is 
still present, once again adopting a double level of interpretation 
that is never absolutist or one-sided. The question of belief in the 
possible, and at the same time its destructuring, is still present 
in the last chapter, “From the Cyborg to the Posthuman,” where 
the metaphor of the posthuman is seen as a tool to once again 
criticize a deterministic and mono-dimensional conception of 
human nature. According to this point of view, openness to the 
possible­is­specifically­embedded­in­the­acceptation­of­its­rel-
ativeness, which can only be understood by assuming the plural 
and­fluid­perspective­of­the­hybrid—the­cyborg.


T H E  C Y B O R G 
A N T O N I O  C A R O N I A
To Maria 
to close the circle

Preface
If the life of a book were comparable to that of a human being 
(an­unutterable­anthropomorphic­temptation­that,­despite­being­
aware­of­its­inconsistency,­we­always­succumb­to),­this­book­
would have reached the age of majority some time ago. In fact, it 
made­its­first­appearance­in­1985­with­the­Theoria­edition,­which­
was­then­reprinted­in­1991.­Out­of­print­for­a­while,­it­was­repub-
lished­in­2001­with­the­ShaKe­edition,­its­original­text­partially­
rewritten­and­modified,­and­a­totally­new­second­part­added.­
For­this­third­edition­(for­the­same­publisher)­the­text­was­again­
rewritten but, bar the corrections of material errors and small 
adjustments,­it­is­the­same­as­the­2001­edition,­with­the­addition­
of a postscript that updates the discourse linking it to the Italian 
and the international debates on the so-called “posthuman.”
The author cannot deny a certain degree of satisfaction in 
seeing that this little book conceived twenty-four years ago has 
in some ways resisted the march of time, growing and showing 
itself capable, if not of providing answers, of at least helping 
and orienting the questions of readers interested in under-
standing some of the more controversial and central phenomena 
of today, like the hybridism of human beings and technology, 
tackling the relationship between human biology and culture in 
the imaginary and real life. It is said that once a book is written 
it leaves the tutelage of its author and becomes, not only a 
“citizen of the world,” but also the property of its readers, who 
use it and interpret it in ways the author might not even have 
dreamed­of.­But­some­books­(perhaps­many)­often­return­to­their­
author, and inspire him to reread, rethink, update and, at times, 
contradict them. If this should happen, as it did with the book 
you are now holding, it is not because it was ahead of its time, 
as some excessively kind readers have pointed out, but more 
simply because its subject matter, the man/machine hybrid, has 
gone­from­being­a­purely­fantastic­figure­to­being­an­everyday­
experience­in­little­more­than­thirty­years.­Back­in­the­fifties­
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more­routine,­but­it­was­a­relationship­between­different­and­
still clearly recognizable partners. However, since the eighties, 
technology,­as­Bruce­Sterling­rightly­puts­it,­has­begun­to­get­
under our skin. We witnessed the growth of a number of customs 
that saw technological gadgets go from being mere fellow trav-
elers to becoming an extension of ourselves. A large part of this 
process, as observed by Derrick de Kerckhove, was stressed by 
going­from­analogical­electricity­(extension­of­our­physical­body)­
to­digital­electricity­(extension­of­content­and­mental­processes).­
The cyborg, that for a good part of the nineteen hundreds 
was a limited analogy of our relationship with machines and 
technology, literally took shape towards the end of that same 
century. The phenomenon is perhaps more general: according to 
Arthur­C.­Clarke,­any­sufficiently­developed­technology­is­indis-
tinguishable from magic, thus every metaphor in the post-Fordist 
world­appears­destined­to­become­literal.­And­the­first­stage­of­
this literalness, much like in Kafka’s story, is our body. This is why 
the­figure­of­the­cyborg­could­lead­to­the­posthuman.
This term, as I will try to show through the course of this book, 
has been a source of countless misunderstandings. However, 
the posthuman debate at least has the merit of having brought 
the question of relations between continuity and discontinuity 
in the development of humans to the fore. To what processes 
does a term like “posthuman” allude? Today, has proximity, 
frequentation and hybridity with technology reached such a 
stage that Homo sapiens may now claim to have overcome his 
dependence on biology? Does the posthuman era also mean a 
post-biological era? Put in these terms, it is clear that the ques-
tions may only be met with a negative answer. As observed by 
many, starting with Denis Diderot back in the eighteenth century, 
the­contrast­between­“natural”­and­“artificial”­is­not­compatible­
with the characterization of the species, considering that man’s 
technical and manipulative activities, on a par with his linguistic 
and symbolic ones, are no more than the developments of our 
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is said and done, culture is our biology and Robert Marchesini 
rightfully reminds us that for some years now the trend in 
hybridity is not simply a characteristic of twentieth and twenty-
first­century­humanity:­what­is­happening­today­apropos­of­
our relations with physical and virtual machines has always 
taken­place­throughout­the­process­of­hominization,­in­the­field­
of­relations­with­other­animal­species.­In­the­final­analysis,­it­
depends on our marked leanings towards caring for the young. In 
this sense, the extremist and post-speciesist interpretation that 
the various “trans-humanist” movements give of the posthuman 
prospect is unfounded and possibly even risky.
But­once­the­fundamental­continuity­of­Homo sapiens’ technical 
approach­has­been­established,­it­is­very­difficult­not­to­see­an­
increase in quality, a radical lack of continuity in the process of 
reproduction and production of life on this planet. Therefore 
the cyborg—if we don’t just mean in the original and limited 
description of a “natural” body to which mechanical, electrical 
or chemical components are added, but in the broader sense 
of­a­being­whose­“original”­biology­is­modified­by­any­process­
that­is­finalized­and­controlled­externally­(for­example,­through­
genetic­modification)—presents­itself­as­characteristic­of­a­
phase in which the organism’s spontaneous functions no longer 
act as a natural barrier to the interventions of hybridity and 
of­modification.­These­no­longer­occur­“downstream”­of­the­
basic­biological­devices­(as­in­the­case­of­traditional­animal­and­
vegetable biotechnologies, with their means of selection and 
hybridism, and the creation of new species and varieties not exis-
tent­in­nature),­but­“upstream”­of­those­devices:­man­can­now­
modify­them­(more­or­less)­immediately­and­permanently,­and­“in­
real time” somehow, giving rise to an unprecedented control over 
and restraint of biological processes. Does this mean that the 
posthuman will allow us to leave the Homo sapiens environment, 
that­biotechnologies­will­configure­the­birth­of­a­new­species­
(Homo technologicus or simbionte, names proposed by Giuseppe 
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combination of biological and cultural evolutions? If this question 
makes­sense,­then­the­answer­to­it­is­firstly­that­Homo sapiens has 
always been Homo technologicus, that the direction of the “techni-
calization” process of human life has not changed in the last forty 
years­with­respect­to­100,000,­500,000­or­a­million­years­ago,­and­
that what we are witnessing is no more than an extraordinary 
acceleration­and­extension­of­that­same­process;­and­thus­there­
is no hurry to announce the birth of a “new species.” If there is 
something we can call “human nature,” it is nothing more than an 
extraordinary­behavioral­predisposition­to­plasticity,­flexibility­
and to diversity, as shown by the vast variety of languages and 
cultures­created­by­human­beings­since­they­first­appeared­on­
this planet: we are beings of possibility, in perennial and dogged 
combat against necessity. The new phase of hybridism with 
technology does not represent a deviation from the premises, 
does­not­have­us­exit­the­birthplace­of­the­species.­But­at­the­
same time we cannot deny that the unusual extent of man’s inter-
vention­in­the­planet’s­biological­(and­geological)­evolution­will­
not raise questions concerning the long-term consequences of 
our cultural conduct. This is indeed an absolute novelty: human 
beings have never shown the potential to modify “natural” 
processes­in­such­a­broad,­widespread­and­profound­way.­But­
this is not enough for a univocal and determined response to 
the question that we posed ourselves. Quite simply, despite the 
hybridization and convergence of the two spheres, the spatial 
and temporal scale of the biological processes clearly remains 
more ample and penetrating, and incomparably more wide-
spread than the scale of cultural processes: and thus at this stage 
of the process we are not capable of guessing all the possible con-
sequences of the latter, and perhaps neither the direction.
And so we come to the problem of judging the values, of ques-
tioning ourselves on the desirability or less of such a process. In 
this­field,­as­in­many­others—but­here­perhaps­more­acutely—
the view of the sociologist or contemporary historian cannot be 
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most complete and accurate picture of what happens, putting 
in parenthesis every judgment on the goodness, legitimacy and 
desirability of these processes. This is not possible because 
inevitably the same choice of the conceptual instruments of 
analysis, of pertinent criteria, of subject matter, refer to inevitable 
preconceptions, to basic directions that condition, whether we 
like it or not, even the most aseptic description of a process. 
Donna Haraway reminds us that all knowledge is situated: there 
is never any talk from a neutral and abstract place, but rather 
from­a­historically­determined­position,­filled­with­expectations,­
prospects and desires. I hope this book’s standpoint is clear 
right from the start. However, I consider it helpful and honest to 
open with at least a basic methodological orientation. Without 
understanding this, it will instead be easy to accuse the book’s 
discourses of technological determinism, or of being an apology 
for the status quo. The author does not ignore, and says so 
explicitly on more than one occasion, that today hybridization 
with technology is one of the privileged ways through which very 
a great and compulsory process of subjection of human life to 
the dispositive of global economy is realized. Today’s cyborg is 
post-Fordist, in the sense that its merging with technology, its 
love­of­technology,­and­the­increase­and­intensification­of­the­
relational and cognitive opportunities that digital technologies 
allow—all of which add up to being the instrument through which 
a fragmented labor force, physically divided and dissipated but 
connected and brought into discussion at a virtual level—is 
forced into a gigantic process of capitalistic growth that sees no 
difference­between­work­and­leisure,­between­the­office­and­the­
playground, and between times for public life and private life. 
Whether we like it or not, we all work twenty-four hours a day for 
the global economy that takes full advantage of the possibilities 
offered­by­technology­to­keep­us­in­an­unstable,­precarious,­
underpaid and subordinate position. This is the contemporary 
form of slavery. This new intellectual and cognitive proletariat—
the hacker class, as termed by McKenzie Wark—has every interest 
28 in overturning the logic of this process, in using the relationship 
with­machines­to­set­it­free,­and­not­to­confirm­its­inferiority.
Now, all this unleashes a series of problems relative to social 
dynamics, to a rethinking of the imaginary, to the opening of 
channels of experience and experimentation, of proposals and 
the­spread­of­conflicts.­It­is­not­this­book’s­job­to­elaborate­on­
the­subject.­But­what­I­believe­we­should­exclude­is­the­illusion­
that the best way to oppose this state of things is to entrench 
ourselves in nostalgia for the past and to demand the return 
to situations that have already passed us by. This is instead a 
temptation often indulged in by a section of radical thought, 
especially some wishing to represent the continuity, albeit with 
the­necessary­updates,­of­Marxist­tradition.­But­didn’t­Marx­
teach us that the circumstances of upheaval and continuous 
innovation created by capitalism were the most advantageous 
for the revolutionary process? Didn’t he encourage us to take 
advantage of every opportunity that the “development of the 
productive­forces”­offers­regarding­the­theoretical­and­practical­
criticism­of­productive­relations?­(I­deliberately­use­a­classical­
dictionary that is probably in need of updating, if only to high-
light­how­distant­today’s­imitators­are­from­their­maestro).­The­
theoretical backwardness and practical impotence of the Left and 
Center Left political parties and trades unions in Europe vis-à-vis 
the gigantic reconstruction of global capitalism and the breaking 
up and weakening of the working classes is there for all to see. 
But­it­won’t­be­the­very­weak­demand­for­a­return­to­the­classic­
welfare­state­that­will­resist­the­devastating­effects­brought­
on by the process of the labor market becoming precarious. It 
won’t be a call for a “return to politics” that will put an end to the 
dictatorship of the post-Fordist economy over the life of men and 
women of the world. And it won’t be the nostalgia for a fading 
“humanism” that will exorcize the advance of a posthuman con-
dition that instead begs to be lived, analyzed and understood all 
the way in order to be criticized, not in its inescapable aspects, 
29but for the tragic and frightening consequences caused by the 
conduct of those with both economic and political powers.

P A R T  O N E
T H E  D A W N  O F  T H E 
M O D E R N  H Y B R I D

Introduction
The twentieth century was unusually rich in extraordinary and 
monstrous­figures,­as­were­the­centuries­bridging­the­Medieval­
and Modern Ages. Some of those forms returned, while other 
completely­new­ones­were­created­in­the­great­science­fiction­
stories on paper and the silver screen. The attitude towards these 
beings might no longer be the same as it was during the Medieval 
Ages, but it still incarnates a sense of fear that, not totally free of 
concerns over ecological catastrophes and nuclear holocausts, is 
a more than plausible hypothesis. Palingenetic dreams resurface, 
and “rebellions against the modern world” with the scornful 
confidence­of­those­who­love­to­inhabit­ruins­(and­who­in­some­
cases­also­love­to­create­them).­But­that­history­is­a­circle,­des-
tined to return to the point of departure, is just a rough and bad 
interpretation of the “eternal return” hypothesis. These fears and 
anxieties,­just­like­anything­else­that­justifies­a­certain­similarity­
between the Late Modern Age and Late Middle Ages, according 
to an analogy that has circulated for quite some time in western 
culture and of which Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose was 
the­most­illustrious­example,­are­the­legitimate­offspring­of­our­
status, of the change of era that we are living: a transformation 
of the basics and the ways of an associated life so radical that it 
has been called an “anthropological mutation” more than once. 
Naturally, this mutation is not provoked by a technology con-
sidered­to­be­an­autonomous­agent:­from­different­but­con-
verging points of view, this is the belief of admirers of all things 
wonderful and the overly harsh critics of the computer rev-
olution. Technology is the child of human activity, and as such is 
not the cause, but the obvious symptom, intermediary element 
and symbol of the transformation that enfolds us. This does not 
detract from the fact that when the change is magmatic, over-
powering and pervasive, man struggles to recognize his own 
impact on what is happening around him, preferring to attribute 
the reasons for the mess surrounding him to autonomous 
figures­who­ominously­rise­up­against­him.­This­is­why­our­era­
34 is populated with monsters, as was the autumn of the medieval 
era that saw in molecular construction a change as intense and 
devastating as the one we are living today.
However, being situated at the crossroads of two not com-
pletely separate, but relatively autonomous traditions, the con-
temporary monster is genetically more complex than its medieval 
counterpart. Naturally, like its predecessor from the classic and 
medieval world, it is a “wonder,” something to be seen, to be 
made­known­(the­root­of­the­Latin­monstrum, “monster,” is the 
same as the Latin words monstrare, “to show,” and, apparently, 
monstrare, “to caution, to counsel” as well as “to warn against,” 
but­also­“to­exhort,­to­chastise”).­In­the­classical­world,­as­in­
the medieval world, the monster is a natural creature, whose 
existence occasionally serves to demonstrate nature’s unlimited 
flair­for­change,­to­restore­it­to­a­primordial­state­of­indifference­
between­man­and­his­environment,­to­mean­(as­in­Saint­Augus-
tine)­a­complex­and­incomprehensible­order­willed­by­the­creator,­
with its embedded aesthetic valence. However, being natural, 
this monster plays on a few constitutive parameters: be it man 
or animal—and the dividing line is never that clear-cut—it is 
either the result of the restriction or the hypertrophy of certain 
organs,­of­certain­sections­of­natural­bodies,­or­(as­is­mostly­
frequently­and­strikingly­the­case)­it­is­a­hybrid,­an­unknown­con-
tamination of the most familiar bodies in nature. This character-
istic of the classical and medieval hybrid guarantees it will be an 
object­of­“scientific”­inquiry­in­the­period­of­transition­between­
the Medieval Ages and today, as in the repertories of Ulisse 
Aldrovandi­and­Ambroise­Paré.­But­in­the­fifteenth­and­sixteenth­
centuries­the­figure­of­the­hybrid­had­already­transferred­part­of­
its physiognomy to a newer character, one born out of traditions 
of thought and the “marginal” cultures of medieval Europe, and 
from certain alchemic and Talmudic currents: the artificial man.
Homunculus or golem,­the­artificial­man­of­the­Renaissance,­
testifies­to­the­proud­project­of­repeating­the­divine­creation,­
and­the­creature’s­inevitable­rebellion­against­the­creator.­But­
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in­the­process­of­“nature’s­artificialization”­that­accompanies­
industrial society’s entire development and the revision of the 
collective imaginary to which it is connected. Combined with 
the extraordinary and magical precision of a new craftsman-
ship that cut its teeth in the new art of watch-making and the 
manufacture of mechanical looms for the textile industry, the 
idea­of­the­artificial­man­materialized­in­the­haughty­and­serene­
eighteenth-century automatons of the likes of Vaucanson and 
Jacquet-Droz.­For­a­couple­of­centuries­the­simplification­of­
Newtonianism entrusted the “machine” concept with a contra-
dictory anthropological paradigmatic role, thinking itself capable 
of taking that decisive and resolute step forward in the study of 
man. In little more than a century, from Mary Shelley to Karel 
Čapek,­the­artificial­creature’s­inevitable­rebellion­was­con-
solidated­in­literature.­In­the­thirties,­science­fiction­inherited­
the­“creature”­and­popularized­it,­first­in­comics­and­then­on­the­
silver­screen.­A­race­of­new­monsters­was­finally­amongst­us,­and­
it was time for the next invasion.
If the Frankenstein monster and the R.U.R. robots caused 
amazement and anxiety in their “overly human” feelings, and 
aspirations­in­the­artificial­bodies­of­double­creatures,­but­
were nonetheless distinct in respect to man, today’s even more 
enigmatic problem is understanding and classifying a creature 
whose human body and machine body are irreversibly entwined. 
Cyborg, a tough but expressive name, is the anacronym of 
cybernetic organism.­“A­fictional­or­hypothetical­human­being,”­
as­defined­in­the­seventies­in­Webster’s­Dictionary,­“modified­
in order to adapt to life in non-terrestrial environments via the 
substitution­of­artificial­organs­and­other­parts­of­the­body.”­It­is­
a­somewhat­simplified­definition,­touching­on­only­a­part­of­the­
cyborgs­that­Brian­Stableford­(in­Clute­and­Nicholls’­Encyclopedia 
of Science Fiction)­classified­as­“adaptive­cyborgs”­and­“functional­
cyborgs.” The third category, “medical cyborgs,”, is not only 
the­most­widespread­in­literary­and­film­science­fiction­(as­in­
36 the seventies TV series The Six Million Dollar Man and The Bionic 
Woman),­it­also­includes­human­beings­who­have­gone­beyond­
the­“hypothetical”­condition­to­live­amongst­us,­not­only­in­flesh­
and­blood,­but­in­flesh,­bone,­metal,­plastic­and­power­circuits,­
with­their­pacemakers­made­of­artificial­veins­and­arteries­(and­
now­hearts­too).­In­any­case,­together­with­whatever­problems­
relate­to­the­precise­definition­of­this­new­being,­the­hybrid­is­
back. However, just like its classic and medieval ancestor, the 
disparate, inaccessible elements that constitute it are no longer 
taken from the alphabet of forms that nature puts at the disposal 
of our imagination. This time the hybrid appears even more sac-
rilegious,­because­it­complicates­(folds­together)­in­a­single­being­
the creator and his creature, the body par excellence, that which 
by the very nature of the body should be more distant. Man and 
machine fused into a single organism. Is this the triumph or the 
definitive­defeat­of­the­radical­materialism­of­the­“man-machine?”
[ 1 ]
Cosmographies
The­cyborg­figure­appears­quite­early­on­in­American­science­
fiction,­in­the­twenties,­and­is­more­or­less­a­contemporary­of­
the­robot­and­the­android­that­science­fiction­had­taken­from­
far older traditions and contexts. In those years, the term still 
had­not­been­coined­(that­would­be­not­until­1960,­and­not­by­a­
writer­of­science­fiction,­but­by­two­doctors­of­the­Rockland­State­
Hospital­in­New­York,­Manfred­Clynes­and­Nathan­Kline,­while­
finalizing­their­work­on­astronautics),­but­there­can­be­no­doubts­
as­to­the­nature­of­the­new­beings.­The­man­of­8,000­BC,­with­a­
clockwork mechanism in his head, with which he travels through 
time­and­unknown­dimensions­(The Clockwork Man, by Edwin V. 
Odle,­1923);­the­immortal­brains­wrapped­in­metallic­casings­that­
plan to bounce Earth from its orbit to theirs in order to conquer it 
(The Comet Doom,­by­Edmond­Hamilton,­1928);­Professor­Jameson,­
who survives the destruction of the human race thanks to the 
encasing of his brain, and then wanders the worlds of the twenty-
fifth­century­(The Jameson Satellite,­by­Neil­R.­Jones,­1931,­the­first­
in­a­long­and­successful­series):­these­are­the­first­man-machine­
hybrids­of­science­fiction­pulp.
38 As one can see, the origins of the cyborg are connected to travel 
through both space and time. In the above books, the cyborg is 
the element of a clearly immeasurable and perhaps even men-
acing cosmography, but in some way still orderly. As in medieval 
times, the monster still inhabits “another world”. However, 
that which in medieval cosmology was the other hemisphere, 
the kingdom of Satan, the desert, or every other place distant 
and unknown, has now journeyed into sidereal space in an 
extreme attempt to save the order of the cosmos by extending 
its­frontiers.­There­is­more:­this­first­alien­cyborg­repeats­the­
close relationship between places and monsters typical of the 
relationships between travel and medieval bestiary, and syn-
thetically­expressed­by­Roger­Bacon,­“The­place­in­which­they­are­
born is the principle that presides over the generation of things.” 
At the time, travelers did not marvel at encountering monsters 
(often­mere­evidence­of­their­presence)­in­the­places­they­passed­
through. The link between places and monsters was both of the 
aesthetic and moral type, and rested on the metaphorical consid-
eration that Earth was a living body: the base parts of the earthly 
body corresponded to vile and degraded beings. A comparable 
relationship seems to link the comet to its inhabitants in 
Hamilton’s novel which, because of its simplicity, can be consid-
ered indicative of this early narrative on cyborgs. The hybrids 
of The Comet Doom populate the solid nucleus of a comet, far 
from the tail’s poisonous gases. They were once “normal” beings, 
their science superior to that of humans: cybernetics came later, 
to compensate for the shortage of food in their world. Another 
shortage­(this­time­of­radioactive­materials­necessary­to­run­their­
machines)­triggers­the­evil­plan­to­capture­Earth­(that­was­rich­
in­them):­annulling­the­sun’s­gravitational­pull­at­the­moment­
in which the comet passes closest to our planet thus launching 
Earth into space to penetrate the comet, whose gases would 
completely wipe out humanity and supply the aliens with space 
and boundless energy. The correlation between the evil of these 
beings­(motivated­by­environmental­needs)­and­the­noxious-
ness of their habitat is quite evident: there is no need after all 
39to expound on the characteristics of this deadly omen that the 
comet has shared with us since antiquity. At least in its intentions, 
this cyborg is alien and opposed to man. “They weren’t men, they 
weren’t of human form”, the author declares peremptorily, only 
to contradict himself on the next page when talking of a nervous 
system,­brain­and­blood­circulation;­after­all,­incongruences­of­
this­type­abound­in­the­“heroic”­science­fiction­stories­of­those­
years: it is true that it will be possible for a man, a traitor, to 
undergo the same operations as the aliens, becoming one of 
them­in­every­way,­without­the­slightest­difficulty.­The­strange-
ness­is­highlighted­by­the­exquisitely­“robotic”­look­of­the­artificial­
body­(towards­the­end­of­the­sixties,­we­will­find­illustrations­of­
robots that would appear to take on this type of appearance to 
the­letter):
Imagine a man with a body of shiny, black metal instead of 
flesh:­a­large­metal­cylinder­that,­in­place­of­legs,­has­four­
metallic limbs much like those of a spider, and in place of 
arms four metallic tentacles, like those of an octopus. This 
was the being: it wasn’t much taller than the average man. 
Instead of a head on its cylindrical body there was a cube, a 
metal box that could turn in any direction. There was a disc 
of soft white light on each of the cube’s four faces.1
Whether evil aliens or clockwork men of the future, merci-
less conquerors or good-natured, cybernetic professors 
wandering amongst the stars, these “sidereal” cyborgs no 
longer share the same vision of the world nor the cognitive 
strategies of the medieval monster. The latter, in the moment 
in which it broke the natural “order” of things, revealed it in 
negative;­the­moment­in­which­it­presented­itself­before­man­
as an indecipherable enigma, it provided an answer at the 
same time, at least Saint Augustine’s answer on the mys-
teriousness of God’s designs, “in knowing where and when to 
create what is or what was necessary”.
1 Edmond Hamilton, The Comet Doom­(1928).
40 Our cyborgs, at least for the moment, do not appear to prompt 
such radical questions, nor make a relevant contribution to a new 
design for the universe, except for the obvious fact that it has 
grown beyond measure. While the cosmic spaces are the new 
austral­hemisphere,­it­will­be­relatively­“reasonable”­to­find­new­
generations of monopods, mandrakes and cannibals, this time in 
the­form­of­aliens­resembling­octopuses,­spiders­and­insects­(the­
famous­BEM,­bug-eyed-monsters).­The­cyborgs­of­the­twenties­
are nothing other than a more “technologized” variation of these 
aliens.
But­things­soon­begin­to­get­complicated.­The­spread­of­the­
eighteenth-century mechanistic version of Newtonian physics 
was­the­final­blow­to­the­symbolic­valences­with­which­the­uni-
verse’s geometry in medieval vision was equipped, in which high 
and low, the known and unknown corresponded, as we have 
seen,­to­“moral”­qualities­and­thus­postulated­a­well-defined­
type of inhabitant. In the mechanistic vision, space is a container 
(to­the­more­naïve)­or­a­mental­function­(to­the­more­hardened,­
who­take­the­lesson­of­Kant­into­account),­but­homologous­and­
isotropic nonetheless: it no longer has direction or privileged 
dimensions. In principle, the monster would thus be free to 
live­wherever­it­likes,­making­nonsense­of­the­Baconian­axiom.­
And space, even if unknown, is in its essence wholly predictable 
and open to travel. This is where it becomes complicated. The 
theoretic practicability, even if only fantastic for the moment, 
of­this­new­homogenous­and­undifferentiated­space­reveals­
to modern sensibilities an aspect that in previous epochs was 
totally­inconceivable.­Because­it­is­potentially­accessible­from­
any direction and at any distance, space regains a frightening 
dimension­due­its­immensity.­And­science­fiction­makes­a­
very diligent appraisal of this. Once again, the crucial point is 
the­journey­and­its­exploration;­the­modality­is­a­merging­of­
imagination and science, not new in western culture.
The theory of relativity, put forward in the early years of the 
twentieth century, quickly became the dominant paradigm in 
41the­scientific­community,­accepted­also­by­writers­of­science­
fiction.­In­this­sector,­in­the­second­half­of­the­thirties,­a­new­
orientation began to assert itself, more preoccupied with the 
“plausibility”­of­the­fictional­construction­(also­from­a­point­of­
view­of­scientific­coherence)­than­the­space-opera of the previous 
decade. The theory of relativity, without questioning the space 
model­inherited­from­classic­physics,­but­by­simply­refining­it­
and making it more complex, nevertheless introduces a limit that 
turns out to be of particular importance. Its equations in fact 
imply that no body can be animated by a speed faster than light 
(equivalent­to­roughly­300,000­kilometers­per­second).­So­how­
can one imagine interstellar travel lasting hundreds, thousands, 
millions of light years? Amongst the various solutions thought 
up­by­science-fiction­writers,­one­quickly­stands­out­“thanks­to­
its great abstraction and formal elegance”:2  “hyperspace” was 
first­articulated­in­science­fiction­in­The Mightiest Machine­(1934)­
by John W. Campbell, who was editor of the Astounding Science 
Fiction magazine and the principal exponent of the new science 
fiction­trend.­The­hypothesis­of­hyperspace­travel­had­already­
been­explored­in­several­English­“scientific­tales”­of­the­previous­
century­(Flatland­by­Edwin­A:­Abbot;­A Plane World by Charles H. 
Hinton;­Giovannoli­also­found­traces­of­the­same­in­the­works­
of­H.G.­Wells):­our­three-dimensional­space­is­immersed­in­a­
“vaster”­space­with­a­major­number­of­dimensions­(at­least­four),­
exactly like the two-dimensional surfaces that we know make up 
part of three-dimensional space.
Just­as­two­distance­points­on­a­surface­(a­sheet­of­paper,­for­
example)­can­be­brought­into­contact­simply­by­folding­the­
space between them, one can imagine doing the same with two 
distance points in space, by “folding” the three-dimensional 
space that contains them. A spaceship may pass instantaneously 
from one point to another by applying a hypothetical curving 
2­ Renato­Giovannoli,­La Scienza della Fantascienza [The Science of Science 
Fiction]­(Milan:­Bompiani,­1991),­175­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
42 technique, a three-dimensional space torsion within the pluri-
dimensional space, or hyperspace, that contains it.
Born­from­a­need­to­render­interstellar­travel­less­“fantastic”,­
soon enough hyperspace  became the focus of many of the fears 
associated with its immensity. Too inaccessible to be a daily 
experience, the leap into hyperspace is a leap into the unknown 
with all its dangers and fears. The collective imaginary takes its 
revenge­on­“scientific”­plausibility.­Any­man­exposed­to­space­
travel will be changed by the experience: the simple sight of new 
constellations silhouetted against the backdrop of black space, 
crude­light­no­longer­refined­by­the­atmosphere’s­refraction,­and­
the frightening contact with a deep space monstrously distorted 
by being plunged into new dimensions generate demoniac and 
seductive visions, new illusory realities in which man’s body takes 
on totally unknown forms and functions. If for the characters 
of Star Wars the leap into hyperspace is a naturally fantastic 
experience, but innocuous nevertheless, one cannot forget the 
phantasmagorical and scary geometry that suddenly appears 
before­David­Bowman­in­his­voyage­beyond­Jupiter­at­the­end­of­
2001: A Space Odyssey, until his more radical mutation.
There, in some corner of eternal space, an atrocious death 
awaited, death and horror that man had never encountered 
before embarking upon interstellar travel […]: the impact 
of a psychic, ferocious and devastating blow dealt the living 
occupants of the spaceship.3
This is how the mysterious entities awaiting the intergalactic 
travelers­in­a­1955­story­titled­The Game of Rat and Dragon by 
Cordwainer Smith were described: beings who the telepathists 
on board the spaceship “liken to the dragons of popular terres-
trial antique traditions, beasts more astute than the beasts, 
devils more tangible than the devils, maelstroms hungry for life 
and hate made up of unknown means from tenuous and subtle 
3­ Cordwainer­Smith,­The Game of Rat and Dragon­(1955).
43materials from interstellar space.” Once again, the monster has 
its­own­space,­an­environment­well­suited­to­it.­But­the­monster’s­
turf­no­longer­defines,­as­it­did­in­tales­of­medieval­travel,­an­
ordered­cosmography;­no­longer­constitutes,­to­put­it­in­Franco­
Cardini’s­words,­the­“confirmation­of­the­creation’s­divine­order.”4 
If all of space is the same, neutral and homogenous, the monster 
will­be­able­to­flourish­anywhere:­it­is­the­cosmography­of­a­new­
chaos, a map of confused and uninterpretable signs, a jumble of 
soothing follies under the tenuous and calm veneer of predict-
ability, ready to leap out and attack the minds of men.
Also because absent in the reports of these future voyages, so 
extraordinary and so full of today, is a certainty that was present 
in­medieval­travel:­the­presence­of­man­as­a­fixed­point,­an­
element­of­comparison,­a­unit­of­measurement­(even­in­his­mis-
fortunes­and­limitations)­posited­by­God­to­distinguish­between­
normal and abnormal, order and disorder. Man constantly risks 
being excluded from interstellar travel. Nothing like the vastness 
of­space­reveals­his­weakness­and­fragility­(caused­by­the­dis-
appearance of God’s hand that until now had supported him 
in­his­more­hazardous­endeavors).­In­the­reports­of­voyages­to­
the new southern hemispheres, “space-sickness” is one of the 
more frequent complaints: intolerable acceleration, solitude, 
visions and hallucinations, the impossibility to communicate. 
Imponderability and discomfort caused by the marked lack of 
room­for­the­first­and­now­familiar­astronauts­of­the­Apollo­and­
Soyuz­spacecraft­are­no­more­than­the­first­intolerable­steps­of­
this mysterious but already operative syndrome. In reality as in 
fantasy,­the­relationship­with­the­machine­(the­computer­and­
its­extraordinary­ability­to­calculate­and­control­processes)­is­
the obligatory route that man must take to explore space. The 
man-machine hybrid, the cyborg, is thus a natural candidate for 
this new endeavor. Monstrosity, alienness, insinuates itself into 
4 Franco Cardini, introduction to Clauce Kappler, Demoni Mostri e Meraviglie 
alla Fine del Medievo [Demons, Monsters and Wonders at the End of the 
Medieval­Age]­(Florence:­Sansoni,­1983),­8­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
44 that same being that, with its testimony and its presence, should 
guarantee the voyage objectivity and purpose. Chaos is no longer 
restricted to man’s exterior, but to his interior as well. The race 
of devils, of whose coming Frankenstein feared, established itself 
permanently in his house. If until the thirties the cyborg was still 
basically an alien, almost exclusively of the “brain-in-a-metal-box” 
type,­hostile­to­man­and­hell-bent­on­invading­Earth­(as­in­the­
above­mentioned­stories,­or­in­the­1932­The Time Conqueror by 
Lloyd­Arthur­Eshbach;­the­only­exception­being­the­Zoromes­who­
“cyborged”­Professor­Jameson­in­the­series­by­Neil­R.­Jones),­it­
now begins more frequently to be a mutated man, in many cases 
to render him more adapted to space exploration.
This­type­of­cyborg­is­somehow­codified­in­the­fifties­by­
Cordwainer­Smith­(a­writer­of­whom­little­is­said­today,­despite­
the­considerable­influence­he­had­on­numerous­writers­
throughout­the­ensuing­decades),­both­in­its­“weak”­form,­as­a­
man who has basically maintained his nature while developing a 
particular­relationship­with­the­machine­(The Burning of The Brain, 
1958;­Golden The Ship Was – Oh! Oh! Oh!, 1959, then resumed by 
Samuel R. Delaney in Nova,­1968;­The Lady Who Sailed The Soul, 
1960),­and­in­its­“strong”­form,­as­a­being­so­mutated­it­has­com-
pletely­or­partially­lost­all­trace­of­humanity­(Scanners Live In Vain, 
1950).­It­is­in­this­second­version­that­the­“spatial”­cyborg­returns­
in­a­series­of­short­stories­and­novels­by­Thomas­N.­Scortia­(Sea 
Change,­1956),­Anne­McCaffrey­(The Ship Who Sang,­1961),­Arthur­
C.­Clarke­(A Meeting With Medusa,­1971),­Frederik­Pohl­(Man Plus, 
1976),­and­Barrington­J.­Bayley­(The Garments of Caean,­1976).
[ 2 ]
Morphologies
The­first­and­most­simple­cyborg­is­also­the­most­radical:­a­brain­
in­a­metal­box.­Nothing­survived­of­the­man’s­body­(or­of­the­
alien’s)­except­his­most­“noble”­organ­that­guarantees­its­cerebral­
functions. Everything else is a replica, nearly always grotesque, 
as has been seen, of the human form or its variant, that of the 
anthropomorphic robot. The most famous and most evil of these 
“boxed” brains is the one described by Curt Siodmak in Donovan’s 
Brain­(1943),­which­was­also­made­into­a­film.
Even­Catherine­L.­Moore,­who­in­1944­wrote­a­powerfully­
innovative­story­on­the­cyborg­(No Woman Born)­in­which­she­
did­away­with­the­stereotype­of­evil­and­for­the­first­time­tried­
to think of the new hybrid’s psychology, resorted to the brain-
in-the-box model: this time the box is not a square built and 
ungainly­robotic­body,­but­a­highly­refined­reconstruction­of­a­
female­body­(the­brain­belongs­to­Deirdre,­a­famous­singer­and­
dancer­who,­only­in­this­way,­could­be­saved­from­a­fire).­There­
is­no­doubt­that­the­image­of­the­brain­closed­in­an­artificial­con-
tainer exercises a strange and perverse fascination on writers, 
and­not­only­those­of­science­fiction,­seeing­that­Jorge­Luis­Borges­
46 and­Adolfo­Bioy­Casares­gave­us­their­parodic­form­of­the­cyborg­
in Cronícas de Bustos Domecq. Cordwainer Smith introduces a 
bizarre variant of the brain-in-the-box, the laminated brain, 
a­kind­of­animal­cyborg,­in­which­the­brain­(of­a­mouse,­for­
example)­is­not­connected­to­any­machine,­but­serves­to­contain­
the entire personality of a human being that may then be used 
as a source of strange holographic projections. The laminated 
brain appears as a “a black plastic cube with shimmering silver 
contact-points­gleaming­on­its­sides,”­and­was­obtained­by­“stiff-
ening the brain with celluprime and then veneering it down with 
at least seven thousand layers of plastic of at least two molecular 
thickness.”5 
Naturally,­though­not­depicted­as­aprioristically­evil,­the­artificial­
body cannot fail to arouse a sense of irritating anxiety, despite 
the unnatural perfection conferred upon it by the artisan. The 
anxiety is far greater knowing that a human brain lives and works 
behind the metal. The amazed and bewildering description of the 
new Deirdre in No Woman Born expresses admiration, but also a 
sense of uneasiness.
She had only a smooth, delicately modelled ovoid for her 
head, with a sort of crescent-shaped mask across the frontal 
area where her eyes would have been if she had needed 
eyes. A narrow, curved quarter-moon, with the horns turned 
upward.­It­was­filled­in­with­something­translucent,­like­
cloudy crystal, and tinted the aquamarine of the eyes Deirdre 
used to have. […] She turned it a little, gracefully upon her 
neck of metal, and he saw that the artist who shaped it 
had given her the most delicate suggestion of cheekbones, 
narrowing in the blankness below the mask to the hint of a 
human face. […] As for her body, he could not see its shape. 
A­garment­hid­her.­But­they­had­made­no­incongruous­
attempt to give her back the clothing that once had made 
her famous. […] The designer had solved his paradox by 
5 Cordwainer Smith, Think Blue, Count Two­(1963).
47giving­her­a­robe­of­very­fine­metal­mesh.­It­hung­from­the­
gentle slope of her shoulders in straight, pliant folds like a 
longer­Grecian­chlamys,­flexible,­yet­with­weight­enough­of­
its own not to cling too revealingly to whatever metal shape 
lay beneath. The arms they had given her were left bare, and 
the feet and ankles. And Maltzer had performed his greatest 
miracle in the limbs of the new Deirdre. It was a mechanical 
miracle­basically,­but­the­eye­appreciated­first­that­he­had­
also showed supreme artistry and understanding. Her arms 
were pale shining gold, tapered smoothly, without modelling, 
and­flexible­their­whole­length­in­diminishing­metal­bracelets­
fitting­one­inside­the­other­clear­down­to­the­slim,­round­
wrists. The hands were more nearly human than any other 
feature­about­her,­though­they,­too,­were­fitted­together­in­
delicate, small sections that slid upon one another with the 
flexibility­almost­of­flesh.­[…]­She­looked,­indeed,­very­much­
like a creature in armor, with her delicately plated limbs and 
her featureless head like a helmet with a visor of glass, and 
her robe of chainmail.6
This is obviously a contest between the artisan and his model, 
resolved­with­sufficient­skill­by­the­former.­Beings­of­this­type,­
however, can only be made of unique parts, and the challenges 
they bring are just as unique, idiosyncratic. The moment they are 
“mass produced”, the boxed brain will inevitably resemble the 
robot­(this­was­the­observation­made­by­Asimov­in­comparison­
with­Neal­R.­Jones’­Zoromes).­The­“functional”­cyborg,­the­one­
conceived for space exploration, as well as its “repeatability,” 
requires a sort of cheapness: only the indispensable parts of the 
human­body­are­substituted­or­modified.­The­new­form­derived­
from it is no less intriguing. We see an example of this in The 
6 Catherine L. Moore, No Woman Born­(1944).­In­the­most­extraordinary­way,­
Deirdre’s­description­recalls­the­fantastic­beings­in­painter­Giovanni­Battista­
Bracelli ’s­etchings­(Bizarie di varie figure,­1624;­see­Paolo­Portoghesi, Infanzia 
delle machine­[Rome-Bari:­Laterza,­1981],­10–11).
48 Garments of Caean, an adventurous-philosophical novel by Eng-
lishman­Barrington­J.­Bayley:
She focused the screen on one specimen to examine it 
closely.­Like­its­brethren,­it­had­been­extensively­modified­
by­deep­surgery­and­the­incorporation­of­artificial­organs.­
Embedded in its skull was a turret-like device which she 
guessed was connected directly to the brain. The eyes were 
hidden by the black goggles which seemed to be riveted into 
the eye-sockets. The nose had been removed. [...] The chest 
had been replaced entirely by a metal box-like structure. 
Likewise­the­abdominal­wall­was­substituted­by­a­flexible­
corrugated shield, making it resemble the abdomen of some 
type­of­grub.­[…]­The­genitals­had­been­left­intact­and­floated­
flaccid­and­loose.­The­mixing­of­man­and­machine­continued.­
From limbs, backs and sides projected an assortment if 
devices­and­turrets.­[…]­The­modified­men­were­far­from­
being identical to one another. The machine-organs they 
incorporated varied from individual to individual, as though 
a division of function existed between them.7
Bayley’s­cyborgs­inhabit­interstellar­space,­living­there­without­
any form of protection, and are thus in need of particularly 
radical­modifications.­At­other­times,­the­demands­are­quite­
different:­living­inside­the­spaceships,­for­example­those­
described by Cordwainer and driven by the pressure of light, with 
enormous sails that extend for tens of thousands of kilometers. 
In­these­spaceships­(prior­to­the­discovery­of­hyperspace,­that­
which­this­author­called­“planoforming”)­voyages­last­dozens­
of years, which requires a considerable reduction in the pilots’ 
biological rhythms, allowing them to stay alive the entire 
duration­of­the­transport.­The­effect­is­obtained­through­a­series­
of surgical interventions on the pilot’s body, such as inserting 
valves­in­the­arteries,­artificial­colostomies­to­regulate­the­bodily­
7­ Barrington­J.­Bayley,­The Garments of Caean­(1976;­published­in­the­U.S.­in­
1978).
49fluids­with­the­insertion­of­catheters,­needles­connected­to­the­
brain­to­reduce­physiological­activities­in­the­desired­way­(The 
Lady Who Sailed The Soul).­The­forefathers,­so­to­speak,­of­the­
functional cyborgs can be found in another Cordwainer Smith 
story, Scanners Live In Vain, and are indeed the scanners. Here 
we are still at the start of the space era. Man has been to the 
Up-and-out, to outer space, but discovered that here nestled 
the­“first­effect”,­“the­great­space­sickness”,­that­induces­in­man­
a desperate need for death until he does actually die. To travel 
into space, man must therefore be transformed: all his sensory 
organs responsible for pain are disconnected from the brain, 
his­internal­organs­(like­the­heart­and­lungs)­no­longer­able­to­
send signals to the rest of the body. This “disconnected” man is 
supplied with a series of control tapes with which to regulate his 
vital signs by hand. He is permanently marked by the “radiating 
scars around the instruments, the stigmas of men who had gone 
to the up-and-out”. Smith indicates two categories of cyborg 
like these: the ordinary ones, called habermans, criminals or 
undesirables, who are sentenced to hard labor in space, forced 
to undergo surgery, and have no direct control over their own 
tapes;­whereas­the­scanners­(controllers­and­observers)­vol-
untarily­choose­mutilation­in­order­to­work­as­pilots­or­officers­
on the spaceships. Formally honored by the community and the 
government, but in reality barely tolerated for their looks and 
habits­(having­no­control­over­their­muscles,­they­walk­heavily,­
have “thunderous and deafening” voices, and their faces become 
“horrendous­misshapen­masks”),­the­scanners­have­formed­an­
exclusive corporation and harbor a secret hate for the other 
men. However, they may temporarily regain full control of their 
senses and enjoy a quasi normal life by subjecting themselves to 
brief periods of “cranching”, the use of a device that temporarily 
restores normal neural connectivity: hearing, smell, taste, muscle 
and voice control. Here is how they themselves describe their 
condition in a sort of catechism that makes up part of the rituals 
of their corporation, and that recalls the similar litanies of the 
men-beasts in The Island of Doctor Moreau by Wells: 
50 “And how, O Scanners, are the habermans made?”
“They are made with the cuts. The brain is cut from the heart, 
from the lungs. The brain is cut from the ears, the nose. The 
brain is cut from the mouth, the belly. The brain is cut from 
desire and pain. The brain is cut from the world. Save for the 
eyes.­Save­for­the­control­of­the­living­flesh.”
“And­how,­O­Scanners,­is­flesh­controlled?”
“By­the­boxes­set­in­the­flesh,­the­controls­set­in­the­chest,­
the signs made to rule the living body, the signs by which the 
body lives.”8
Cordwainer Smith doesn’t give very precise information on 
the techniques of the construction of his scanners. And it is 
perhaps this vagueness that renders them all the more fas-
cinating. However, twenty-six years later, in Man Plus, Frederik 
Pohl would expand quite faithfully on the space cyborg studies of 
Clynes, Kline, Del Duca and other NASA scientists to paint a more 
“realistic” picture:
The­eyes­were­glowing,­red-faceted­globes.­His­nostrils­flared­
in­flesh­folds,­like­the­snout­of­a­star-nosed­mole.­His­skin­
was­artificial;­its­color­was­normal­heavy­sun­tan,­but­its­
texture was that of a rhinoceros’s hide. Nothing that could 
be seen about him was of the appearance he had been born 
with. Eyes, ears, lungs, nose, mouth, circulatory system, 
perceptual centers, heart, skin—all had been replaced or 
augmented. The changes that were visible were only the 
iceberg’s tip. What had been done inside him was far more 
complex and far more important. He had been rebuilt 
for­the­single­purpose­of­fitting­him­to­stay­alive,­without­
external­artificial­aids,­on­the­surface­of­the­planet­Mars­[…].­
Pulse, temperature and skin resistance sensor pads clung 
to his shoulders and head. Probes reached under the tough 
8 Cordwainer Smith, Scanners Live in Vain (1950).
51artificial­skin­to­measure­his­internal­flows­and­resistance.­
Transmitter antennae fanned out like a peasant’s broom 
from his backpack. Everything that was going on in his 
system was being continually measured, encoded and trans-
mitted­to­the­100-meter-per-second­broad-band­recording­
tapes.9
And in the following chapters Pohl does not miss the oppor-
tunity to furnish us with further details of the cyborg’s new 
sensory systems, its daily life, its new metabolism. Such an acute 
preoccupation with verisimilitude, albeit futuristic, such a precise 
insistence on the “point to point” correspondence between the 
natural­body­and­the­artificial­body,­return­the­hybrid­to­a­realist­
narrative­atmosphere,­albeit­within­the­science­fiction­genre,­in­
accordance with Pohl’s choices of the seventies. The emphasis, 
beyond the adventurous plot, is placed on the character’s interior 
conflicts­and­the­dramatic­dimensions­of­his­condition.­But­when­
the cyborg is introduced to illustrate a contentious, sarcastic or 
simply ironic debate on the hyper-technological trends of our 
world­and­their­inauspicious­consequences,­the­figure­of­the­
brain-in-the-box or one of its variants is once again the most 
exploited.­This­is­what­happens­in­David­R.­Bunch’s­bitter­and­
violent­(and­often­boring­and­monotonous)­Moderan­(1971),­a­
world­described­as­completely­artificial­and­covered­in­plastic,­
and ruled by “displaced” men. In a rare moment of self-irony, one 
of them describes himself:
[A]t my ease I do not look like a god. I must look more like 
a suit of old armor once would have looked if it had in the 
ancient days rolled in some thick-sliced bacon and then gone 
to­bed­on­a­bridge­truss.­Yes,­we­look­like­walking­steel­shells­
with­flesh­piping,­in­Moderan,­and­we­think­of­wars­and­good­
pounding. To live forever, to be our true bad selves—those 
are our twin destinations.10
9 Frederik Pohl, Man Plus­(1976).
10­ David­R.­Bunch,­Moderan­(1971).
52 And­even­when­Borges­and­Casares’­alter­ego,­Bustos­Domecq,­
has­to­satirize­the­longing­for­immortality­(Los Immortales, 1967),­
he encounters nothing but disturbing cubes:
The narrow space was round, white, low-ceilinged, with 
neon lighting and no window to combat the claustrophobia. 
It was inhabited by four characters or furniture. They were 
the­same­color­as­the­walls;­the­material,­wood;­the­form,­
cubic. Each cube had a smaller one on top of it, with a short 
grate above an aperture that looked something like a letter 
box. Taking a closer look at the grate, one was amazed to 
see a pair of eyes following one’s every move. At intervals, 
the apertures let loose with a chorus of sighs or indistinct 
little voices whose words were quite unintelligible. Their 
positioning was such that each cube found itself face to 
face­with­another,­while­flanked­by­another­two­to­create­a­
reunion of friends.11
Borges­and­Casares,­insisting­on­the­geometric­and­material­
form of their immortals, on the paralyzing and claustrophobic 
atmosphere­that­surrounds­them,­create­a­cyborg­figure­that­is­at­
the antipodes of the one imagined by Clarke in 2001 and devel-
oped­(for­too­many­pages)­in­the­sequel­2010: Odyssey Two, which 
describes an immaterial being wandering through space, trans-
ported by perverse, highly mobile and electromagnetic waves. 
“The­brain,”­says­gerontologist­Narbondo,­who­suggests­Bustos­
Domecq­turn­himself­into­the­new­being­definitively,­“irrigated­
day and night by a system of magnetic currents, is the last animal 
stronghold in which gears and cells still coexist. The rest is For-
mica,­steel,­plastic.­Breathing,­eating,­procreation,­movement,­
and even excretion are all obsolete stages. The immortal,” he con-
cludes, “is a property”.12
11­ Jorge­L.­Borges­and­Adolfo­B.­Casares,­“Los Immortales,” in Cronícas de Bustos 
Domecq­(1967)­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
12 Ibid.
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Bodies and Mechanisms
The­cyborg­is­the­final­frontier­(for­now)­of­man’s­confrontation­
with machines, one that has been present in Western culture 
for at least three hundred years, its roots going back even fur-
ther. The antithesis between man and machine comes from that 
between­“natural”­and­“artificial”,­but­does­not­identify­with­it­
entirely. In fact, machines are not only creations of man, they 
already­exist­in­nature.­In­the­modern­age,­the­first­to­formu-
late this observation and so draw on the possible consequences 
was René Descartes: in his mechanistic vision of the world, 
everything can be explained based on material and its movement 
in space. The universe is a gigantic machine, animals no more 
than robots. Contrasting this is man, the hub of a conscious 
activity that cannot be explained in corporeal and material terms, 
and therefore presupposes the existence of another principle, 
not­furnished­with­enhancement­but­with­thought­(Principia 
Philosophiœ,­1644).­Descartes,­however,­admitted­that­the­human­
body’s entire function is explainable in purely mechanical terms: 
therefore even man’s body is a machine, likewise an animal’s 
body. The establishment of this similarity between body and 
54 machine­(that­other­thinkers,­like­Hobbes­or­La­Mettrie,­will­
radicalize by denying the existence of a “deliberating substance” 
and­by­reinstating­the­notion­of­material­movement)­is­in­reality­
typical of modern science, and refers to a mutation of the “body” 
in the transition between antique and medieval societies, still 
influenced­by­the­remnants­of­“magical”­thought­and­modern­
society.
We­can­find­this­analogy­a­century­before­Descartes,­in­Andreas­
Vesalius’s­anatomic­charts­(De humani corporis fabrica,­1537–1543)­
that ushered in new medicine by releasing its foundations from 
the­confines­of­classical­texts,­as­was­the­custom,­and­initiating­
a new practice in empirical observations, penetrating the body 
through the dissection of cadavers. To liken the human body to 
a machine is the analogy from which one may imagine the body 
being made up of organs, observable and learnable, of which one 
may­describe­the­functions­and­base­a­scientific­discussion­on­the­
ensuing descriptions. The Age of Reason will develop this point of 
view rigorously and relentlessly: the automatons of Vaucanson, 
Jacques Droz, and Maillardet, with their extraordinary gears 
and precision mechanics that mimic certain movements of the 
human­body­in­such­a­refined­way,­depend­on­this­conception­in­
the­final­analysis.­These­creations­are­registered­within­a­line­of­
thought­defined­with­great­clarity­by­Diderot:­man,­in­his­every­
activity,­is­a­product­of­nature,­and­therefore­in­the­final­analysis­
his every creation is “natural”, even when he proudly conceives 
it­as­an­innovation­(Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature,­1753).­
One may never surpass nature, no matter the sophisticated and 
daring heights man’s ingenious work might reach, there is no 
significant­distinction­between­natural­and­artificial.­Naturalism­
and mechanism work well together in the illuminist seventeenth 
century, at least in France. Anthropology is a specialized branch 
of cosmology, and the machine may cause amazement or per-
plexity, but certainly not anxiety. The homologation between the 
body of man and the body of the machine temporarily concludes 
the process started two centuries earlier with Vesalius: a process 
55that aimed at maintaining a unitary picture of the world, even 
after the dissolution of classical and medieval cosmology and 
anthropology.
In the medieval vision, just as in that of classical antiquity, the 
body still conserved traces of its role as the fundamental social 
mediator that it had held in so-called primitive societies. In these, 
the­most­significant­elements­of­collective­life­(birth,­initiation,­
marriage,­sickness,­death)­were­accompanied­by­a­strong­social­
investment in the singular body, of which contemporary western 
societies retained little more than a blurred memory. Consumed 
within those events were processes of adaptation to the changes 
in the social codes concerning the collective, a veritable “creation 
of meaning”, since the latter was never, as for us, given once 
for­all,­but­was­meant­to­be­defined­time­and­again­in­relation­
to the continuous homeostatic adjustments of the balance 
between man and nature. Levi-Strauss,13 analyzing societies that 
don’t­write,­described­this­process­as­an­excess­of­significance,­
a “plethora of meaning” in so-called “pathological” thought, 
versus­a­reality­lacking­in­significance.­This,­something­that­José­
Gil­called­“fluctuating­signifier”,­must­be­temporarily­pinned­
down during the course of events that indicate the resolution of 
a­crisis,­and­it­is­precisely­this­fixation­that,­with­the­creation­of­
a new sense and new correspondences between man and the 
cosmos, signals resuming control of the situation. In general, 
the shaman is responsible for regaining control by identifying a 
material­object­as­the­support­of­the­fluctuating­signifier­whose­
free and uncontrolled character threatened social equilibrium. If 
sometimes, for example during the potlatch, the support came 
in the shape of objects or artefacts exchanged or donated, more 
often than not it is found in the human body. 
In these societies, on getting better, the body of a sick person, 
for example, always reveals a piece of extraneous matter or 
13 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology­(New­York:­Basic­Books,­1963),­
181.­
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of the sickness, the proof of the sickness and its eventual cure: 
a practice that has survived on the fringes of contemporary 
society to this day. In a culture of this type the body comes 
across­as­a­network­of­signs,­not­always­transparent­but­effective­
nonetheless,­sometimes­as­an­indifferent­support­to­the­symbolic­
processes,­taken­from­the­usual­processes­of­significance­
and open to being bombarded by all sorts of languages. 
Scarcely involved in the processes that psychology would call 
identification­or­the­construction­of­“self,”­here­it­is­directly­impli-
cated in the holy dimension, and together guarantees a primitive 
and immediate unity between man and nature. This is why, in the 
shamanic experience, the human corporeal form can easily trans-
form into that of an animal.
Establishing­the­body­as­an­object­of­scientific­investigation,­
which we have conventionally gleaned from Vesalius’s new 
anatomy, is possible only by overcoming the magical solidarity 
that the body enjoys with its environment, and the “natural 
history” it helped to write. Sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
materialism, in its naturalistic meaning, looks very much like an 
attempt to recreate, on neither magical nor holy grounds, the 
solidarity between body and nature, bravely incorporating every 
human activity. So on one side, with La Mettrie, d’Holbach and, 
to a lesser degree, Diderot, we take a look at the material of a 
sentient character, while on the other we take a general look at 
scientific­discoveries­and­technological­inventions­like­playing­
“catch-up,” a way to become increasingly more compatible 
with­nature.­The­problem,­no­different­to­that­of­the­shaman­
in so-called primitive societies, is about channeling the energy 
that circulates freely, not allowing it to cause any damage and, 
if­possible,­making­it­produce­positive­and­beneficial­results­
instead. It is clear that science and technology share the vision 
that will dominate a large part of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries,­of­a­linear,­undefined­and­ever­burgeoning­growth­of­
man’s productive forces in all their forms, including machinery. 
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because they are his creation. As far as man’s body is concerned, 
it will revert to being a network of gestures, but only because 
its­functions­(both­physical­and­mental)­reflect­a­universal­
mechanical order that treats mental activity as a particular case 
in a still unfamiliar way, a situation destined to change sooner or 
later.
Nevertheless, the progress and development of the new 
productive forces, in essence the new machines built and 
marketed­in­this­first­phase­of­the­Industrial­Revolution,­did­not­
convince­everyone.­As­early­as­the­eighteenth­century,­the­first­
criticisms came from an area of Europe not yet at the center of 
technical and economic innovation, Germany, and were relatively 
isolated. In the years in which they were published, the stories by 
Ernst­Theodor­Amadeus­Hoffmann­seemed­little­more­than­the­
bizarre outpourings of a contorted mind. However, the robots, 
the extraordinary machines that amazed and delighted the courts 
and salons of Europe, turned into grotesque apparitions, bearers 
of ruin and death. Within years, the evil robot will become one 
of romantic Germany’s most popular characters, will also cross 
the English Channel to become the indeterminate and monstrous 
artificial­creature­of­Mary­Shelley’s­Frankenstein, and will go on to 
become one of the mainstays of the fantasy genre, inaugurating 
a­tradition­still­with­us­today.­In­Karel­Čapek’s­R.U.R., when the 
automaton changes into a robot it will continually rebel against its 
creator and determine his ruin. One will have to wait until Isaac 
Asimov’s I, Robot­in­1950­to­have­an­artificial­creature­capable­of­
living­peacefully­and­beneficially­with­mankind,­despite­having­a­
problem or two of its own. What happened? The man’s body, sep-
arated from the system of symbols that lent coherence to society 
and to a primitive world, taken from the immediate and elastic 
rapport of his fellow creatures and with the other elements of 
nature that gave it a sense of stability, established himself in that 
new modernity called “self,” the system in which the events of 
a “psychic life” had never been described before because they 
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presumably­non-existent).­That­human­psychic­activity­is­based­
on corporeal fundamentals is an old materialistic hypothesis, 
unsustainable­in­its­“naïve”­and­radical­eighteenth-century­form,­
but reformulated in a disapproving way by psychoanalysis: 
A person’s own body, and above all its surface, is a place 
from which both external and internal perceptions may 
spring. It is seen like any other object, but to the touch it 
yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equiv-
alent to an internal perception. Psycho-physiology has fully 
discussed the manner in which a person’s own body attains 
its special position among other objects in the world of 
perception­[…].­The­ego­is­first­and­foremost­a­bodily­ego;­it­
is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a 
surface. The ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, 
chiefly­from­those­springing­from­the­surface­of­the­body.­It­
may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface 
of the body [...].14
The importance of the perception of one’s own body in psychic 
life has become an inalienable fact, and kindles such a general 
consensus­that­one­may­find­this­concept­in­the­most­unexpected­
places.­Staying­with­science­fiction,­here­is­how­for­example­
it is formulated in List’s Cultural Compendium,­the­fictitious­
anthropological­text­invented­by­Bayley,­the­date­of­its­writing­
unknown but which can presumably be placed hundreds of years 
in the future:
Every creature having a complex nervous system makes use 
of body images. The body image is an image of itself: the 
knowledge that the creature has of its physical existence, 
a knowledge that sets itself halfway between conscious 
and unconscious perceptions. Much has been said about 
whether or not the body image has a genetic base, or if 
14 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id­(1923).
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problem, experiments were carried out on human vol-
unteers subjected to total amnesia, and attempts made to 
have them accept alternating images of animals or robots 
as their own. The results were convincing. […] Some of the 
subjects admitted to having “dreamed” of being what they 
saw as their own bodies: a dog, a bear and, in one case, even 
a­butterfly.15
Undoubtedly,­the­experimenters­that­List­(and­Bayley)­talks­about­
knew­of­Zhuang-Tzu’s­analogous­dream,­of­a­couple­of­millennia­
earlier…16
What is certain is that, at a given moment, the machine’s 
increasing capacity to simulate and emulate human behavior has 
combined with the changes taking place in the status of the body, 
and­has­given­rise­to­the­creation­of­a­differently­featured­and­
named­“artificial­man,”­who­has­assumed­the­functions­of­man’s­
“double” collective, evil and ruinous, in which, as in other doubles 
of fables and literature, a return of the reject is embodied. To the 
double­“human”­of­fantasy­literature,­the­“artificial”­double­of­
science­fiction­(meant­in­the­broad­sense,­to­include­Frankenstein 
and R.U.R.)­one­can­add­an­ambiguous­character,­one­halfway­
between machine and man. The reject, in a manner of speaking 
“social”, who in this way returns, has a more direct approach to 
the workings and position of the machine in collective life: like 
all rejects it has something very familiar, so familiar it ends up 
being put aside. It is the presence, real and metaphorical, of the 
15­ Bayley,­The Garments of Caean.
16­ “Once­Chuang­Chou­dreamt­he­was­a­butterfly,­a­butterfly­flitting­and­
fluttering­around,­happy­with­himself­and­doing­as­he­pleased.­He­didn’t­
know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid 
and­unmistakable­Chuang­Chou.­But­he­didn’t­know­if­he­was­Chuang­Chou­
who­had­dreamt­he­was­a­butterfly,­or­a­butterfly­dreaming­he­was­Chuang­
Chou.­Between­Chuang­Chou­and­a­butterfly­there­must­be­some­distinction!­
This is called the Transformation of Things.” Chuang Tzu, “Discussion on 
Making All Things Equal,” in The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,­trans.­Burton­
Watson­(New­York:­Columbia­University­Press),­49.
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man’s­life,­as­decisive­as­it­is­remote­and­invisible.­But­doesn’t­lit-
erature perhaps have, amongst other things, the power to reveal 
what is hidden, to render the invisible visible?
Whereas the material and concrete eighteenth-century 
automaton­built­by­great­machinists­had­a­reassuring­effect­with­
regard­to­man’s­physical­excellence­(so­complex­it­deserved­to­be­
copied)­and­to­his­mind­(so­acute­it­was­capable­of­imitation),­the­
robot,­the­android­and­the­cyborg­of­modern-day­science­fiction­
instead signal the decline of man as we know him, or think we 
know him from what history and routine have passed on to us, 
and the birth of a new man, similar in appearance to the creature 
that he himself built, but in some ways already autonomous. They 
do it by asking a question, though not new, but unquestionably 
actual­(“what­is­man?”),­in­the­most­emotionally­and­narratively­
effective­form­of­“how­does­one­distinguish­a­‘natural’­man­from­
an­artificial­one?”­Though­an­explicit­response­is­rarely­given,­an­
implicit­response­is­often­contained­in­the­modification­of­the­
question,­even­in­its­radical­reversal:­“how­can­an­artificial­being­
become­an­authentic­man?”­Science­fiction,­from­Cordwainer­
Smith­to­Asimov,­to­Simak,­is­filled­with­stories­of­civil­rights­bat-
tles won by robots, androids and underpeople. Giovannoli talks of 
a continuous “becoming”: from machine to man via the robot and 
android stages, and from man to machine via the cyborg stage.17 
During­the­course­of­this­“becoming”­described­by­science­fiction,­
the cyborg represents a hypothetical radical response, the birth 
of­a­new­species:­a­response,­naturally,­that­is­not­definitive,­and­
in­no­way­settles­the­problems;­on­the­contrary,­it­presents­innu-
merable others.
In her new metal body, the reconstructed Deirdre of No Woman 
Born­poses­problems­for­Maltzer,­her­maker,­who­is­afflicted­
with an ambiguous syndrome, halfway between Pygmalion 
and Frankenstein. On one hand, Maltzer is rightfully proud 
17 Giovannoli, La Scienza della Fantascienza,­24­[Trans.­Robert­Booth].
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proportions” that it replicates the old body of the woman, but 
with totally new vocal and motor possibilities. On the other hand, 
however, he is convinced that Deirdre is no longer human: “She 
hasn’t any sex. She isn’t female any more,” and has also lost three 
of­the­five­senses,­the­oldest­and­most­deep­rooted­in­man’s­
corporeal system: touch, taste and smell. “Sight is a cold, intellec-
tual­thing­compared­with­the­other­senses.­But­it ’s­all­she­has­to­
draw on now. She isn’t a human being any more, and I think what 
humanity is left in her will drain out little by little and never be 
replaced.“­But­Deirdre­was­once­an­actress­and­a­singer,­a­female­
entertainer, and wishes to return to the stage. Maltzer wants to 
spare her any stress and disappointment, convinced as he is that 
she will not be accepted by the audience.
Like her maker, Deirdre is also convinced of her irreparable and 
radical­uniqueness,­“[a]­sort­of­mutation­halfway­between­flesh­
and­metal.­Something­accidental­and...­and­unnatural,­turning­off­
on a wrong course of evolution that never reaches a dead end.”18 
She­has­no­doubts­about­her­loneliness,­present­and­future.­But­
the tenacity with which she experiments with all the new pos-
sibilities of her body, the stubbornness with which she decides 
to prepare her new show, reveal a strong trace of humanity still 
within­her;­and­the­stage­is­the­means­to­manifestly­highlight­
her links with the original species. Naturally, Maltzer is wrong: 
Deirdre’s­show­is­a­huge­success,­and­the­new­figure’s­sensual­
element overwhelming, as though the cyborg wanted to get 
revenge for the maker’s mortifying observation regarding her 
femininity­(it ’s­worth­remembering­that­the­author,­Catherine­L.­
Moore,­is­a­woman).
No Woman Born­is­the­first­science­fiction­story­in­which­the­
cyborg sheds the clothes of an alien originating from some 
distant­star­to­take­on­the­look­of­a­more­familiar­alien­(if­the­
paradox­is­allowed),­namely­man.­Man­intended­as­human­being,­
18 Moore, No Woman Born.
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she opens the door to other female aliens, characters in sev-
enties­science­fiction,­some­of­whom,­significantly,­will­still­be­
cyborgs­(Helva­in­the­already-mentioned­The Ship Who Sang, and 
Philadelphia­Burke­in­The Girl Who Was Plugged In, published in 
1973­by­James­Tiptree­whose­real­name,­in­spite­of­the­mas-
culine­pseudonym,­is­Alice­Sheldon).­Catherine­L.­Moore’s­story­
highlights the problem of cyborg identity, and consequently 
that of man too. As a technological hybrid, the cyborg cannot 
help but carry an enigma both internally and externally, just 
like­its­distant­predecessor,­the­mythical­sphinx.­Algis­Budrys­
individualized this radical query of identity in his novel Who? 
published­in­1958.­American­scientist­Lucas­Martino,­the­victim­
of­an­accident­in­a­West­Berlin­laboratory,­is­abducted­by­the­
Soviets­and­returned­a­few­months­later­with­an­artificial­head­
and arm: the extraordinary operation, they say, was necessary 
to save his life, otherwise he would have died due to the injuries 
he­sustained­in­the­accident.­But­the­Americans­can’t­be­sure­
that the person restored to them in that condition is really 
Martino, and suspect he might be a spy sent by the Russians to 
steal data on the highly important and top-secret project that 
he worked on before the accident. The secret service is mobi-
lized to gather proof that will decide the cyborg’s true identity. 
They­will­never­find­that­proof.­The­man­with­the­metal­head­will­
retire to an isolated country house, far from prying eyes, even 
though­the­reader­(having­had­his­doubts,­like­the­secret­service,­
during­the­course­of­the­book)­now­knows­that­he­really­is­Lucas­
Martino.­The­novel­(very­much­like­Jack­Gold’s­1974­film­of­the­
same­title)­paints­a­picture­of­extreme­gloom­in­the­lonely­life­
of­the­new­being,­whose­egg-shaped­head­(much­like­Deirdre’s)­
prompts disgust and repulsion from all the humans who come 
into­contact­with­him.­By­now,­in­most­of­the­literature­on­the­
cyborg, this situation is paradigmatic: the hybrid is seen by man 
to­be­a­sort­of­new­freak,­and­at­first­glance­the­horror­that­it­
provokes­is­stronger­than­curiosity.­In­fact,­Budrys­has­Martino,­
who­has­just­arrived­in­New­York,­run­the­tragic­gauntlet­of­urban­
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Street. Here, the concierge shows no distaste on seeing the 
metal face: “The clerk was used to seeing cripples. The rooms 
upstairs were full of one kind or another.”19 Martino’s body, like 
with all cyborgs, and particularly in space, performs deeds far 
superior to its normal human counterpart, but is considered by 
others to be that of a “cripple.” Cordwainer Smith accentuated 
this aspect: his scanners are deprived of senses, and when they 
want to go back, albeit temporarily, to being complete men, they 
must­first­undergo­cranching—as cyborgs, their deafening voices 
and grotesque faces render them unacceptable to man. One of 
them­has­even­learned­to­speak­softly­and­to­artificially­control­
its face muscles in order to cultivate more normal social relation-
ships.­Beings­of­this­type­cannot­help­but­swing­back­and­forth­
between a spasmodic wish to be reintegrated into humanity and 
a­proud­desire­to­remain­within­the­corporation­(that­is­when­the­
cyborg isn’t an exceptional and unique individual, like Deirdre or 
Martino).­Sometimes­the­rhetoric­of­space­conquest­and­progress­
serve­as­a­consolation.­Bart,­one­of­the­cyborgized space pilots 
described in Sea Change, while trying to convince some human 
interlocutors, talks of himself and others like him in the third 
person:
They aren’t men anymore. They might not even be humans 
anymore.­But­they­aren’t­machines­[…].­They­have­something­
that normal men will never have. They have found a role in 
the grandest dream man has ever dared dream. And it takes 
guts… a lot of guts to be what they are. Not men, and yet part 
of the greatest thing that man has ever looked for.20
And the story ends with the vision of “a metal confraternity 
crossing outer space: tense brains enveloped in a metal skin, in a 
single organism reaching… reaching for the stars.”
19­ Algis­Budrys,­Who?­(1958).
20 Thomas N. Scortia, Sea Change­(1956).
64 Fortunately, we are rarely forced to swallow a cocktail of 
broken-winded rhetoric of this type. At other times, the hybrid’s 
propensity to return to its primitive form helps it be explicit in the 
face­of­the­first,­immediate­reaction.­When­Smith’s­scanners­find­
out that space sickness has been eliminated, that space travel 
will be accessible to normal human beings, they feel that their 
profession is threatened and so decide to kill the inventor. The 
historical and narrative rationality embodies itself in the scanner 
Martel, who quite by chance witnesses the cranch meeting when, 
looking in from the outside, he becomes aware of all the horror 
of­their­condition;­he­therefore­decides­to­warn­the­inventor­and­
allow all the scanners to return to their human form. However, 
this type of happy ending is not common. More often than not, 
the­cyborg­form­is­presented­as­a­definitive­state,­and­the­horrific­
effect­it­has­on­us­is­attributed­to­our­quality­as­men­of­the­
present—this will no longer exist in the future. However, even in 
this case, some of the narrative choices made by authors betray 
an­uneasiness­with­the­hybrid;­for­example,­by­hiding­the­man’s­
original­body­inside­the­machine.­In­Bayley’s­novel,­The Garments 
of Caean, the space travelers come across another species of 
cyborg other than the one described in the previous chapter: 
giant spacesuits, about three and a half meters tall, minus their 
legs, minus a visor, that, driven by an autonomous propulsion 
system, wander about in an asteroid zone, emitting radio signals. 
On capturing one, the human explorers, to free the human it 
presumably contains, have no choice but to cut open the suit. No 
sooner­done,­they­find­a­naked­human­form­with­atrophied­arms­
and legs, completely linked to the suit by a tangle of cables, tubes 
and catheters. The suit, to all intents and purposes, is its body, 
with sensory, locomotive and phonatory organs, and the being 
never­leaves­it:­this­species­has­also­developed­a­form­of­artificial­
sex fully capable of reproductive activities, in the shape of a tooth 
that protrudes from the “male” suit to penetrate the sheath of its 
“female” counterpart. The expedition’s sociologist comments:
65It means that his own body-image of himself doesn’t include 
anything we would recognize as a human being. When he 
thinks of himself as a person, the picture in his mind is that 
of his suit’s exterior. Probably he isn’t even conscious of his 
biological body, except as a sort of internal organ or essential 
core. As far as he is concerned, the suit is his body.21
Even the “shell-brains,” the “minds” that steer the spaceships in 
The Ship Who Sang, are miniaturized bodies within titanium suits, 
hidden for security reasons within the ship’s central column. They 
are the bodies of babies born with irreparable malformations 
but with a normal brain, who, after just a few months of life, are 
trained to live in their new metal bodies, after which they receive 
schooling to suit their future occupation:
Shell-people resembled mature dwarfs in size whatever their 
natal deformities were, but the well-oriented brain would 
not have changed places with the most perfect body in the 
universe.22
From their column, the encapsulated minds see and hear 
everything that occurs on the ship, communicate with the “arm,” 
the human partner who drives the ship with them, and who they 
choose themselves, and with whom they can even fall in love, 
which is what will happen to Helva, the story’s leading character. 
This equilibrium between the values of corporeal beauty, 
intelligence­and­sensorial­power­established­by­McCaffrey­(the­
original­deformity­is­the­price­the­cyborg­“pays”­for­its­new­skills)­
has­a­slight­consolatory­flavor­to­it.­Tiptree,­who­resumes­the­
theme,­flips­the­situation­around­instead,­dramatizing­it­to­the­
hilt. Delphi, the beautiful holovision star in The Girl Who Was 
Plugged In, is a “waldo,” a remotely controlled cybernetic system, 
or­rather­an­automaton,­“eighty-nine­pounds­of­tender­girl­flesh­
and blood with a few metallic components,”23 controlled at a 
21­ Bayley,­The Garments of Caean.
22­ Anne­McCaffrey,­The Ship Who Sang­(1961).
23 James Tiptree, The Girl Who Was Plugged In­(1973).
66 distance by a human operator in a shell with the brain linked 
to the communications system that animates the machine. For 
the­female­operator,­Philadelphia­Burke,­an­ugly­and­unhappy­
girl, Delphi’s life epitomizes a thrilling experience she would be 
unable to live if it weren’t for the automaton that gives her life. 
Apparently divided into two components, human and machine, 
the­figure­of­the­cyborg­reunites­in­death,­when­Delphi’s­young­
lover, having discovered her nature as a mechanical doll, kills 
her­together­with­Burke.­Just­like­Helva­in­The Ship Who Sang, 
Burke­also­manages­to­escape­an­unhappy­destiny­thanks­to­her­
integration­with­the­machine;­like­the­latter,­the­former­also­expe-
riences­the­trauma­of­separation­(her­human­partner­dies­during­
the­voyage,­while­Helva,­well­protected­by­the­metal,­is­saved),­
but­the­happy­ending­that­follows­in­McCaffrey’s­story,­with­a­
predictable speech on the “sense of duty” and the “continuity of 
life”, is a far cry from the dramatic conclusion of Tiptree’s story. 
Here the integration of man and machine is pushed to such a 
degree that stopping the latter means killing the former. Just like 
television’s cyborg The Six Million Dollar Man, in which the naked 
eye cannot tell which parts of the body are human and which are 
artificial.
The enigma that the cyborg carries inscribed in its body is 
therefore the same one recalled by the androids in Asimov’s 
“detective”­series­(The Caves of Steel and The Naked Sun),­and­
the replicants in Blade Runner that Ridley Scott adapted from 
the novel by Philip K. Dick (Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?): 
what­is­this­being­I­find­in­front­of­me,­man­or­machine?­Is­it­a­
product of nature, or of human ingenuity? If the question, as far 
as­the­android­is­concerned,­is­epistemological­(that­is­to­say,­
concerning the possibility of having certain knowledge of the two 
beings,­man­and­android,­whose­origin­is­surely­different),­as­far­
as the cyborg is concerned it is ontological. Wondering if a cyborg 
is man or machine is like doubting our beliefs and our convictions 
on what is man, his nature or, from a linguistic point of view, his 
definition.­And­if­in­the­dualistic­tradition­of­Western­thought­
67the line of demarcation between human and nonhuman is more 
on­the­side­of­the­mind­than­the­body­(Descartes­had­identified­
the­distinctive­characteristic­of­man­with­respect­to­animals),­it­
cannot be denied that in one’s conscience the corporeal form 
is­closely­associated­with­mental­activity.­But,­as­we­have­seen,­
by­identifying­man’s­body­as­the­object­of­a­specific­discipline,­
modern science has robbed it of the possibility to function as 
a place of mediation between it and nature, as a support of 
symbolic communication processes between the codes. As Kafka 
himself taught us, from that moment on every metaphor will be 
monstrous and socially unacceptable. He describes the transition 
in the story In der Strafkolonie with great lucidity. An aloof and 
neutral traveler is about to witness the last act of the colony’s 
old judiciary regime, put in place by the previous commander, 
now­dead,­and­observed­by­little­more­than­a­lone­officer:­with­a­
complicated system of needles, a machine tattoos the words of 
the broken law onto the condemned man’s skin, a long operation 
that ends with his death. However, as the procedure is falling into 
disuse and has practically run out of supporters, the machine is 
now dirty, damaged and no longer capable of functioning with 
its former precision. The traveler can’t decipher the instruction 
manual, nor the complicated hieroglyphics needed to steer the 
movements of the machine’s needles. Seeing that the machine 
doesn’t­work,­the­officer,­driven­to­extremes,­pauses­the­machine­
and takes the condemned man’s place: in a tangle of components, 
the­machine­goes­crazy,­and­the­needles­rip­in­to­the­officer’s­
skin without writing a word. The usual transformation of the 
sufferer’s­body,­the­“ecstatic expression” produced when he begins 
to decipher the inscription in his wounds, and that the audience 
does everything to see, does not take place this time.
[The­dead­man’s­face]­was­as­it­had­been­in­life;­there­was­
no­trace­of­the­promised­transfiguration;­the­thing­that­all­
the­others­had­found­in­the­machine;­his­lips­were­pressed­
together, his eyes were open, their expression was that of the 
68 living man, and the point of the great iron spike had passed 
through the forehead.24
It is in this “tranquil belief” in a new phase, in the end of man’s old 
privileges, in the lack of a superior point of view that legitimizes 
his place in the universe, that these questions, of which the 
cyborg is also the bearer, are inscribed.
24 Franz Kafka, In the Penal Colony­([1919]­1941).
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Spectacle, Sex, Death
Deirdre­is­a­singer­and­dancer;­Delphi­a­holovision­star­used­to­
make­indirect­advertisements­(direct­having­been­illegal­for­some­
time)­for­her­sponsor’s­products.­Helva­is­a­spaceship­pilot,­but­
when it comes to choosing her crew “no actress on her opening 
night could have been more apprehensive, more fearful, more 
breathless,”25­and­her­hobby,­which­gives­the­story­its­title­(The 
Ship Who Sang),­is­singing,­something­that,­given­her­intellec-
tual and instrumental prowess, she is capable of doing better 
and with more versatility than any normal human. It appears 
that­authors­of­science­fiction­(in­this­case­female­authors)­
have a fondness for linking cyborgs with the world of entertain-
ment. This is no surprise if we consider the cyborg as a sort of 
technological freak, and let’s not forget that the playhouse, or the 
circus­ring,­is­this­figure’s­homeland.­Forever,­the­monster­and­
deformity­(according­to­the­etymology­of­the­word)­have­been­
judged worthy of being put on show. The cyborg exploits the 
extreme, ultra-human possibilities of the body like the dwarf or 
25­ McCaffrey,­The Ship Who Sang.
70 the bearded lady, which are comparable to those of the dancer or 
acrobat.
For a moment everything was motionless upon the stage. 
Then, at the head of the stairs, where the two curves of the 
pillared­balustrade­swept­together,­a­figure­stirred.­Until­that­
moment she had seemed another shining column in the row. 
Now she swayed deliberately, light catching and winking and 
running molten along her limbs and her robe of metal mesh. 
She swayed just enough to show that she was there. Then, 
with every eye upon her, she stood quietly to let them look 
their­fill­[…].­She­stood­quiet,­swaying­just­a­little,­a­masked­
and­inscrutable­figure,­faceless,­very­slender­in­her­robe­
that hung in folds as pure as a Grecian chlamys, though she 
did not look Grecian at all. In the visored golden helmet and 
the robe of mail that odd likeness to knighthood was there 
again, with its implications of medieval richness behind the 
simple lines. […] Now she swayed and came slowly down 
the steps, moving with a suppleness just a little better than 
human.­The­swaying­strengthened.­By­the­time­she­reached­
the­stage­floor­she­was­dancing.­But­it­was­no­dance­that­any­
human creature could ever have performed. The long, slow, 
languorous rhythms of her body would have been impos-
sible­to­a­figure­hinged­at­its­joints­as­human­figures­hinge.26
Here the freak turned horror into fascination, performing an 
exercise in seduction in the false but stimulating etymological 
sense­proposed­by­Jean­Baudrillard,27 where the audience, 
expecting­to­see­an­artiste,­first­sees­a­machine,­and­then,­as­the­
show continues, a woman gifted with the most extraordinary 
talents. We also discern that Ms. Moore’s entire description, con-
sidering the terms used, the evocative images, the atmosphere, 
quite openly suggest a religious event, or a sort of superhuman 
26 Catherine L. Moore, No Woman Born (1944).
27­ See­Jean­Baudrillard,­De la séduction­(Paris:­Galilée,­1979),­37:­“Stratégie­de­
Déplacement­(seducere:­amener­à­l’écart,­detourner­de­sa­voie)”.
71epiphany. In “developed” societies at the end of the century the 
show­exculpated­those­same­functions­fulfilled­by­the­dimension­
of holiness in previous eras. It is a “degraded” holiness, as Mircea 
Eliade would say: it doesn’t conjure up any transcendent reality, 
but a sort of distracted unity amongst all the users, reconciled 
by mysterious electronic feedback processes that occur in the 
secrecy of the studios’ production and recording equipment.
The­idea­that­art­thrives­on­creative­flamboyance­has­
long been torpedoed by the proof that what art needs is 
computers.­Because­this­showbiz­has­something­TV­and­
Hollywood never had—automated inbuilt viewer feedback. 
Samples, ratings, critics, polls? Forget it. With that carrier 
field­you­can­get­real-time­response-sensor­readouts­from­
every receiver in the world, served up at your console. That 
started­as­a­thingie­to­give­the­public­more­influence­on­
content.­Yes.­Try­it,­man.­You’re­at­the­console.­Slice­to­the­
sex-age-educ-econ-ethno-cetera audience of your choice and 
start.­You­can’t­miss.­Where­the­feedback­warms­up,­give­‘em­
more­of­that.­Warm—warmer—hot! You’ve­hit­it—the­secret­
itch­under­those­hides,­the­dream­in­those­hearts.­You­don’t­
need to know its name. With your hand controlling all the 
input and your eye reading all the response you can make 
them a god.28
The show business world is also at the center of The Continuous 
Katherine Mortenhoe­(or­The Unsleeping Eye,­1974),­a­book­by­Eng-
lishman David G. Compton. In a world practically free of sickness 
and disease, a show about sickness and pain is one of TV’s most 
attractive programs. NTV’s Human Destiny is the best of this 
genre, and it is only natural that those responsible want to use 
one of their best reporters, Roddie. For the occasion, he has 
agreed to swap his eyes for a pair of miniaturized video cameras 
that transmit non-stop everything he sees at the television 
studios. The equipment can never be deactivated, and if Roddie 
28 Tiptree, The Girl Who Was Plugged In.
72 closes­his­eyes­or­finds­himself­in­darkness,­excruciating­pain­will­
warn­him­that­he­must­find­new­visual­material­for­his­system.­
In this way, the program will enjoy the immediacy and the truth 
of­a­live­show­(Bertrand­Tavernier’s­La Mort en direct,­1980­[Death 
Watch]­is­based­on­this­book).­What­the­reporter­must­film­are­
the­last­twenty-five­days­of­Katherine’s­life.­In­charge­of­computer­
fiction­for­a­major­publisher­(another­aspect­of­the­machine’s­
entry­into­the­world­of­entertainment­and­communication),­
she­was­found­to­be­suffering­from­a­progressive­and­incurable­
degenerative disease that leaves her with just four weeks to live. 
Compton returns to a theme already dealt with by American 
science­fiction­writers­of­the­fifties­and­sixties­(Bradbury,­
Sheckley):­television­as­a­“total”­machine,­as­an­inhuman­mech-
anism that lives and prospers vampire-like on the emotions and 
pain of men, paying particular attention to the accuracy of the 
characters’ speech and psychology, but above all with a highly 
acute awareness of their involvement in the entertainment 
system.­As­Ruggero­Bianchi­observed:­
... the sense of the whole thing isn’t in the fact that Katherine 
and Roddie are the victims of a system manipulated by 
the media against whom they attempt—successfully or 
unsuccessfully—to rebel, but in the fact that the two protag-
onists belong to the media world, taking part in it with every 
fiber­of­their­being­and,­when­the­chips­are­down,­they­don’t­
exist outside of it.29
Roddie’s condition as a cyborg, on the other hand, is not 
unique to him alone: not only is it an obvious metaphor of the 
paroxysmal predominance of our social system’s image, of the 
uninterrupted and circular process of production-consumerism-
production­image,­but­it­also­represents­an­effective­mediation­
29­ Ruggero­Bianchi,­introduction­to­the­Italian­translation­of­David­G.­
Compton’s The Continuous Katherine Mortenhoe,­ed.­Nord,­(Milan:­1977),­III­
[trans.­Robert­Booth]­(the­introduction­was­not­included­in­the­1993­edition);­
the U.S. title is The Unsleeping Eye­(1975).
73between machine and consumer. Thanks to the integration of 
body and television camera, he is capable of representing and of 
reinforcing the bond between the public and the visual system 
that­is­now­the­main­guarantor­of­the­“reality­effect”­on­the­entire­
globe. No matter how integrated he is with this system, however, 
Roddie maintains the more traditional needs of rationality that 
will­take­him­to­the­final­crisis.­He­is­in­fact­convinced­right­from­
the start that the “truth” coincides with the “continuity” of the 
processes and especially with people:
I had this thing about continuity, you see, having long ago 
decided that people were only true when they were con-
tinuous. As an attitude, an approach to my job as a reporter, 
it had done me very well. It had got me where I was at that 
moment […]. It will be noticed that I was at that time very 
much concerned with what I saw as the truth.30
In fact, when on the screens he sees the transmission of the 
images­that­his­eyes­filmed­sequentially,­he­realizes­that­the­
visual immediacy, what his eyes recorded, does not correspond 
in any way to what Katherine is in his mind, to how he “sees” her. 
Robbie­resolves­this­conflict­between­an­individual­system­of­
perceptions­and­affects­and­the­social­system­of­images­and­com-
munication­(a­conflict­evidently­of­an­ethnic­nature)­by­destroying­
the­instruments­linking­his­self­to­the­social­system;­voluntarily­
surrendering himself to darkness, provoking the destruction of 
the miniaturized TV cameras, thus blinding himself.
This clearly Oedipal solution takes us back to a discourse present 
in the traditions of English literature on the inadequacy of senses, 
and particularly of sight,31 but mainly to Freud’s observations 
30 Compton, The Continuous Katherine Mortenhoe.
31 H. G. Wells, in his The Country of the Blind­(1911),­describes­a­remote­village­
whose blind inhabitants are convinced that the eyes of those who can see 
are the result of a disease, and have built a perfectly coherent universe 
that­excludes­sight.­Borges­and­Casares,­in­their­already­mentioned­Los 
Immortales, resume the theme of the creation of the super man through 
74 on the equivalence of blinding and emasculation,32 formulated 
especially with reference to the myth of Oedipus. In fact Roddie 
is separated from his wife: their marriage destroyed due to his 
work as a reporter that therefore acquires a connotation of 
evident sublimity, reinforced by inserting video cameras in place 
of his eyes. When Roddie goes to visit her, during the course of 
the story, he refuses to make love with her. A disturbed condition 
in emotional relations, when not out-and-out sexual impotence, 
that often characterizes cyborgs or the “cyborgized.” Smith’s 
scanners, we have seen, tend to stick together because, when 
in the habermans­state,­humans­find­them­almost­unbearable,­
yet they must “cranch” whenever they want to have sex with 
their­wives.­Since­his­school­days,­Lucas­Martino­(the­scientist­
in Who?)­has­turned­his­back­on­any­sort­of­human­relationship,­
preferring­to­concentrate­on­his­schooling­and­scientific­career,­
precluding in particular any possibility of satisfactory contact 
with­a­woman­(though­he­doesn’t­approach­the­girls­he­likes,­he­
will quite cold-heartedly establish a relationship with any other 
girl, a relationship he quickly becomes ashamed of and has no 
qualms­about­terminating):­the­“dehumanization”­of­which­he­
will later be a victim is in some way anticipated in his past life. 
Roger Torraway, the lead cyborg of Man Plus, even has his genitals 
removed as “unnecessary” during the course of a complete body 
reconstruction that will allow him to live on Mars, and discovers 
that before being subjected to real castration he had already 
suffered­metaphorical­castration,­because­his­wife­systematically­
played around on him with a member of the same space crew 
(the­woman’s­choice,­as­implied­by­the­narrator,­is­not­totally­
unrelated to the sort of obsessive relationship that Roger had 
established­with­her).­This­is­with­regard­to­the­male­cyborgs.­As­
far as the female cyborgs go, quite a bit has already been said. 
suppression­of­the­senses,­quoting­English­poet­Rupert­Brooke:­“And­see,­no­
longer blinded by our eyes”.
32 See Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo­(1913)­and­The Uncanny­(1919).­The­con-
nection­between­the­eyes­and­sexuality­is­also­affirmed­by­Georges­Bataille­
in Story of the Eye­(1928).
75Both­Deirdre­and­Helva,­for­different­reasons,­have­to­exteriorize­
their femininity in a totally metaphorical and symbolic way, 
though­no­less­intensely.­Delphi­and­Burke,­on­the­other­hand,­
attempt a complete sexual relationship, but here satisfaction 
is­conditioned­by­keeping­Delphi’s­android­nature­a­secret;­the­
couple man/machine works only as long as the human part is 
kept hidden, revelation of the truth means the end of the male’s 
love and the death of the cyborg, at least of the human part 
(Delphi,­we­are­told,­will­survive­with­another­female­operator).­
The “mechanization” of man would allude, therefore, to the same 
inability to love that Otto Rank pointed out in the protagonists of 
those­works­based­on­the­figure­of­the­double,­from­Dorian Gray 
to The Student of Prague.33
Examined from this perspective, the cyborg is therefore 
presented­as­the­objectification­of­a­disturbed­sensuality:­not­
necessarily­as­a­menace­(on­this­point,­attitudes­vary­from­author­
to­author),­but­certainly­as­a­symbol,­or­catalyst,­of­an­aggres-
sion against the individual or social “self” of which, however, the 
development of technology is an important component. All things 
considered, the Frankenstein syndrome returns to the fore, made 
even more disturbing by the fact that the attack on the man’s 
identity, and especially his corporeal identity, does not come from 
the exterior, but straight from within his own body. Therefore, we 
will not be surprised if a large percentage of the tests examined 
in this chapter contain a more or less direct reference to the 
prospect of death. At times it is the cyborg’s origin, connected to 
a fatal accident, that is averted thanks to this transformation of 
the­man­(No Woman Born, Who?);­otherwise­it­is­the­cyborg­who,­
when menaced, plans the man’s death, even without realizing it 
(Scanners Live In Vain);­or­perhaps­the­cyborg’s­human­partner,­or­
its­human­half,­die­(The Ship Who Sang, The Girl Who Was Plugged 
In, The Unsleeping Eye, Man Plus).
33 See Otto Rank, The Double ([1914]­1989).
76 The link between mental disturbance with strong sexual 
elements and death is achieved in a very interesting test 
presented by a “cyborg doctor” in Michael Crichton’s The Terminal 
Man­(1972).­As­is­his­wont,­Crichton­doesn’t­present­his­book­as­
a­story­of­science­fiction,­but­as­a­fictional­scientific­report­with­
graphics, photographs, precise references and dates, together 
with an extensive bibliography that makes a lot of sense, but is 
probably­false­in­many­ways.­Benson,­the­protagonist,­suffers­
from epilepsy, and during the attacks he becomes extremely 
aggressive, a condition that at times has taken him to the brink 
of killing people. The doctors, considering the trouble they have 
administering other therapies, decide to implant a microscopic 
stimulator in his brain, a microcomputer connected to the hos-
pital computer via a radio link-up, the idea being to stimulate 
a certain area of the brain and prevent further attacks. Only 
psychiatrist Janet Ross feels any misgivings about the operation. 
Benson­thus­becomes­a­“terminal”­man,­as­the­surgeon­explains­
somewhat coldly:
Now, however, in this operation we have created a man with 
not one brain but two. He has his biological brain, which 
is damaged, and he has a new computer brain, which is 
designed to correct the damage. This new brain is intended 
to control the biological brain [...]. And therefore the patient’s 
biological brain, and indeed his whole body, has become a 
terminal for the new computer. We have created a man who 
is one single, large, complex computer terminal. The patient 
is a read-out device for the new computer, and he is helpless 
to control the readout as a TV screen is helpless to control 
the information presented on it.34
Benson­might­not­be­the­best­patient­for­this­kind­of­operation.­
His “personality disorders”, that, according to the psychiatrist, 
are an integral part of his illness, include the conviction that 
“machines are everywhere. They used to be the servants of 
34 Michael Crichton, The Terminal Man­(1972).
77man, but now they’re taking over. Subtly, subtly taking over.” 
His hate for machines has already extended to all those at the 
service of machines, “mechanics, dancers, translators, gas-
station attendants,” as well as those he already sees turned into 
machines,­“particularly­the­prostitutes.”­Benson­escapes­the­
hospital, and the stimulator starts to break down, sending out 
too many stimuli and putting the brain into a state of hyper-
agitation­that­provokes­artificially­produced­crises.­And­so­begins­
the hunt for the patient who, in the meantime, has killed one of 
the surgeons and the girl who helped him escape. Wounded and 
hounded, in the hospital’s computer room, it will be the psychia-
trist, the only one who considers him a human being, a victim of 
mistaken therapy, who will stop him with a pistol.

[ 5 ]
Intelligent Machines
Benson’s­conviction­that­machines­are­taking­control­of­our­life­is­
not­new.­In­1872,­when­in­his­book­Erewhon­Samuel­Butler­wrote­
the following, the hypothesis that machines had a “conscience” 
might still have sounded odd:
There is no security against the ultimate development of 
mechanical consciousness, in the fact of machines pos-
sessing little consciousness now. A mollusk has not much 
consciousness.­Reflect­upon­the­extraordinary­advance­
which machines have made during the last few hundred 
years, and note how slowly the animal and vegetable 
kingdoms are advancing. The more highly organized 
machines are creatures not so much of yesterday, as of the 
last­five­minutes,­so­to­speak,­in­comparison­with­past­time.­
Assume for the sake of the argument that conscious beings 
have existed for twenty million years: See what strides 
machines­have­made­in­the­last­thousand!­May­not­the­world­
last twenty million years longer? If so, what will they not in 
80 the end become? Is it not safer to nip the mischief in the bud 
and to forbid them further progress?35
The scenario presented by Edward Morgan Foster in the story 
The Machine Stops­(1909)­is­that­of­a­completely­artificial­world­
in which man lives underground, totally dependent on food, 
rest and movement from a central machine in which automatic 
houses are the terminals. At the time, this world might also have 
seemed pure fantasy or considered excessively pessimistic. In 
the thirties, when Aldous Huxley wrote Brave New World, the 
material for judgement was already more abundant. The discus-
sion­that­took­place­in­1984,­the­year­that­is­the­title­of­George­
Orwell’s homonymous book, was criss-crossed with comments 
and forecasts on the real and possible development of machines 
in the informatics and telematics sectors. An American critic, 
Patricia S. Warrick, complained that, when dealing with robots 
and computers, the attitude of the vast majority of science 
fiction­writers­was­one­of­pessimism­and­catastrophe.36 One 
may­argue­the­accuracy­of­this­observation­(after­all,­the­most­
popular and best known author outside this genre, Asimov, rep-
resented­the­opposite­view);­but­in­any­case­one­has­to­admit­
that the apocalyptic will exist as long as the integrated exist, and 
presumably this will last for some time to come. However, neither 
science­fiction­writers,­nor­analogous­critics,­will­be­responsible­
for curtailing the development of research based on sound 
economic trends. The swing between the opposite attitudes of 
excitement and denigration habitually present in the history of 
man is particularly accentuated in periods of transition, even 
more so if that transition is accelerated, convulsive and complex 
like the one initiated in the second half of the twentieth century. 
And from the moment the massive inclusion of machines into our 
daily lives brings with it, inevitably, an entire circle of enthusiasts 
35­ Samuel­Butler,­Erewhon (1872).
36 Patricia S. Warrick, The Cybernetic Imagination in Science Fiction­(Cambridge,­
MA:­MIT­Press,1980).
81and gullible exaltés of whatever is “new,” a certain rebalancing of 
the trend is basically on the cards.
That­reality­transcends­fantasy­(by­taking­a­different­route­to­the­
latter­because­no­one­can­honestly­ask­writers­to­act­as­prophets)­
is by now a common consideration, and just as well founded. The 
term “cyborg,” as we have seen, was born in the shadow of NASA 
and space research. Even though the abundance of projects 
formulated in the sixties was reduced in the following decade, 
together with the entire space sector, the man-machine systems 
created from that research are, however, enough to leave the 
non-professionals­flabbergasted.­In­the­seventies,­General­Elec-
trics’­Cybernetics­Anthropomorphous­Machine­Systems­(CAMS)­
included mobile, manipulatory and multi-wheel vehicles, systems 
for telefactoring, all based on the principle of correspondence 
between the movements of an operator armed with a powered 
exoskeleton and a nearby, or more often distant, machine that 
repeats­them,­transmitting­a­sensory­feedback­(ponderous,­
spatial,­tactile,­sometimes­even­visual)­to­the­operator.­The­
machine’s­legs­or­arms­thus­benefit­from­the­precision­of­the­
operator’s movements, while the latter receives information 
directly­from­his­senses­and­not­from­numerical­systems­(he­feels­
the objects’ shape or opportunely proportioned weight that the 
mechanical­arms­lift).­Built­by­NASA,­the­Space-Horse­systems­
gave­analogous­performances,­and­were­made­up­of­artificial­
limbs whose motors picked up electric signals from the brain, 
arms with tracking mechanisms directly linked to the eye that 
opened­fire­immediately.37 This research was further developed 
in the eighties and nineties with virtual realities, and particularly 
with the “tele-presence” systems.38
These technologies were able to grow thanks only to the devel-
opment of the computer. And thus it is man’s new partner, his 
artificial­other-half,­keeping­him­company­inside­the­cyborg.­It­
37 David M. Rorvik, Brave New Baby­(1971).
38­ On­virtual­reality,­see­chapter­7,­“Technology­under­the­Skin.”
82 is the new double, the one that today already rivals us in mas-
tering situations that require laborious calculations, reductions 
of complexities, elementary decisions in the blink of an eye. 
What­we­foresee­(and­fear)­may­also­rival­us­tomorrow­in­the­
activity that we have always thought rendered us unique in the 
world: thought. On one hand, there is the spread of the personal 
computer, machines still somewhat limited, that nonetheless 
perform tasks much faster and with greater precision than we 
do, while, on the other, the departure from restrictions placed 
on research into AI has contributed to modelling the imaginary 
in this direction. Naturally, there is nothing diabolical in personal 
computers, nor have researchers of AI ever led us believe, not 
even for the briefest of seconds, that their work hides a new race 
of machine suddenly capable of usurping man’s prerogatives 
and his place on this planet. However, there is no doubt that this 
research has brought back the themes and classical problems of 
previously mentioned Western philosophical studies with regard 
to­man’s­definition­and­place­in­the­world,­strongly­influencing­
our imaginary too. This is true irrespective of the successes and 
failures that this discipline, on the borderline between infor-
matics, mathematics, linguistics and psychology, has collected in 
less­than­sixty­years­of­life­(the­starting­date­having­been­set­at­
1956).­If­we­look­at­it­from­an­informatics­point­of­view,­it­is­hard­
to contest that AI has succeeded in obtaining from computers 
performances that in a human being would be considered 
“intelligent”, like playing chess, understanding text and being able 
to­respond­to­questions­on­it,­formulating­medical­diagnoses.­But­
AI cannot boast of similar successes on the subject of cognitive 
psychology: intended as “simulation of the mind”, like the attempt 
to reproduce the workings of the human brain in a computer 
program­(naturally­calibrated­and­chosen­according­to­the­
particular­mental­activity­to­be­simulated),­it­has­not­produced­
positive­results,­on­the­contrary,­it­has­suffered­more­failures­
than successes. This is because AI machines “think” exclusively 
83through the manipulation of formal symbols, according to a 
rational abstract model that is neither that of man, or animal.39
However, AI has made it considerably easier to solve problems. 
In criticizing the AI research program, starting with the debate 
kicked­off­by­Searle­in­1980,40 philosophical positions are in 
general­curiously­inverted­with­regard­to­our­somewhat­naïve­
expectations. The most radical critics of AI, including Searle, 
have no “idealistic” or “dualistic” positions, so to speak, but are 
on the contrary strongly materialistic, and identify thought with 
the­activity­of­the­brain:­this­is­why­they­find­it­inconceivable­that­
“intelligence” may be attributed to something as immaterial as 
a computer program, no matter how complex it may be. Sup-
porters of AI, on the other hand, appear little interested in the 
“metaphysical” question of material support for the intelligence 
processes, and concentrate on a so-called “functional” model 
of the mind, more alert to functions, to reactions, etc. In this 
sense, their attitude seems more in line with NASA doctors 
and­engineers­who,­in­the­sixties,­were­the­first­to­formulate­a­
theory on space cyborgs. “I believe that life is more a question 
of relations and organization than one of material,” Manfred 
Clynes declared.41 It is clear that this view of the problem, one he 
considers irrelevant, rather than assume a precise position, the 
age-old dilemma of mind/body, seems better adapted to insure a 
peaceful integration of man and machine. From this point of view, 
the­cyborg­is­a­far­less­conflictive­figure­than­it­appears­in­literary­
works.
39 On the conceptual bases and story of AI, see Vittorio Somenzi and Roberto 
Cordeschi, eds., La filosofia degli automi [The Philosophy of the Automatons], 
(Turin:­Boringhieri,­1986);­and­Roberto­Cordeschi,­La scoperta dell’artificiale. 
Psicologia, filosofia e macchine intorno alla cibernetica [The discovery of the 
artificial.­Psychology,­philosophy­and­machines­associated­with­cybernetics]­
(Milan:­Dunod,­1998).
40­ The­entire­debate­can­be­found­in­John­R.­Searle,­“Minds,­Brains­and­
Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Science 3,­no.­3­(September­1980):­417–424.­
41 See Rorvik , Brave New Baby.
84 But­there­is­another­aspect­to­the­study­of­AI­that­appears­
relevant to our debate, and this time more on the side of the 
imaginary than the philosophical, expressed or otherwise. It 
might be better to introduce it with an example. One of the more 
famous criteria used to decide a machine’s “intelligence” is the 
so-called “Turing Test”, which consists of submitting a series of 
tests­(basically­questions­and­answers)­to­the­judgement­of­an­
outsider, data that comes from two interlocutors unseen by the 
judge, one a man, the other a machine. The latter passes the test 
if­the­judge­fails­to­identify­its­answers­in­a­significant­percentage­
of cases. This image of a closed room from which comes infor-
mation,­answers,­sheets­of­paper­filled­with­words­or­images,­
acquires­a­significance­that­goes­beyond­the­strictly­scientific­con-
text used by researchers. It is something akin to watching tele-
vision­or­working­on­a­computer:­the­world­of­TV­is­flat­and­two-
dimensional, while that of the computer is discreet, segmented, 
made up of numerous small, elementary movements, and atomic 
positions.­It­is­perfectly­normal­that­scientific­work­be­carried­
out in this way, through abstraction and then the subtraction of 
the attributes of the objects to be studied. However, we cannot 
avoid shuddering, feeling a sense of unease, when the object 
of this study is our own mind. We cannot help contemplating 
with a certain detachment the segmented and quantized world 
of video and computer: all the more so if we see, even without 
desperation, that it coincides in a literal sense with the reality in 
which we live. And even more if we realize that the segmentation 
and quantization of the world becomes increasingly more like a 
fragmentation and a discontinuity of our own interior world, of 
a combination of activities that we usually call “self.” If we look at 
things from this point of view, the cyborg changes its aspect, no 
longer an organic monstrosity, but more simply a combination 
of processes that occur between man and machine: already a 
daily experience, something that changes molecularly day by 
day. Seen as an indication of the existence and feasibility of the 
man/computer relationship, the cyborg becomes a linguistic 
problem: how to program the machine’s languages and enrich 
85communications­between­man­and­machine;­in­other­words,­a­
problem­of­interfacing.­Yes,­there­remains­a­paradox,­an­unan-
swered question for the common conscience: that it is possible 
that questions of “interpretation” are raised between the innate 
language of man, that distinguishes him from other natural 
beings,­and­the­artificial­language­of­machines,­that­man­himself­
created. That it is possible that a new creation is capable of telling 
us more about the world than we already know ourselves.
Science­fiction­has­long­represented­this­paradox­in­dramatic­
terms, speaking of the computer-generated reality that pits 
itself against a purely human reality, or as the expression of an 
evil­plot­against­man­(The Computer Connection,­1975,­by­Alfred­
Bester),­the­thematic­exemplification­of­the­super­man­(The Ring 
of Ritornel,­1968,­by­Charles­Harness),­the­representation­of­man’s­
destiny­of­vicious­slavery­(I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream, 
1967,­by­Harlan­Ellison).­But­the­more­the­computer­becomes­
a fact of daily life, the more the image of the “intelligent” and 
“creator-of-reality” machine will be played down. For example, in 
Overdrawn At The Memory Bank­(1976)­by­John­Varley,­the­figure­of­
the “man-trapped-in-the-computer”, performed by Harness with 
heroic overtones, is depicted in an everyday dimension, with a 
touch of irony. The protagonist, attached to a computer following 
a terrible accident, lives a personal decades-long experience in 
just­a­few­hours,­in­a­fictitious­and­completely­iridescent­reality,­
without being even remotely upset about it. The dwindling, 
changing levels of reality bring to mind Philip K. Dick, but without 
his grandiose and oppressive mood. When he returns to “reality”, 
the trapped man will retain fragments of his previous experience 
in a tangible form, much like his university degree.
Taking his cue from the encounter between the human pilot and 
the­alien­spaceship­in­the­film­Star Trek, Carlo Formenti describes 
the process in this way:
There­still­exists­an­indication,­a­difference:­the­creature­has­
accumulated immense knowledge and it is now necessary 
86 to repay a debt of information. This occurs in a totally new 
way: not through the human’s resumption of control over 
the­machine—not­by­redefining­the­skin­of­the­Other,­the­
place­of­separation­and­difference—but­through­voluntary­
union, clearly sexual, between pilot, second-in-command 
and machine. This union does not give birth to a superman 
or super-calculator, but to a super-cyborg that forces us 
to question ourselves on the place and the function of his 
skin, on the meaning of this metaphor, of this change. Here 
the theoretical story must be less rigorous, more allusive: 
the sensitive diaphragm that divides man and machine, 
assuming it still exists, can no longer be sought after in the 
productive process. The fact that society’s indoctrination 
has developed way beyond that of material production is 
no accident: capital, as a system of simulation, takes on the 
work­process­only­as­one­of­the­metaphors­(perhaps­not­
even­the­most­important)­of­the­development­process.­The­
general information-equivalent frees itself of productive 
referentialities, the stakes becoming the control of the 
language transformation process.42
This linguistic challenge that takes place on the borderline 
between man and machine tends to swing from material 
production to “immaterial” production. In the process of recip-
rocal interrogation between man and machine, projections and 
hitherto undreamed of exchanges arise, the machine no more 
humanized than man is mechanized. From productive investment 
to emotional investment. Luciano Gallino, a sociologist who, for 
a certain period worked closely with AI, proposing a model of the 
human­mind­(intended­as­“social­actor”)­named­Ego,­and­a­model­
to interface with the machine, Alter Ego, both workable on the 
computer, concluded an exhibition of his work with these words:
42 Carlo Formenti, “La pelle della macchina” [The skin of the machine], Alfabeta, 
no.­17­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
87A regular and prolonged interaction with systems that 
reveal, even in a limited sense, an intelligence on a par with 
human beings will surely end up changing something in 
the operator’s mind. It is highly likely that, after a lengthy 
exchange with Alter Ego through Ego, the subject will no 
longer be the same, even in the relatively deep reaches of 
its structure. Obviously, interacting with non-intelligent 
machines­is­just­as­likely­to­modify­personality­traits.­But­
interaction partnered with simulation, even if rough and 
limited, equivalent to that of a human being, assumes an 
intrinsically­different­nature.­In­some­way­indefinable­and­
yet quite evident, it means interacting with a mind removed 
from its natural—I was about to say traditional—physi-
ological support. It means interacting with systems that 
somehow show they possess a “self,” an identity complex. It 
could be enough in some cases, because as far as the subject 
is concerned Alter Ego is a machine, whereas he is a person. 
Perhaps­a­new­form­of­alienation;­or­rather­a­form­of­inter-
action by no means original, a virtual symbiosis between two 
minds­with­different­physical­supports,­from­developments­
our­current­cognitive­codes­find­quite­indecipherable.­Who­
says that a mind must be locked forever within a single 
brain?43
43 Luciano Gallino, Mente, comportamento e intelligenze artificiale [Mind, 
behavior­and­artificial­intelligence],­(Milan:­Comunità,­1984),­74­[trans.­
Robert­Booth].
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The Price of Immortality
Man’s body is therefore mute. It could speak as long as nature 
spoke, and a series of secret, esoteric missives went from one to 
the other, and the repetition of rites illustrated the myth again 
and again, allowing the signs accumulated on the body to be 
deciphered. Today, nature no longer exists, it broke up into a 
series of delimited echo-systems, alternately threatened and 
protected, surrounded and made to emerge by an “ambience” 
that­has­taken­nature’s­place,­yet­is­completely­artificial,­as­we­
know. The body spoke even if only to expound, at every given 
opportunity, on a supreme law that illuminated equally senseless 
facts­and­attitudes.­But­this­law­is­now­obsolete,­the­machine­that­
wrote the articles went mad and killed the last custodian without 
even­giving­him­the­satisfaction­of­being­able­to­offer­his­body­
as paper on which to write those articles for the last time. Death 
even threatens dwindling hope, the promise of one day having a 
system of equations, no matter how long and complicated, that 
tells us: “So from material comes thought, the bridge that from 
DNA arrives at the imaginary, dreams, speech.” Philosophers 
today investigate the whys and wherefores that, in less than a 
90 century, have taken Western culture from a position of “strength” 
to one of “weakness,” from “great stories” to fragments. It isn’t 
the least relevant of the paradoxes that the era of technology’s 
greatest expansion, namely man’s capacity to modify the environ-
ment in which he lives with his artefacts, is the era that considers 
the crisis far deeper than the image man has created of himself, 
an­image­that­was­built­(as­some­thought)­to­comply­with­the­
expansion of these capacities.
Until­now­we­have­tried­to­show­how­a­figure­of­contemporary­
imagery, the cyborg, might illuminate, albeit with a tangential 
and oblique light, this complex of problems. The hypothesis 
that emerges, certainly in a very hybrid way, as suited to the 
argument, is that a part of the traditionally human prerogative, 
in keeping with the growth of its accomplishments, is being 
transferred­to­the­machine;­perhaps­because­this­burden­is­
becoming too great for its bearer. It is a process that brings both 
elation and fear, enthusiasm and pessimism, mocking advances 
and fearful retreats. In so far as it pertains to the argument that 
has been chosen, we attempted to document them all, without 
regard for either the pre-established thesis or the discriminatory 
parameters­between­the­texts­(for­example­the­“literary”­quality)­
that weren’t essential to the illustrations of the indicated themes. 
Amongst these, one perhaps deserves a few more words. Man 
seems envious of machine’s immortality. This isn’t something 
new: man has always granted his more eminent creations the 
eternal life that he as an individual is denied biologically, and 
whose species’ survival is by no means guaranteed. Nonetheless, 
even the great masonry and architectural creations, those that 
easily outlive their creators, are subject to a long and unrelenting 
decline­due­to­the­materials­they­are­made­of.­Besides­this,­
the remorseless passage of time and the linear approach even 
in this domain render death even more inevitable, without 
traditional correctives of a religious nature being able to call upon 
a­significant­course­of­action;­despite­contemporary­thinking­
having dismissed death in a particularly radical way. The machine 
91on the other hand seems to share in this linear temporality 
enough to guarantee a certain chance of survival: insofar as 
the advent of the computer distances its being from a material 
substratum­and­identifies­with­the­“working­principles”­of­an­
immaterial type, or largely independent of the support on which 
they­are­realized­(the­programs).­The­cyborg,­this­undoubtedly­
non-mystical­union­of­man­and­machine,­of­natural­and­artificial,­
could therefore allude to the realization of man’s age-old dream, 
“immortality.”
Of­all­the­characters­in­the­science­fiction­genre­examined­thus­
far, one stands head and shoulders above the others, just as 
his author does amongst other authors: Palmer Eldritch, the 
“arcane pilgrim” in Philip K. Dick’s The Three Stigma of Palmer 
Eldritch­(1964).­During­the­Kennedy­and­Vietnam­War­years,­Dick­
combined an extraordinary capacity for analysis and the por-
trayal of contemporary American reality with an acute under-
standing of the deeper characteristics of the anthropological 
transformation that, for many, would only become apparent 
some ten years or so later. Palmer Eldritch is a very singular 
cyborg, anomalous with respect to all those we have analyzed 
until­now.­When­he­first­appears­in­the­book,­his­transformation­
is already complete: he arrives back from a mysterious voyage 
to Proxima Centauri, a red dwarf star of which nothing is known, 
other than it having involved him in an indeterminate accident. 
However, on his return his appearance is no longer entirely 
human:­what­is­striking­about­the­body­is­the­artificial­eyes,­teeth­
and an arm, which will become a distinctive mark of his presence. 
He­has­come­back­with­a­very­powerful­drug­named­Chew-Z,­
with which he intends to supplant the drug already widely used 
by the settlers of Mars, Can-D, produced by industrialist Leo 
Bulero.­A­first­stage­of­the­book­deals­with­this­industrial­fight­
between­Bulero,­a­representative­of­the­capitalist­“old­guard,”­
and Eldritch, who fronts for the new breed of technological cap-
italists. At this stage it is already typical of Dick to reveal not the 
capitalists of the traditionally industrial sector, but producers 
92 and dealers of something popular with the masses like drugs, 
that­render­life­tolerable­to­the­terrestrials­on­Mars­(an­arid­and­
squalid­planet,­far­different­from­the­one­portrayed­by­Bradbury),­
projecting them into hallucinatory realities that make the settlers 
identify with protagonist dolls made of otherwise inanimate 
compositions.­But,­at­the­second­stage­of­the­book,­Eldritch’s­
Chew-Z­doesn’t­limit­itself­to­preferring­(as­might­be­interpreted)­
creations of the unconscious within preformed environments like 
the­“compositions”­of­the­dolls.­The­new­drug,­in­effect,­creates­
far­more­powerful­hallucinatory­elements,­very­real­artificial­
worlds created by individuals without any reference to external 
stimuli, and in which other characters can be “trapped,” as expe-
rienced­by­Bulero­and­his­employee,­Barney­Mayerson,­whom­
he sent to muscle in on the opposition. Gradually it emerges that 
these worlds are no more than variations of Eldritch’s mental 
projections,­like­the­“three­stigmas”­(artificial­eyes,­teeth,­arm)­
that circulate amongst all the characters without their being 
able to stop it. Their appearance becomes the signal that the 
reality they are living at that moment is under Eldritch’s con-
trol. Thus, as Darko Suvin points out, the three stigmas become 
“three­signs­of­demonic­artificiality.­The­prosthetic­eyes,­hands,­
and teeth, allow him—in a variant of the Wolf in Little Red Riding 
Hood—to­see­(understand),­grab­(manipulate),­and­rend­(ingest,­
consume)­his­victims­better.”44­But­the­cyborg­here­is­not­just­the­
exponent of a change in an industry destined to better control 
and exploit its consumers within its system. It is also the symbol 
of an immortality attained through the manipulation of reality 
and time, a return of what is holy within the only dimension in 
which it is possible, the eternity and the pervasiveness of the 
merchandise’s­cycle:­“I­did­not­find­God­in­the­Prox­system.­But­I­
found something better. [...] God [...] promises eternal life. I can 
44 Darko Suvin, “P. K. Dick’s Opus: Artifice as Refuge and World View (Introductory 
Reflections),” in Richard D. Mullen and Darko Suvin, eds., Science-Fiction 
Studies. Selected Articles 1973–1975­(Boston:­Gregg­Press,­1976),­170.
93do better, I can deliver it,”45 Palmer Eldritch says. The religious 
dimension,­armed­with­the­industrial­dimension­of­efficiency,­
becomes­invincible.­Behind­the­cyborg,­and­the­anthropological­
upheaval which it delays, lives, as noted by Pagetti, a patriarchal 
obsession in which technological progress and return of the 
archetype is combined:
Leo­Bulero­and,­later,­Palmer­Eldritch­are­father­figures­to­Barney,­
the epitome of a paternity against which any form of rebellion 
is destined to fail […]. On the other hand, both fathers are the 
result of a technological progress that turned them into mon-
strous­creatures,­cyborgs,­disfigured­faces­that­threatened­the­
helpless­and­terrified­children­[…].­We­are­faced­with­the­entropic­
condition of the Dickian universe and its message that by now is 
reduced to a single obsessive piece of information: the universe is 
Palmer Eldritch, Palmer Eldritch is the universe. Palmer Eldritch’s 
three­stigmas­refer­however­to­the­devastating­effects­that­the­
capitalist technology has had on mankind, to the exploration that 
man carries out in the shadow of a God-father halfway between 
childhood memory and electronic manipulation, to the fantastic 
representation of a journey of psychic regression.46
Literature’s­first­monster­in­the­modern­sense,­Frankenstein,­was­
clearly­the­son­of­man;­Palmer­Eldritch,­according­to­Pagetti’s­
interpretation, incarnates the father. A possible sense of the 
journey taken by man’s imagination and linked to technology is 
closed within this reversal of positions, despite not being com-
pletely spent. From son to father, from death to immortality. It all 
depends on the price.
45 Philip K. Dick, The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch­(1964).
46 Carlo Pagetti, “Introduzione,” in Philip K. Dick, Illusione di potere (Roma: Fanucci, 
2009),­VI­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
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Technology under the 
Skin
In the popular imagination of the twentieth century, we saw the 
cyborg­emerge­as­an­ambiguous­and­grim­figure:­linked­certainly­
to the developments of technology without which it would 
probably­have­failed­to­make­it­to­the­pages­of­science­fiction­
books, to cinema screens, to comic books, but ultimately still 
immersed in a prevalently fantastic dimension that demonstrates 
ambition, concern, nightmares born from routine, but then 
immediately detached themselves in order to be projected into 
the “unreal” space of the imagination and, apparently, stay there.
From the Imaginary to the Everyday
However, if we pay closer attention to the historic development 
of­this­figure,­we­notice­that,­starting­in­the­sixties,­it­takes­on­
a more domestic dimension, something closer to real life. The 
boxed brains from the stories of the twenties and thirties still 
have that metal robotic look, whereas Roger Torraway of Man Plus 
or Roddie of The Continuous Katherine Mortenhoe have an unmis-
takably­human­aspect,­despite­being­modified­by­technology.­The­
98 change is even more apparent if we think of cinema. Fritz Lang’s 
intelligent intuition in Metropolis­(1926),­namely­that­the­robot­
may look perfectly human, remained unique for a long time, and 
not­until­1956­did­it­re-emerge­in­Don­Siegel’s­Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers;­but­Jack­Finney­and­Siegel’s­fake­humans­are­extra-
terrestrials,­not­artificial­men.­In­order­to­celebrate­his­cinematic­
apotheosis,­the­humanoid­robot­(alias­android,­alias­replicant,­the­
indistinguishable­copy­of­the­original)­found­in­Asimov’s­stories­
from­the­fifties,­and­Dick’s­a­few­years­later,­will­have­to­wait­
until Blade Runner­in­1982.­The­cyborgs­of­the­fifties­have­a­mien­
that, in general, makes them look very much like robots. In The 
Colossus of New York,­for­example,­a­1958­film­by­Eugène­Lourié,­
the brain of the scientist who dies in an accident is encapsulated 
in an imposing, clumsy and quite frightening metallic, vaguely 
anthropomorphic body, who must once again learn the basic 
movements­and­the­fundamentals­of­speech­(this­mediocre­film­
comes across as a boring copy of Whale’s Frankenstein, with a 
tin­body­in­place­of­the­creature’s­monstrous­fleshy­body).­But­
in­the­two­cyborg­films­that­better­represent­the­eighties,­James­
Cameron’s Terminator­(1984),­followed­by­his­Terminator 2­(1991),­
and Paul Verhoeven’s Robocop­(1987),­it­is­the­human­body­that­
returns­to­the­screen,­in­two­very­different­but­conspiring­ways.­
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s body in Terminator47 is human only 
skin-deep:­in­the­famous­scene­in­which­the­cyborg­(an­android­
in­reality)­repairs­its­damage­in­a­sordid­hotel­room,­the­camera­
reveals the inner workings of the body, such as the micro-video 
cameras in place of the eyes, the wiring and metal rods in place 
of the muscles and tendons in the arm. Cameron’s fantastic 
technology­was­capable­of­enveloping­a­machine­(the­horrible­
metallic­skeleton­of­the­film’s­final­scene­when­it­rises­up­out­of­
the­flames­to­pursue­Sarah­Connor)­with­the­faithful­simulacrum­
of the human body, and the spectator, before the Terminator is 
47 In reality The Terminator has a curious ancestry, also from the point of 
view­of­the­plot,­in­Franklin­Andreon’s­wild­1966­film,­Cyborg 2087, in which 
Michael Rennie plays a humanlike cyborg from the future.
99reduced­to­a­(metal)­skeleton,­looks­upon­that­merciless­body,­in­
all­its­hellish­artificiality,­as­the­image—the­metaphor,­also­from­
an ethical point of view—of technology’s invasion of the human 
body. The same invasion is shown as it unfolds in Robocop, which 
is the visual epitome of the authentic computerized electro-
mechanical­cyborg.­The­face­of­Police­Officer­Murphy­(Peter­
Weller),­who­was­almost­killed­in­a­gun­battle­against­evil­drug­
dealers,­disappears­for­most­of­the­film,­buried­beneath­the­
solemn metallic helmet that hides his features, following the 
reconstruction­process­and­the­insertion­of­artificial­components­
that­turn­him­into­a­machine­of­law-enforcement­(but­the­cyborg­
hangs onto a few vague memories of the human being he once 
was, so much so that the faithful Nancy Allen recognizes the 
supposedly­killed-in-action­cop­beneath­that­mechanical­façade);­
Weller’s face reappears only at the end, in a scene exquisitely 
reminiscent of westerns.
By­laying­claim­to­the­term­“cyborg,”­Hollywood­got­it­wrong­from­
the start, making it a synonym of “android,” but even so they 
somehow managed to register the new cultural and technological 
galaxy that allowed direct technical penetration of man’s body. 
Both­Terminator and Robocop, however, present extreme situ-
ations,­both­narratively­and­technologically­(fantastic,­hypo-
thetic),­necessary­for­the­transformation­of­the­body.­These­
cyborgs­can­even­frequent­everyday­life­situations,­offices,­the­
homes of human beings, but their origins are still rooted in 
far-flung­places­in­time,­in­space,­in­techno-science;­the­social­
character of that origin is still very indirect, very arbitrary. Going 
back­to­Stableford’s­classification,­it­is­still­all­about­medical­
cyborgs,­adaptive­cyborgs­or­functional­cyborgs;­or,­if­one­prefers­
the terminology of Gray’s manual, “restorative,” “normalizing,” 
“reconfiguring”­or­“enhancing”­cyborg­technologies.48­But­
everyone­knows­that­classifications­exist­to­be­refuted.­In­the­
48 Chris H. Gray, ed., The Cyborg Handbook­(London­and­New­York:­Routledge,­
1995),­3.
100 same year that Blade Runner was released, another cyborg hit the 
screens, one that enjoyed less success, an absolutely new cyborg, 
not­even­remotely­akin­to­Hollywood­(it­could­even­be­considered­
anti-Hollywood),­with­a­body­whose­technological­integration­was­
by no means a deliberate choice, nor was it the result of surgery 
or of a high-tech procedure: it was instead the result, more or 
less spontaneous, but by no means less exceptional and sur-
prising,­of­a­social­process,­of­a­particular­configuration­of­the­
communicative­flow.­In­David­Cronenberg’s­Videodrome­(1982),­
it is society, and in particular the social apparatus central to the 
modernism of the media system that secretes the frightening 
hybrid of man and machine, and produces it directly from 
quotidian routine. This time the mixed dimension of anthropo-
technology isn’t the result of a war between man and machine, 
between­past­and­future­(Terminator),­or­from­the­collision/
collusion between criminal violence and institutional violence in a 
desolated­metropolis­(Robocop),­but­from­a­clandestine,­low-def-
inition television signal, the Videodrome, that impinges on the 
ether between the other signals and so sends out psychic, more 
profound images of particularly receptive individuals like Max 
Renn­( James­Woods),­the­restless­television­producer­always­on­
the lookout for increasingly more violent, more realistic porno-
graphic­programs.­With­what­was­defined­as­“invisible­editing”,­
void of “any magic or gothic atmosphere”,49 Cronenberg shows us 
a world that is undoubtedly ours—even if to the nth degree—with 
pervasive and morbid, but domestic television programming, 
a constitutive element of our daily lives while at the same time 
acting as a catalyst of pulses powerful enough to transform the 
world around us, to wipe out every stable boundary between 
the objective exterior and the interior of a psychic experience, 
of sexual fantasies, of the urge to die. “The battle for the mind 
of­North­America,”­says­Professor­O’Blivion,­a­sort­of­spirited­
McLuhan­to­whom­Cronenberg­in­some­way­entrusts­the­film’s­
49 Serge Grünberg, David Cronenberg­(Paris:­Editions­Cahiers­du­Cinéma,­1992)­
[trans.­Robert­Booth].
101philosophical bent, “will be fought in the video arena, with the 
Videodrome. The television screen is the retina of the mind’s eye. 
Therefore, the television screen is part of the physical structure 
of the brain. [...] Therefore, television is reality, and reality is less 
than television50 While Max turns into a “hallucination machine”,51 
the world around him also changes, without the spectator 
ever being able to decide whether or not this transformation 
depends­on­Max’s­altered­mind­or­if,­within­the­film’s­world,­it­
has an objective quality: the videocassettes originating from 
Videodrome become agitated and shake before being slipped 
into the video recorder, the television screen becomes soft and 
expands,­dilates,­Nick’s­lips­(the­radio­diva­who­pulls­and­ferries­
Max­into­the­world­of­Videodrome)­no­longer­create­a­flat­image,­
but extend into the room, enveloping and absorbing the pro-
tagonist. With Nick having become an element of Videodrome, 
almost without realizing it, his body begins to manifest the 
stigmas of the cyborg. A hole opens up in his stomach into which 
he slips the videocassette that will trigger the process of trans-
lation: later, from the same hole, Max will pull out a viscous pistol 
of­organic­fluid­soldered­directly­to­his­hand­with­which­he­will­
avenge those who tried to change him into a pawn for their game. 
None of this is the result of a mission carried out by some human 
or­mechanical­agent.­Cronenberg­doesn’t­show­us­any­specific­
technology responsible for this transformation: it happens before 
the eyes of the spectator, spontaneously, even though obviously 
shocking,­the­direct­“effect”­of­television.­The­fusion­of­Max’s­
hand with the pistol takes place within his body, in a process that 
the screenplay doesn’t worry about explaining, and the result is 
an image linked much more to the organic of cinematographic 
and comic-book cyborg traditions. It is because Max Renn 
50 Cronenberg, Videodrome.
51 Grünberg, David Cronenberg­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
102 appears to escape the standard cyborg categories that I sug-
gested­he­be­defined­as­a­“media­cyborg”­or­“coded­cyborg.”52
The­hybrid­figure,­as­we­know,­is­one­of­the­central­figures­of­
Cronenberg’s cinema. The fact that the hybridization man-
machine­(namely­the­cyborg)­is­one­of­the­Canadian­filmmaker’s­
favorite­themes­was­confirmed­with,­apart­from­Crash­(1996),­his­
next­film­eXistenZ­(1998).­eXistenZ­picks­up,­just­over­fifteen­years­
later, where Videodrome­left­off­(this­time­with­more­explicit­and­
insistent­references­to­Philip­K.­Dick):­for­those­involved,­the­slide­
between the “real world” and the virtual worlds is impossible 
to distinguish. Except that this time television is no longer the 
medium­that­creates­this­slide,­but­is­instead­centered­(under-
standably­so,­seeing­that­the­film­was­made­at­the­end­of­the­
nineties)­on­videogames.­However,­as­always­with­Cronenberg,­
the theme of virtuality is not present at a purely dreamlike level, 
with the sole representation of the altered perceptions that signal 
the entrance into parallel universes generated by the various 
media. From Shivers, Rabid and Brood to Dead Ringers and The 
Fly, Cronenberg’s attention is constantly focused on biological 
processes as the origin, the means, the organizational center, 
and­battlefield­of­the­imaginary.­As­in­Videodrome, Max Renn’s 
body bears the visible and traumatic signs of his entry into 
the­new­dimension­(the­television,­in­the­powerful­end­scene,­
explodes­revealing­an­interior­of­blood­and­entrails),­so­eXis-
tenZ­is­an­artificial,­but­live­game,­Game-Pod,­made­up­of­syn-
thetic meat, MetaFlesh, that comes into direct contact with the 
player’s nervous system via a connector plugged into his spine at 
waist­level,­the­Biosport.­This­“connection”,­fired­from­a­special­
pistol,­looks­just­like­a­sexual­orifice­(as­on­other­occasions­with­
Cronenberg: Rose’s armpit-vagina in Rabid, and the long scar 
on Gabrielle’s leg in Crash­with­which­James­makes­love).­And­so­
the­player,­in­order­to­play­the­game,­must­become­a­modified,­
52 Antonio Caronia, Il Corpo Virtuale­[The­Virtual­Body],­(Padova:­Muzzio,­1966),­
91–92­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
103reconfigured­human­being,­must­accept­an­organic­artificial­
presence inside his body, and must be in symbiosis with Game-
Pod: he must become a cyborg, despite being organic and not 
electro-mechanical.
Universes to be Kept in the Pocket
Already­in­1982,­therefore,­Videodrome­shuffled­the­cards­in­the­
cyborg’s universe and signaled, somewhat before its time, a 
change in the imaginary relative to the relationship between 
man­and­machine.­There­is­a­scene­in­the­film­that,­seen­years­
later, proves to be singularly prophetic: at the headquarters of 
the company that produces Videodrome, Max is made to wear a 
helmet with which the technicians may study his hallucinations. 
But­the­editing­and­the­visual­structure­of­the­scene­somehow­
suggest that the helmet is more than just an image “recorder”, 
that it is almost a go-between through which Max evokes and 
visualizes­his­sadistic­fantasies­about­Nick.­In­1982­the­term­
“virtual reality” was still relatively unknown, but when, some 
years­later,­one­began­to­see—first­at­fairs­and­specialized­con-
ventions, then at videogame halls, hospitals, research centers—
the head-mounted displays, Cronenberg’s fans will remember 
that scene with pleasant amazement. The technologies capable 
of­simulating­artificial­environments­that­go­under­the­heading­
of “virtual reality”53­had­in­effect­already­taken­root­back­in­
the sixties and seventies, thanks to the work of researchers 
like­Ivan­Sutherland­(inventor­of­the­head-mounted­display),­
Alan Kay, Nicholas Negroponte and others, at institutions like 
the­Architecture­Machine­Group­(known­later­as­Media­Lab)­of­
MIT, and Atari Laboratory. The basic intuitions are credited to 
“visionaries” like Douglas Engelbart and J.R.C. Licklider, whose 
idea­of­a­“man-computer­symbiosis”­influenced­the­widespread­
53 See Howard Rheingold, Virtual Reality­(New­York:­Summit­Books,­1991),­
and Sandra K. Helsel and Judith P. Roth, Virtual Reality, Theory, Practice and 
Promise­(Westport,­Meckler,­1991).
104 use­of­the­personal­computer.­Between­the­late­sixties­and­early­
seventies, Myron Krueger, an experimenter whose work bordered 
on technology and art, had already created interactive environ-
ments that reacted to the movements and actions of visitors, the 
most­famous­of­which­(1975–77)­was­“Videoplace”.­Krueger­had­
chosen­the­name­“artificial­reality”54 for these environments, a 
term­that­was­not­successful.­But­it­wasn’t­until­the­mid-eighties­
that­a­genius­self-educated­twenty-five-year-old­named­Jaron­
Lanier­put­together­Sutherland’s­helmet,­Thomas­Zimmerman’s­
“data glove” produced for NASA—a Lycra glove that duplicated 
the movements of the hand—stereophonic sound and a new 
visual­programming­language­in­order­to­build­the­first­environ-
ment that would be called “virtual”. The founding of his company, 
the­Visual­Programming­Language­(VPL),­coincided­with­the­
brief but intense boom of virtual reality that kept journalists, 
commentators and crowds of curious people all over the world 
busy­for­five­or­six­years.­In­the­intentions­of­its­prophets,­virtual­
reality had all the characteristics of a new interface between man 
and­computer;­an­interface­that­no­longer­needed­sequences­of­
letters numbers or abstract symbols to be typed on a keyboard, 
nor two-dimensional icons to be dragged across the screen with 
the mouse—all replaced by simple movements of the body. The 
software­that­created­the­reality­(the­reality­engine)­responded­
to­movements­and­changed­the­environments­around­us­(walls,­
furniture,­objects)­to­make­us­perceive­them­as­those­of­an­
ordinary reality. The computer-generated virtual world brought 
to us via the small screens and the helmet was a copy of the real 
world,­or­one­that­abided­by­different­laws,­but­appeared­to­
sight,­sound­and,­within­certain­limits,­touch­(if­one­wore­the­data­
glove)­as­the­real­thing:­one­could­pick­up­virtual­objects,­move­
them­around,­hear­the­accompanying­sounds;­one­could­move­
from one virtual room to another, or stay outdoors, walk barefoot 
across­virtual­grass­beneath­a­(virtual)­bright­blue­sky.
54 Myron W. Krueger, Artificial Reality II­(Reading,­MA:­Addison-Wesley,­1991).
105The creation of a world that shared numerous characteristics 
with the real world, and in which the participant had oppor-
tunities­to­do­things­unheard­of­in­the­real­world­(like­being­
able­to­fly­by­simply­lifting­a­finger,­or­being­endowed­with­
superhuman­strength)­was­what­mainly­caught­the­public’s­
imagination;­in­fact­for­some­years­the­biggest­money­makers­
were the “immersive” videogames. The moment the user put 
on­the­helmet­or­the­gloves­(or­gripped­the­joystick)­it­became­a­
temporary cyborg in a man connected to a machine, in an “aug-
mented­human­being”­(augmented reality was another term sug-
gested­to­indicate­virtual­reality),­and­took­off­for­worlds­hitherto­
unknown. Not necessarily a fantastic world, also a world rem-
iniscent­of­the­one­lived­in­every­day­(except­for­the­scale­of­the­
objects and the ranges that made up the surfaces, but this was 
a­problem­of­the­computer’s­power).­For­the­first­time,­cyborg­
technology involved sensorial translation—and no longer a purely 
imaginary one—in a parallel reality. As with Cronenberg, the 
technical­transformations­(even­temporary)­applied­to­the­body­
influenced­the­environment­in­which­the­body­was­immersed,­
the world. The creators of the more lucid virtual realities were 
aware­that­this­leap­forward­in­exteriorization­(a­modality­always­
founded­in­technology,­but­capable­this­time­of­a­greater­quality)­
implicated a rethink of the concept of experience. It ’s worth 
knowing­what­Lanier­had­to­say­in­a­1989­interview:
Virtual­reality­is­not­like­the­next­way­computers­will­be;­it ’s­
much broader than the idea of a computer. A computer is a 
specific­tool.­Virtual­reality­is­an­alternate­reality­[…].­In­Vir-
tual­Reality­your­memory­can­be­externalized.­Because­your­
experience is computer-generated, you can simply save it, 
and so you can play back your old experience anytime from 
your own perspective. Given that, you can organize your 
experience and use your experience, use your externalized 
memory in itself, as the basis for what you would call The 
Finder­in­the­Macintosh.­That­will­be­quite­a­different­thing.­
106 You­can­keep­whole­universes­in­your­pocket­or­behind­your­
ear and pull them out and look through them any time.55 
Virtual reality’s mass media boom died out like a meteor, just in 
time­to­anticipate­a­far­more­consistent­(and­apparently­more­
durable)­boom,­that­of­the­Internet,­and­yet­that­togetherness­
of technology appears to have broken the promise of giving 
everyone “entire universes to keep in one’s pocket”. In reality it ’s 
not like that. Pending an ulterior increase in computer power, and 
equipment less awkward than the now ancient head-mounted 
display and the data glove with their mass of cables, technology 
continues to modify our bodies while doing the same to the world 
around us. And it continues to mix the real world with its virtual 
image, multiplying the informative channels open between man 
and man, and between man and environment. The cell phone 
alone­is­an­instrument­that­connects­us­to­the­whole­world­(and­
the whole world to us, which isn’t fun seeing how anyone can 
follow­our­every­move­if­they­so­wish)­in­a­way­that­wasn’t­even­
contemplated until a few years ago. However, in the usual labs 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the future, as a 
lazy journalist would say, advances by giant leaps and bounds. 
The consortium’s “Things that think” projects include numerous 
“softwear” research programs: glasses with miniature cameras 
that show a constant picture of what is going on above and 
behind­us­(with­the­added­capability­of­changing­the­luminosity­
or­perspective­of­our­surrounding­world)­without­us­having­to­
turn­our­heads;­a­live­keyboard­to­take­notes;­sensors­in­the­
shirt or pocket that measure our heartbeat, how fast we are 
walking, even how much we sweat. “Three forces,” wrote Neil 
Gershenfeld, the co-director of the Things That Think consortium, 
“are driving this transition: people’s desire to augment their 
innate capabilities, emerging technological insight into how to 
embed computing into clothing, and industrial demand to move 
55 Adam Heilbrun, “Virtual Reality. An Interview with Jaron Lanier,” Whole Earth 
Review­(Fall­1989):­112.
107information away from where the computers are and to where 
the people are.”56 Going in the same direction is the “Personal 
Area­Network”­(PAN)­invention­by­IBM’s­Tom­Zimmerman­that­
utilizes the very small electric current that courses through our 
skin to send messages from one part of the body to another, or 
from­body­to­body­(so­that,­for­example,­one­could­pay­with­a­
credit card without producing it, by simply shaking hands with 
the­vendor).57 In other words, cyberspace can exit the computer 
screen or our heads to become our daily space, and reality loses 
its objective character more and more to become a technological 
artefact;­much­like­our­body,­and­the­body­of­the­cyborg.
A Fractal Subject for a Fractal World
So there you have it, cyberspace: because a unifying word was 
needed, one that could indicate the new space inhabited by the 
cyborg, deal with the graphic simulations of virtual reality, of 
“augmented­reality”­filtered­and­enriched­by­the­“softwear,”­or­
by the more immediate and domestic version that is the Inter-
net’s­“non­place.”­This­expression­came­from­a­novel,­the­first­by­
an­American­writer,­who­lived­in­Canada,­wrote­science­fiction­
stories and for many years believed there was “something” 
behind the computer screen, something that not even he 
could­identify­(considering­the­fact­that­little­was­known­about­
computers­at­the­time),­a­sort­of­virtual­space­in­which­some­of­
his characters could enter and leave as they wished. He named 
it­matrix­in­his­first­stories.­In­Neuromancer,­published­in­1984,­
the term juxtaposed with cyberspace. The word was liked 
not only by readers, but also by scientists and technologists, 
and rapidly began to be used to indicate not only the literary 
invention, but also the environment of virtual realities, and then 
that­of­the­Internet.­William­Gibson­was­the­most­gifted­(quickly­
56 Neil Gershenfeld, When Things Start to Think­(New­York:­Henry­Holt,­1999),­47.
57 See Antonio Caronia, “Contanti o Stretta di Mano?” [Cash or Handshake?], Vir-
tual,­no.­38­( January­1997).
108 becoming­the­most­famous)­of­a­small­group­of­writers­who,­as­
occasionally­happens­in­the­world­of­science­fiction,­wanted­to­
revamp the genre, to reconnect it somehow to its origins as a 
“hard” technological genre, but speaking—with a little extrap-
olation—more of the present than of the future. The success 
of Neuromancer brought international recognition to this group 
of writers, who, thanks possibly to the word cyberspace and to 
highlight their attitude as “angry young men”, were baptized 
“cyberpunks” by the critics. The cyberpunks, because of their 
predilection for mirrored sunglasses, preferred to be called the 
“Mirrorshades Movement”, and were all the rage not only at 
book­conventions,­but­also­at­scientific­and­cultural­conventions­
exploring­virtual­reality.­And­the­neologism­that­defined­them­
was soon adopted by radical and libertarian groups from U.S. and 
international countercultures that had for years intervened on 
the social use of technology.58
The cyberpunk writers’ great innovation consisted in knowing 
how to see the changes in the relationship between technology 
and society, over and above the arrangement of the existing 
imaginary, in understanding and describing the turning point in 
technology’s­effective,­triumphant,­dramatic,­ironic,­but­in­the­
final­analysis­everyday­entry­to­body­technology,­and­the­gigantic,­
subterranean transformation in the ways of producing values in 
society that rendered them possible thanks to this technological 
revolution. They knew how to describe, with drama and irony, 
this new aspect of society that in just over ten years had become 
a­common­experience,­but­one­that­between­1980­and­1985­was­
still relatively unheard of, and was only intuited by those who 
for­years­had­frequented­certain­film­and­literature­circles,­or­
by­those­who­stubbornly­reflected­on­the­whys­and­wherefores­
58 See Cyberpunk. Antologia di Testi Politici [Cyberpunk. Anthology of Political 
Texts],­ed.­Raffaele­Scelsi­(Milan:­ShaKe,­1990).­A­reconstruction­of­the­lit-
erary and social aspects of that movement may be found in Antonio Caronia 
and Domenico Gallo, Houdini e Faust. Breve Storia del Cyberpunk [Houdini and 
Faust.­A­Brief­History­of­Cyberpunk],­(Milan:­Baldini­&­Castoldi,­1997).
109of the defeat of the anti-capitalist struggle in the sixties and 
seventies. During those years, many of us were stunned by 
the spread of Thatcherism and Reaganism, and still took it, 
instinctively, to be a sign of continuity with the capitalistic recon-
struction of the previous phases, as the instrument to kick-start 
the accumulation process and to reconstitute, in a “classical” 
way,­the­profit­margins­of­businesses.­Instead,­Gibson,­Sterling­
and friends showed us, with a certain understatement, that what 
was starting was a new model of accumulation, that capitalism 
and society were reinventing themselves, that the relation-
ship between the political, economic and social institutions, of 
the traditional capitalistic society had been shaken, that the 
relationship between territory and power was changing, that 
new­relations­between­new­institutions­were­springing­up;­that­a­
new geography of power, of command, of relationships between 
individuals and society were emerging in the new areas of vir-
tuality, and inextricably linking information, communication, 
knowledge and production. Perhaps not with the same clarity 
for all, but these—and we can say so today—were the reasons 
for the very real enthusiasm that gripped many of us in Europe 
between­1985­and­1987­when­we­read­Neuromancer. Driven by 
this enthusiasm, we rushed out to look for books by Gibson’s 
friends:­Bruce­Sterling,­Rudy­Rucker,­Lewis­Shiner,­John­Shirley­
and­others,­starting­with­that­old­Urania­of­1981,­City Come A-
Walkin’  by Shirley, in which the city, like an organism in symbiosis 
with its inhabitants, fought to defend itself against the aggression 
of the new “model of development”.
In­1986,­Bruce­Sterling­effectively­summarized­this­transfor-
mation of the social imaginary in his introduction to Mirrorshades, 
the group’s anthology-manifesto:
Science­fiction,­at­least­according­to­its­official­dogma,­has­
always­been­about­the­impact­of­technology.­But­times­have­
changed since the comfortable era of Hugo Gernsback, 
when­science­was­safely­enshrined,­and­confined­in­an­ivory­
tower. The careless technophilia of those days belongs to 
110 a vanished, sluggish era, when authority still had a com-
fortable margin of control. For the cyberpunks, by stark 
contrast, technology is visceral. It is not the bottled genie of 
remote­big­science­boffins;­it­is­pervasive,­utterly­intimate.­
Not outside us, but next to us, under our skin, often inside 
our minds. Technology itself has changed. Not for us the 
giant steam-snorting wonders of the past: the Hoover Dam, 
the­Empire­State­Building,­the­nuclear­power­plant.­Eighties­
tech sticks to the skin, responds to the touch: the personal 
computer, the Sony Walkman, the portable telephone, the 
soft contact lenses.59 
“When authority still enjoyed a comfortable margin of control.” 
Sure, here Sterling ducks the question of dominion with great 
elegance, seeming to almost legitimize the misunderstanding that 
the­decentralization­and­the­territorialization­of­command­(the­
end­of­the­“comfortable­margin­of­control”)­signify­a­decrease­
in­conflicts­in­post-Fordist­society.­Naturally,­this­isn’t­true,­on­
the contrary the contradictions in the new methods of capitalist 
production are sharpened, and not alleviated, by the new levels 
of integration, by the squandering of classical political inter-
vention, by the direct subsumption of language in the productive 
process.­But­this­doesn’t­do­away­with­the­fact­that­the­intuition­
was singularly and deeply just. There is no longer any possible 
control­(in­the­classic­sense)­when­technology­abandons­a­spe-
cialized and separated sector of the community, and becomes a 
constitutive­element­of­daily­life;­by­directly­entering­the­body­
it­literally­creates­“life”.­Less­than­ten­years­later,­in­1994,­Kevin­
Kelly, guru of the new technologies and new economy, renewed 
this concept, starting with the title of his monumental and doc-
umented review on the “new biology of machines”, Out of Con-
trol.60­The­era­of­electro-mechanics­has­definitely­run­its­course,­
59­ Bruce­Sterling,­“Preface,”­in­Mirrorshades: The Cyberpunk Anthology,­ed.­Bruce­
Sterling­(Gettysburg,­PA:­Arbor­House,­1986),­xiii.
60 Kevin Kelly, Out of Control. The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems and the 
Economic World­(Reading,­MA:­Addison­Wesley,­1994).
111whereas that of biomechanics has just started. The integration 
of information control in new generation machines relieves 
them of a predictable and strictly deterministic dimension, of 
increasingly identical and repetitive behavior, making them more 
and more akin to living beings, capable in some way of “resolving 
problems.” of establishing strategies of adjustment to the world, 
rather­than­living­in­limited­worlds­tailored­to­fit­their­limitations.
In the coming neo-biological era, all that we both rely on and 
fear will be more born than made. We now have computer 
viruses,­neural­networks,­Biosphere­2,­gene­therapy,­and­
smart­cards­–­all­humanly­constructed­artefacts­that­bind­
mechanical and biological processes. Future bionic hybrids 
will be more confusing, more pervasive, and more powerful. 
I imagine there might be a world of mutating buildings, 
living­silicon­polymers,­software­programs­evolving­off-
line,­adaptable­cars,­rooms­stuffed­with­co-evolutionary­
furniture, gnatbots for cleaning, manufactured biological 
viruses that cure your illnesses, neural jacks, cyborgian body 
parts, designer food crops, simulated personalities, and a 
vast­ecology­of­computing­devices­in­constant­flux.61
William Gibson, whose antennae are always sensitive to picking 
up suggestions that circulate in cutting edge technology and 
society, did not hesitate to discuss many of these things with us, 
for example “mutating buildings”: one of the most impressive 
inventions in his novel Idoru­(1996)­is­that­of­a­post-earthquake­
Tokyo rebuilt by biological nanotechnology that assembles the 
ruins and reconstructs the buildings as living beings, buildings 
that “slid apart, deliquesced, and trickled away, down into the 
mazes of an older city.”62 As for “simulated personalities,” we need 
only frequent any one of the virtual communities that for decades 
have­flooded­the­telematic­networks­in­order­to­collect­examples­
of the plentiful “self” fragments that make up the virtual subjects, 
61­ Ibid.,­500–501.
62 William Gibson, Idoru­(1996).
112 and that weave a canvas of “individual” narrations to which only 
the particular, often marginal characteristics of physical subjects 
correspond;­subjects­and­virtual­narrations­that,­in­the­simulative­
dimensions­and­relational­hypertrophy­of­the­networks,­find­an­
environment wonderfully suited to their expansion, an environ-
ment that protects their fragility and weakness, extolling instead 
their hybrid character, lying between the real and imaginary.
To­get­back­to­Baudrillard’s­formula:­what­happened,­why­this­
“breakdown of imaginary over reality”? How could this migration 
of­technologies­from­fantasy­to­effectuality­create­such­blatant­
effects­in­the­reconstruction­of­reality,­in­the­contamination­
of imagination and behavior, and in the breakup of traditional 
combinations­(work/spare­time,­private/public,­trivial/cultural)?­
Where does this invasion of parallel universes throughout 
our daily activities, mechanisms and social processes come 
from?­Let’s­hypothesize;­go­back­to­the­figure­of­the­cyborg.­
What occurred during the eighties wasn’t just that applying 
technological fantasies to the body, limited to vague potentials 
at­the­best­of­times,­started­out­as­shaky,­fitful­laboratory­
experiments before going on to become increasingly more solid 
technologies that could be bought for a steal on every street 
corner. Gradually, as this took place, it became clearer that 
the­technological­imagination­(science­fiction,­and­more)­had­
seen, or foreseen, the phenomenon in too limited a way, in a 
single­direction:­it­had­imagined­(desired­or­feared)­an­invasion­
of the body, a rush for the exterior to intrude on the interior. 
Conversely, while this certainly took place, a movement in the 
opposite direction also occurred: the interior invaded the exterior. 
What until yesterday had occupied man’s psychic and private 
dimension, his fantasies and dreams, withdrew from that secret 
dimension, became immediately communicable, could be shared 
with others far beyond the linguistic instrument, could become 
a common experience. Until now these experiences had existed 
only within the traditional mediation of accepted and established 
social behavior, for which fantasy, dreams and idle digression 
113were the hidden rear zones that contributed to propping up the 
front line of a “personality” considered presentable, because 
it­was­different,­the­labyrinthian­and­dark­basements­that­fed,­
in somewhat unconscious ways, the image that everyone had 
of themselves, the one that they presented to the world. In 
principle,­everything­could­now­be­objectified,­“represented,”­
brought­to­life;­the­technologized­body­brought­a­whole­world­
with it, an environment in which to prosper, express itself, grow 
and become stronger. And if this was possible, it means that the 
dogma of reality’s uniqueness faltered: the break-up of “self” 
brought with it the plurality of worlds. The parallel universes 
left­the­pages­of­science­fiction,­or­the­quantum­physicists’­most­
daring cosmological hypotheses, to become the worlds of the 
house next-door, from which one could come and go in a rel-
atively­“normal”­fashion.­In­one­of­the­more­acute­reflections­on­
cyberpunk­science­fiction,­Brian­McHale­explained­why­it­(and,­
more­in­general,­all­of­science­fiction)­is­such­an­appropriate­
instrument for this type of theme. According to McHale, science 
fiction­(much­like­the­postmodern­novel)­enjoys­an­“ontological­
dominance”,­whereas­the­modernist­novel­(and­the­thriller)­
worries instead about epistemological problems. “Epis-
temologically-oriented­fiction­(modernism,­detective­fiction),”­
McHale writes,
is preoccupied with questions such as: what is there to know 
about the world? Who knows the world, and how reliably? 
How and to whom is knowledge transmitted, and with what 
degree of reliability? The questions typical of ontologically-
oriented­fiction­(postmodernism,­science­fiction)­are­
instead like: What is a world? How is a world constituted? Do 
alternative worlds exist, and if they do exist how are they 
constituted?­What­are­the­elements­that­distinguish­different­
114 worlds­and­the­different­types­of­world?­And­what­happens­
when one goes from one world to the other?63 
Now­“poetry­in­which­the­category­‘world’­is­plural,­unstable­
and­problematic,­seems­to­imply­a­model­of­‘self ’­that­is­also­
plural,­unstable­and­problematic.”­But­while­postmodern­story-
telling represented the disintegration of “self” at the language 
or narrative structural level, and not the world­of­fiction­in­which­
the­narration­is­set­(with­some­shining­examples,­like­Pynchon’s­
Gravity’s Rainbow),­cyberpunk­science­fiction­has­chosen­a­
more­direct­route,­“that­of­rendering­effective,­literal,­what­in­
the postmodern poetic appears as a metaphor with regard to 
the language, the structure, or the materiality of the means. 
Where­postmodernism­uses­a­figurative­representation­of­dis-
integration,­cyberpunk­texts­generally­project­fictional­worlds,­
which­include­(fictional)­objects­and­(fictional)­phenomena­that­
embody and illustrate the problems of individuality: human-
machine­symbiosis,­artificial­intelligences,­biologically-engineered­
alter egos, and so on.64
If we take a look, for example, at Neuromancer, we see that it 
contains­in­effect­a­far­wider­and­quasi­exemplary­range­of­such­
characters and situations of the sort, and that the interactions 
between­these­characters­serve­to­define­what­could­be­called­
the “ontological consistency” of the worlds amongst which the 
action unfolds. There is a typically “traditional”, electrome-
chanical cyborg, Molly, a female samurai with a prosthetic body: 
mirrored glasses in place of the eyes, retractable blades beneath 
the­fingernails.­There­is­the­new­mass-media­cyborg,­Case,­who­
abandons his own inert body on the chair, with the faithful Ono-
Sendai on his lap, in order to romp about between the “lines of 
lights in the non-space of his mind, amassed and constellated 
63­ Brian­McHale,­“Elements­of­a­Poetics­of­Cyberpunk,”­in­“Postmodern­science­
fiction,”­special­issue,­Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction­33,­no.­3­(1992):­
139.
64­ Ibid.,­149–150.
115with data” of cyberspace, “a consensually-lived hallucination 
experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators.65 There are 
artificial­intelligences­like­Wintermute­and­the­one­that­gave­its­
name to the book’s title, Neuromancer, packed with software 
that, though lacking human “motivation,” could be considered a 
“personality”. And there is even an immaterial individual, Dixie 
Flatline, a “constructed”, with the thoughts, conscience and ability 
of a cyberspace cowboy, now dead, recorded on a silicon platelet. 
To get a better understanding of how the relationships between 
these­characters­help­link­their­different­worlds,­the­different­
levels of reality that co-exist in Neuromancer, the more interesting 
scenes are perhaps those in which Case, by way of a simstim 
transmission­switch­(cyberspace’s­“commercial”­version),­can­link­
up with Molly whenever he wishes and see the world through 
her senses. McHale analyses these scenes from the point of view 
of the characters’ innovation, pointing out that this automatic 
switch of point-of-view is “a subversive gesture, implicitly under-
mining the model of the centered centripetal self upon which 
modernist perspectivism rests”:66 for example when through 
Molly’s eyes, Case contemplates himself huddled with the cyber-
space­deck­between­his­legs.­But­in­these­scenes­there­is­also­an­
implication, so to speak, on the nature of the world. During the 
combined­attack­on­Sense/Net’s­headquarters­(in­the­second­
part of Neuromancer),­carried­out­by­Case­from­cyberspace,­
by Molly from inside the building, and by the gang of Modern 
Panthers wreaking havoc on the city’s communication system, 
Case’s­continuous­passage­from­one­environment­to­another­(his­
room,­cyberspace,­the­Sense/Net­building),­with­the­trouble­he­
has distinguishing “his” sensory input from Molly’s, explicates 
the world’s already disparate and no longer monolithic character. 
It is a scene that summarizes Neuromancer’s implicit ontology 
(and­cyberpunk­fiction­in­general):­the­world­is­no­longer­made­
up of just one physical environment, of a “nature” transformed 
65 William Gibson, Neuromancer­(New­York:­Ace,­1984).
66­ McHale,­“Elements­of­a­Poetics­of­Cyberpunk,”­158.
116 by­man’s­material­presence­(buildings,­streets,­cities),­but­
rather a plurality of levels—not only material, but imaginary 
and informative too—that intertwine and intersect, in which 
the characters may live again and again, and simultaneously 
in certain cases, and in which it is not possible to establish a 
hierarchy,­so­that­a­(for­example,­material)­level­may­become­
more “established” than others. Rather, the game between the 
levels and the handling of the plots that weave in and out of each 
other constitute the cyborg era’s real, new form of politics.
Evidently, such a world is neither controllable, nor cognizable—
not even in principle—with the completeness and rigor required 
by the thought of modernity. In it, the cognitive and interpretive 
models applied by man cannot keep the necessary distance 
from the objects that they are supposed to model or represent, 
but inevitably end up becoming elements of the game, parts 
of the world, hybrid objects that must model themselves. The 
anthropologist may not deem his presence within the tribe as an 
element­that­does­not­influence­the­behavior­of­the­observed.­
The physicist cannot simultaneously determine the position and 
extent of movement of the subatomic particle that he is studying. 
There is no algorithm capable of automatically generating all 
the theorems of arithmetics. In the cyborg era the traditional 
program of classical science, the Laplacian dream of knowing 
the world’s past and future based upon a thorough examination 
of its state at any given moment, is abandoned: recognizing 
the unmanageable complexity of the world—not only “natural”, 
but also technological—one may concentrate on the objective 
of reproducing numerous new versions of that complexity, of 
repeating the characteristics of the physical and social macro-
cosm in the microcosm of every single machine and micro-uni-
verse that surrounds it like a bubble. It is no longer the moment 
for theory and critical thought, it is the time for simulations. “To 
think” no longer means to formulate theories, but to produce 
operative models, simulations. The cyborg is a fractal subject, 
hybrid not only in its body, but also in its rapport with the world.
[ 8 ]
From Electromechanics 
to Genetics
Problems of Classification
In­his­rich­dictionary­of­artificial­and­fantastic­beings,­Vincenzo­
Tagliasco­defines­the­cyborg­in­a­way­that­appears­more­
reductive with respect to the chosen criteria in this book, but 
does, however, come substantially to the same conclusion: 
that­artificiality­is­now­the­characteristic­that­distinguishes­our­
body.­His­meticulous­taxonomy­provides­a­continuum­of­36­cat-
egories­that­go­from­“normal”­human­(“being­born­from­female­
bearer­following­sexual­intercourse”)­to­“human­simulators”­
(mannequins,­inflatable­dolls­and­the­like),­listing­all­the­possible­
categories­in­terms­of­quantity­and­quality,­and­of­artificial­inter-
ference­with­the­body.­Tagliasco­sandwiches­the­cyborg­(cat-
egory­10)­between­mutants­and­cloned­beings.­He­starts­with­the­
definition­in­the­Zingarelli­dictionary­(“Cyborg:­human­being­onto­
which mechanical and electrical organs have been grafted,” which 
is­somewhat­reductive),­to­then­declare:
In the present taxonomy the cyborg is given a somewhat 
restrictive interpretation, linked to evaluations of 
118 performance and not to the substitution of so-called 
“normal” functions through technical and technological 
solutions.­Within­the­ambit­of­such­significance­a­human­
being who has undergone the substitution of various joints—
hip, knee and elbow—or the transplant of the cornea, heart, 
lung and liver, must not be considered a cyborg […]. Whereas, 
a human being who entrusts himself to neuropharmacology 
to strengthen his intellectual prowess could be considered 
a cyborg, inasmuch as the component of pharmacological 
artificiality­alters­his­machine-brain.67 
Given that “evaluations of performance” is a reasonably elastic 
conception, and that it could include “substitution of functions”—
considering it means to bolster a performance that has fallen 
below accepted levels—it must follow that potentially every 
human­being,­in­developed­societies,­is­a­cyborg.­And­the­final­
example­would­confirm­this­conclusion.­On­the­other­hand,­
talking about the prospect of genetic programming on already 
chosen­offspring,­Tagliasco­asks:­“Is­it­about­introducing­artificial­
elements in natural processes, or about acknowledging that 
the­so-called­‘natural’­presents­rules­of­evolution­profoundly­
correlated to the technological development of the human com-
munity?”68 It is here that all the ambiguity of “normality” emerges, 
along with the recognition that, within the realms of human 
activity,­each­overly­definite­distinction­between­“natural”­and­
“artificial”­risks­leading­to­irremediable­contradictions.­With­each­
technical advance, each new prosthesis, each new manipulation 
of physiological and relational mechanisms that guarantee new 
performances, the imaginary reacts by attributing the character 
67 Vincenzo Tagliasco, Dizionario degli essere umani fantastici e artificiali 
[Dictionary­of­fantastic­and­artificial­human­beings]­(Milan:­Mondadori,­
1999),­156­[trans.­Robert­Booth].­With­regard­to­the­precision­of­taxonomy—
that touches on the maniacal at times—and the wealth of references 
to­books,­stories,­films,­comic­books,­TV­series­and­technological­
achievements, this work represents an irreplaceable medium, not only at 
the Italian level, but also internationally.
68­ Ibid.,­15–16.
119of “natural” to the technologies of the previous generation, 
labelling these last objects as nostalgic memories.
The­fountain­pen­was­so­beautiful,­elegant­and­fluid­before­the­
squat and noisy typewriter came along to mechanize an activity 
as­magical­and­intimate­as­handwriting.­But­immediately­after­
that it was so great to pound away on a typewriter before the 
advent of the computer: I could feel the resistance of the key to 
the­pressure­of­my­finger,­I­had­to­feed­and­remove­the­sheet­of­
paper from the roll, it felt so alive, not this impalpable machine. 
And then the longing for natural medicines, and the cultivation 
of organic foods to save us from the pollution of “overly” indus-
trialized and technologized products. Just or understandable 
solutions, clearly, if the previous technologies turn out to be 
polluted or harmful, but to which do we grant with exaggerated 
generosity­the­qualification­of­“natural”,­without­reflecting­on­the­
fact­that­basically­it­is­just­a­recourse­to­different­technologies:­in­
an industrial or post-industrial world it is always “more” and not 
“less” technology that allows us to realize what is considered by 
common naivety as “natural”.  So, while inspecting the impact of 
technology on man and his body, we must highlight the cyborg’s 
technological and social leap, and its continuous relationship 
between body and technique that is constitutive of our species, 
as­indefinite,­“open­to­the­world”,­and­thus­in­need­of­an­“action”­
that­modifies­the­original­nature,­starting­with­that­of­the­body.69
However, Tagliasco’s planning and, even more, the example he 
gives of neuropharmacological enhancement are useful points 
because they take us back to the origin of the debate on the 
cyborg­in­the­early­sixties,­when,­as­mentioned­earlier,­New­York­
doctors Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline took part in research 
69 Here I refer to Arnold Gehlen’s philosophical anthropology, expressed for 
example in Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt [Man, his 
nature and place in the world]­(1940),­and­Urmensch und Spätkultur­(1956).­In­
Italy,­Gehlen’s­approach­was­expanded­by­Ubaldo­Fadini­(see­for­example­his­
Principio metamorfosi. Verso un antropologia dell’artificiale [Milan: Mimesis, 
1990]).
120 to modify the body in order to render it better adapted to space 
travel. This research was not born from nothing. From a certain 
point­of­view­it­fit­very­nicely­into­the­same­mix­of­psychology,­
biology and physics from which the studies on the theory of 
servomechanisms­were­born­in­the­forties­and­fifties­and­that,­
according to the neologism proposed by Norbert Wiener, would 
be called “cybernetics:” studies that used the new mathematical 
theory of information elaborated in the same years by Claude 
Shannon and Warren Weaver, and based upon the premise that a 
single­theory­(based­on­the­principle­of­retroaction,­or­feedback)­
was capable of registering the physiological behavior of animated 
organisms as well as that of automatons.70 How much of that 
research­program,­later­to­be­included­in­the­field­of­AI,­turned­
out to be well founded and fruitful is obviously another ques-
tion­(which­we­tried­somewhat­briefly­to­allude­to­in­chapter­5).­
Recently, at the United States Archives, Thomas P. Hughes dug 
up­a­1950­document­that­could­be­one­of­the­first­cyborg­tele-
matics­emergencies­(in­a­broad­sense,­naturally).­It­deals­with­a­
“Progress­Report”­from­the­scientific­branch­of­the­United­States­
Air­Force,­dated­1­May­1950,­in­which,­amongst­other­things,­it­
mentions:
The­aerial­defense­system­(ADS)­reveals­points­in­common­
with all the system types listed in the Webster’s Dictionary. 
But­more­particularly­it­enters­into­a­specific­systems­cat-
egory: the category of organisms. This word, according to the 
Webster’s, means “a complex structure of interdependent 
and subordinate elements whose relations and properties 
are largely determined by their function on the whole.” The 
emphasis­is­placed­not­only­on­the­configuration­and­on­the­
70 See Roberto Cordeschi, “Quarant’anni di indagini meccanicistiche sulla 
mente:­dalla­cibernetica­all ’intelligenza­artificiale”­[Forty­years­of­mech-
anistic­inquiries­into­the­mind:­from­cybernetics­to­artificial­intelligence],­
introduction to Vittorio Somenzi and Roberto Cordeschi, La filosofia degli 
automi: Origini dell’intelligenza artificiale [Philosophy of the automatons: 
origins­of­artificial­intelligence]­(Turin:­Bollati­Boringhieri,­1994).
121disposition, but also on what is determined by its purpose, 
an attribute that for the ADS represents an advantageous 
characteristic. The ADS is therefore an organism […]. 
But­what­are­organisms?­There­are­three­types:­animate­
organisms, that include animals and animal groups, mankind 
included;­partially­animate­organisms,­relating­to­animals­
associated with inanimate mechanisms, as in the case of the 
ADS;­and­inanimate­organisms,­like­vending­machines.­These­
organisms all have in common sensors, decisional centers, 
action adjusters and actuators or executive agents. The 
organisms also have the power to develop and to grow […]. 
On top of that, they demand to be supplied with materials. 
[…] Almost all organisms can discern not only the external 
world, but also their own activities […]. The organism’s 
function is to interact with the activities of other organisms 
and­to­modify­them,­usually­to­achieve­a­specific­goal.71
What is interesting here, other than attributing the same 
characteristics to the “systems” as those of living organisms, is 
the hint of a sort of “collective cyborg:” the entire air defense 
system is supposedly a “partially animated organism.” However, it 
is a relatively short step from “associating animals with inanimate 
mechanisms” to conceiving permanent mechanical appliances 
within the human body. This is precisely what Clynes and Kline 
did­in­1960.
However, an examination of their treatise written that year, Drugs, 
Space and Cybernetics, reveals that the cyborg the two scientists 
considered­of­a­particular­type­was­in­fact­far­different­from­the­
one­illustrated­by­science­fiction­in­books,­comics­and­the­cinema.­
71 “Progress Report of the Air Defense Systems Engineering Committee,”­May­1st­
1950,­written­for­the­scientific­convention,­American­Air­Force­Chief­of­Staff,­
George­Vallee­Committee,­C50-10788-AF;­quoted­in­“Modern and Postmodern 
Engineering,” report by T. P. Hughes at the seventh annual Arthur Miller con-
ference­on­science­and­ethics,­MIT,­April­8th­1993­[retrans.­Robert­Booth].­
I owe knowledge of this paper to the courtesy of Mario Orlandi of the Uni-
versity of Pisa, and to Paolo Alberti.
122 The­merit­goes­to­Sadie­Plant­for­having­revealed­and­reflected­
upon this incongruence so we’ll let her guide us.72 In fact, it is true 
that Clynes and Kline thought of inserting a mechanical device 
into the body, a pump capsule triggered by osmotic pressure, 
but­it­was­supposed­to­effect­“slow­and­constant­injections­of­
an active biochemical substance, at a biologically comparable 
speed”.
The­treatise­(by­Clynes­and­Kline)­dealt­with­the­possibility­
of a drug conforming to an organism’s metabolism, to 
its capacity to transform food and liquids, to its zymotic 
system, to its vestibular function, to cardiovascular control, 
to maintaining muscular tone and the perceptive abilities. It 
also dealt with ways of regulating sleep and the hours awake 
“through the use of those types of drugs recognized with the 
name of psychic energizers, combined with other medicinal 
drugs” already in use. It listed problems categorized by such 
phenomena as variations of pressure and temperature, 
of­radiation,­of­magnetic­fields­and­of­gravitational­force.­
It discussed methods for combatting psychoses and for 
alleviating­the­effects­of­“perceptive­immobility­and­lack­of­
action”­that­the­space­traveler­might­have­to­face,­reflecting­
on the techniques for causing unconsciousness or oblivion in 
extreme­emergencies­and­suffering.
Therefore it has to do, as Sadie Plant says, with a “chemical 
interface”:73 an approach to the cyborg problem that would have 
had the merit of revealing, once again, the continuity of this new 
figure­(planned­or­imagined)­with­procedures­of­“chemicalization”­
72 Sadie Plant, “Soft Technologies for Soft Machines: the Chemical Interface,” 
Virus Mutations,­no.­6­(1999),­from­which­come­all­the­quotes­of­the­next­
paragraphs­[retrans.­Robert­Booth].
73 The broader meaning with respect to the informatics with which Plant uses 
the term “interface” is analogous to the one given it by Pierre Lévy in Le 
tecnologie dell’intelligenza. Il future del pensiero nell’era dell’informatica [The 
technologies of intelligence. The future of thought in the computer era], 
(Verona:­Ombre­Corte,­2000).
123of the body already amply carried out during the history of man, 
and­now­in­line­with­the­new­technological­possibilities.­But­that­
is not how it went.
This chemical interface is one of the richest zones in which 
to­reveal­the­cyborg’s­emergence.­By­wiping­out­the­confines­
between­man­and­machine,­between­natural­and­artificial,­
between intimate and distant, between bodily interiors and 
exteriors, the drug-induced cyborg overcomes the limits with 
greater­intensity­than­the­successive­drug-free­models.­But­
no­matter­how­this­fundamental­document­has­classified­
the drug as a determinant characteristic of the cyborg, it 
has­not­succeeded­in­influencing­the­debate­that­developed­
later.­The­theme­linked­to­the­effects­of­pharmaceuticals­was­
developed in several books concerning the cyborg, including 
Metrofaga by Richard Kadrey, Snow Crash by Neal Stephenson 
and Neuromancer by William Gibson. Furthermore, over the 
past years, both medical and military practices, as well as 
the illegal use in cities, have produced such a proliferation 
of narcotics, addicts and methods of administration that the 
chemical interface today constitutes one of the technical 
changes to which the most sophisticated, inquisitive and 
profound­of­men­is­subjected.­But­whereas­the­role­of­
artificial­organs­and­other­types­of­even­more­extraordinary­
prostheses have had enormous importance in recent discus-
sions on the cyborg theme, the chemical interface stands out 
instead because of its absence.
In recent years, researcher Sadie Plant, who studied global 
politics­on­drugs­and­their­effects­on­the­social­imaginary,­has­
tried to explain the absence of this subject from debate, “that 
rendered it impossible to say where exactly the human ended 
and where the cyborg began,” by resorting to politics’ increasingly 
repressive attitude towards drugs since the start of the sev-
enties.­“The­silence­that­descended­on­their­cyborg­(Clynes­and­
Kline’s),”­she­wrote,­“is­a­clear­indication­of­how­the­climate­of­
prohibition induced by the war on drugs has spread insidiously 
124 at the more general level. […] The war on drugs, launched with 
the aim of regulating the chemical composition of individuals and 
collectivities, demands the control of every aspect of the research 
and development of these substances, their production, dis-
tribution and consumption.” And she continues reconstructing, 
albeit summarily, a story about the taking of psychoactive sub-
stances, in peacetime and especially in wartime, that goes back 
to­at­least­the­Spanish­conquest.­Plant­ends­by­reaffirming­the­
role of drugs, “soft technology for soft machines,” in the con-
stitution of the body’s self-perception as a chemical machine, but 
reveals­the­slippery­nature­of­this­figure­of­popular­imaginary,­
and, behind the removal of the chemical interface, glimpses a 
normalizing choice analogous to that of the creation of the drug 
addict­(a­figure­who,­as­we­know­only­too­well,­was­an­effect­of­
the­fight­against­drugs,­and­not­the­cause,­as­the­prohibitionists­
claim).
If we admit to the existence of a cyborg population, then it 
lives in this pharmaceutical zone: but in truth this hypothesis 
is very problematic. Even when cyborgs are discussed in 
relation to more visible technological prostheses, to object 
that the term seems overly redundant is far too predictable, 
inasmuch as human beings have always been, in one way 
or the other, cybernetic organisms. From the point of view 
of a chemical interface, this conclusion becomes even more 
inescapable. Cyborgs have always been elusive, and drugs 
have­rendered­them­practically­impossible­to­define.­Initially,­
cyborgs­could­have­been­defined­as­a­precocious­inter-
est for the biochemical self-regulation system, but once 
they fell prey to Hollywood screenwriters and to academic 
debate­they­became­far­more­definite,­they­were­turned­into­
more­austere­entities­that­worked­toward­a­confirmation­
rather than a challenge, somewhere between human and 
mechanical. Just as the category drug addict at the end of 
the nineteenth century contributed to concealing the fact 
that “sober” individuals were as dependent on chemistry 
125as those taking drugs, so it was that the cyborg at the end 
of the twentieth century served to classify, limit and stem a 
combination of practices, experiments and explorative inter-
ventions that turned men into soft machines as much as they 
did cyborgs.
The Body as Interface
It could therefore be said that the electromechanical variant 
of the cyborg has found its true function within a “discursive 
strategy”­(to­use­a­Foucauldian­concept)­meant­to­define­and­
harness­a­figure­and­practices­that­institutions­would­otherwise­
find­unmanageable.­Let’s­try­to­get­a­better­understanding­of­
how­this­could­have­happened.­There­is­no­doubt­that­the­figure­
of­the­man-machine­hybrid,­present­in­American­science­fiction­
since the twenties as a variant of the robot, has since the sixties 
progressively­gained­visibility,­not­only­in­the­new­fictitious­con-
quest of space, but also in relation to a series of transformations 
(at­the­time­only­incipient)­by­the­productive­structure,­by­
technologies and by the capitalist organization of labor. The idea 
of an intimate collaboration, of a combination between organic 
and inorganic is in certain ways born from the closeness with 
the machine achieved in capitalistic industry, with the worker’s 
subordination to the rhythms and demands of the machinery 
introduced by Taylorist labor organization. However, as long 
as­we­remain­within­the­bounds­of­Taylorism–Fordism—and­of­
electro-mechanical and mechanical industrial technologies—the 
machine is not only an autonomous power, it is also free and 
opposed to man: “In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker 
makes­use­of­a­tool;­in­the­factory,­the­machine­makes­use­of­
him,”74 or rather “[t]he instrument of labour, when it takes the 
form of a machine, immediately becomes a competitor of the 
74 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy; Vol. 1­(Harmondsworth:­
Penguin­in­association­with­New­Left­Review,­1976),­548.
126 worker himself.”75 The possibility of interpenetration, of a very 
real­symbiosis,­however­conflictive­and­dramatic,­between­man­
and machine, occurs only with the existence of technologies 
far­more­ductile­and­flexible­than­their­electromechanical­
counterparts, namely those that are computerized and digital. 
These technologies, especially towards the end of the seventies 
when, with the invention of the personal computer, they escaped 
the logic of industrial “gigantism” and began to develop their 
own­potential­ductility,­flexibility­and­immediate­adherence­to­
market changes, allowed capital to take a huge leap forward in 
the processes of socialization of work and of molecular pen-
etration in the productive processes in every aspect of daily 
life, rendering the processes of valorization incomparably more 
complex with respect to classic capitalism, and narrowing the 
gap between work and spare time, creating the conditions for an 
ever increasing globalization pushed as much by the economy 
as by the new processes of self-valorization. This is the new con-
stellation of the production and the imaginary to which the name 
of post-Fordism has been given.76
In­a­first­phase,­the­imaginary­registers­this­change­and­reacts­by­
simply breaking up and remixing the already known and avail-
able elements. Even when it is electromechanical, the cyborg 
immediately relates to a relationship between man and machine 
that is changing, alludes to a proximity to man and machine that 
first­reveals­the­changes­in­the­machine’s­dimension,­logic­and­
functions, and then the inevitable changes that these processes 
induce­in­man.­But­the­process,­however­intuited,­is­still­not­fully­
developed, and the imaginary’s previous traditions of modernity 
on which the new imaginary works are all still centered on 
elements­of­heavy­artificiality­(metallic­bodies­and­prostheses,­
machines­and­engines):­these­are­therefore­the­components­
75­ Ibid.,­557.
76­ For­a­general­introduction­see­Adelino­Zanini­and­Ubaldo­Fadini,­eds.,­
Lessico postfordista. Dizionario di idee della mutazione [Post-Fordist lexicon. 
Dictionary­of­ideas­on­mutation]­(Milan:­Feltrinelli,­2001).
127found again in the electromechanical cyborg. However, we 
have­already­seen­that­different­elements­are­present­in­these­
traditions, more “biological” with respect to the crystalized ones 
found­in­the­figure­of­the­android­or­robot,­to­which­the­cyborg­
is­closely­related;­one­just­has­to­think­of­the­alchemical­figure­of­
the homunculus, or the mix of electricity and bodies with which 
Mary­Shelley­creates­the­Frankenstein­“creature”.­But­so­that­this­
alchemical-chemical-biological imaginary may fully redeploy itself 
in the cyborg image, new elements are required, new changes 
in­the­scientific­paradigms,­in­technologies,­in­the­analysis­of­
society.­The­first­of­these­elements­is­surely­the­emergence­of­the­
“information” concept initially in cybernetics and then in biology 
with the new centrality of genetics. The basis of this new point 
of view was the discovery of the DNA helix by James Watson and 
Francis­Crick­in­1953,­but­it­took­another­twenty­years­before­
molecular biology learned to work with Shannon’s concept of 
“information, and until, as much in science as in the imaginary, 
it could develop the idea of a living being as an organism of 
elaboration and distribution of information. The second cen-
tral element is not only the appearance of new technologies of 
information and communication, but is principally their detailed 
diffusion­throughout­society:­not­so­much­the­birth­of­informatics­
as­a­discipline­at­the­end­of­the­forties­and­fifties,­more­the­
appearance of “distributed informatics” following the invention 
of the personal computer—an invention, it ’s worth remembering, 
that did not stem from the lecture halls of higher education or 
from the laboratories of industry, but from the thick of political 
movements and anti-authoritarianism and the Californian 
underground movement of the seventies.77 The third element 
is the change of the social model that evolved internationally 
during the course of the seventies, the assertion of a “method of 
production no longer dominated by forms of vertically integrated 
accumulation and the distribution of contracted wealth between 
77 For a rich and prompt reconstruction of this event, see Steven Levy, Hackers: 
Heroes of the Computer Revolution­(New­York:­Dell/Doubleday,­[1984]­1994).
128 collective and supervised representation of the State, but by 
forms­of­flexible­accumulation­capable­of­integrating,­of­net-
working­ways,­times­and­places­of­production,­one­more­different­
than the other: from the robotized factory to the hi-tech farm, 
from the industrial district to the Mexican maquiladora, to the 
days­of­global­finance.”78 The link between information, com-
munication, knowledge and production in post-Fordist capitalism 
determines a crucial change in our discourse, what Christian 
Marazzi called “the linguistic turn of economy:”
Of all the characteristics brought to light in recent years to 
explain what distinguishes just-in-time production strategy 
from Fordist production strategy, what would appear more 
effective­for­the­study­of­political­and­socioeconomic­trans-
formation is the one placing communication at the center of 
technological-productive innovation. One might say that the 
combination of just-in-time strategy, communication and 
flow­of­information­gains­direct­access­to­the­productive­
process. Communication and production overlap in the 
new method of producing, whereas in Fordism the com-
munication era juxtaposes with the productive process.79
This superimposition of communication and production has, 
amongst its various consequences, this, fundamental to our 
analysis: that the body, our principal instrument of com-
munication with the world around us, our global interface, is 
directly integrated into the process of capitalistic development, 
“fulltime” so to speak, and also integrates with technology in a far 
78­ Adelino­Zanini­and­Ubaldo­Fadini,­“Il­catalogo­è­questo”­[The­catalogue­is­
this], in Lessico postfordista,­11.­A­brief­and­effective­description­of­this­new­
phase of capitalistic production can be found in Part II of David Harvey’s 
The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Blackwell,1990).
79 Christian Marazzi, Il posto dei calzini. La svolta linguistica dell’economia e i suoi 
effetti sulla politica­è­[The­place­of­socks.­The­linguistic­shift­of­the­economy­
and­its­effects­on­politics]­(Bellinzona:­Casagrande,­1994);­subsequently­pub-
lished­by­Bollati­Boringhieri­(Turin­1999),­14.
129more pervasive and delicate way than in the past. And since both 
production and development today are far more integral and 
extensive linguistic processes than they were in the recent past, 
so language today traverses our entire body, and the structure 
according to posture, rhythms and technologies that the Fordist 
industrial era did not know. Here is another meaning of Sterling’s 
slogan about technology that works its way “under our skin 
and inside our minds.” In the eighties, the transformations in 
the process of the production and circulation of goods began 
to be transcribed directly and very visibly onto man’s body: the 
fusion of man and technology realized through the hybridism 
of the body can therefore tell us new stories, not only about the 
body-cum-factory, like Asimov’s robots and Dick’s replicants, but 
also like that of the body-cum-television as in Videodrome, like 
that of the body-cum-information-cum-simulated worlds as in 
Neuromancer or eXistenZ. And today, the cross between man and 
technology can even avoid resorting to the invasion of foreign 
bodies,­transferring­the­full­weight­of­artificial­insertion­onto­the­
modification­of­the­information­apparatus,­with­an­external­and­
programed involvement in the genetic code. The real leap into 
the cyborg dimension, therefore, will no longer be in a “chemical 
interface,” but more likely a “genetic interface.”
Biopolitical Devices
This new immaterial invasion of the body created by language 
naturally brings with it a series of new problems and opens new 
conflictual­configurations­in­post-Fordist­society.­On­the­one­
hand it highlights an entire biological, “corporeal” dimension of 
politics, whose rulings are no longer limited to subjecting the 
body­to­a­disciplinary­regime­(and­the­jails­and­prisons,­at­times­
camouflaged­to­look­like­“hospitality­centers,”­are­increasingly­
more reserved for bodies of foreign extraction, for immigrants 
still­refused­citizenship),­but­instead­give­technology­the­job­of­
improving the behavioral patterns now granted bodies, with a 
relatively higher “tolerance”. This political investment in bodies, 
130 however, on the other hand dangerously reduces their auto-
nomy by putting pressure directly on the linguistic device: the 
body risks being unable any longer to pit speech against that 
extralinguistic residue that is visible and almost ostentatiously 
present in face-to-face oral communication, and that in writing 
remains­hidden­instead,­but­produces­subtle­and­veiled­effects,­
especially when it maintains a poetic dimension or is anyhow 
oriented towards the expressive aspect of communication. It is 
that residual aspect of the body with respect to speech that was 
expressed with such force, even if in a cryptic way, by Artaud 
in his plea to the “body without organs,” and that Deleuze and 
Guattari picked up again some decades later to make it one of 
their more charming “borderline practices.”
There is no doubt that the general picture is the one already out-
lined by Michel Foucault in his research on the history of sexuality 
when­he­identified,­at­the­origin­of­modernism,­the­change­from­
having the “right of death” to a power that intervenes positively 
on life: “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a 
power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.”80 It is the 
emergence of bio-power, or of bio-politics.
For­the­first­time­in­history,­no­doubt,­biological­existence­
was­reflected­in­political­existence;­the­fact­of­living­was­no­
longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from 
time­to­time,­amid­the­randomness­of­death­and­its­fatality;­
part­of­it­passed­into­knowledge’s­field­of­control­and­
power’s sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be 
dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate 
dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mas-
tery it would be able to exercise over them would have to 
be­applied­at­the­level­of­life­itself;­it­was­the­taking­charge­
of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its 
access even to the body. If we can apply the term bio-history 
80 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert 
Hurley­(New­York:­Pantheon­Books,­1978),­138.
131to the pressures through which the movements of life and 
the processes of history interfere with one another, one 
would have to speak of bio-power to designate what brought 
life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations 
and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of 
human life […].81
The devices of bio-political power that appear at the start of the 
new century, during the cyborg era, seem however to go beyond 
both­the­categories­identified­by­Foucault,­that­of­the­“anatomo-
politics of the human body”, namely the disciplinary integration 
of the individual’s body within the systems of social control, and 
the “bio-politics of the population”, in other words the combination 
of measures meant to regulate the biological macro-parameters 
of­the­communities­(birth­and­death,­health­conditions,­etc.).82 
Linguistic investment in the body does in fact seem to delineate, 
against the background of these two mechanisms that self-
perpetuate­with­a­minimum­of­explicit­intervention­(the­breakup­
of­the­social­state),­a­process­of­coordination­of­the­bodies­with­
the social imaginary of dimensions never seen before. With the 
extension of the process of appreciation within society and no 
longer­just­at­“production­locations”­in­the­strict­sense­(factories),­
post-Fordist­capitalism­in­fact­appears­capable­of­profiting­from­
every spatial and temporal modulation of the body, from the 
imaginary’s every articulation, from social energy’s every pro-
vision, even uncontrolled—from shopping malls to discotheques. 
Whatever language the bodies speak, there is always the risk of 
it becoming a dialect of a new language that speaks through us 
even­when­we­believe­we­are­outwitting­it.­For­this­reason­Big­
Brother­was­able­to­abandon­the­“control­room”­of­political­power­
(if­it­ever­truly­lived­there)­to­become­a­TV­format­that­only­the­
most­naïve­of­us­consider­to­be­an­innocuous­farce.­At­the­end­of­
the seventies, Foucault was still able believe that the unleashing 
81­ Ibid.,­142–143.
82­ Ibid.,­139.
132 of­the­plurality­of­bodies­could­effectively­withstand­the­debate­
on power:
It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we 
aim—through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms 
of sexuality—to counter the grips of power with the claims 
of bodies, pleasures and knowledges, in their multiplicity 
and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the 
counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not 
to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.83
Today, when a bio-political perspective can no longer take life 
as a given on which to build its own macro- and micro-regulative 
operations, when the body is assailed by languages, not only 
imaginary but also by techno-science, and is subordinate to an 
actual production process, how can we still hope to work on a 
“tactical reversal” of languages? Does the mix of biology and 
technology, in which the cyborg’s body has been transformed, 
perhaps not rob us of every possibility of rescuing it from the 
apparatuses of power that operate on both the imaginary and 
the symbolic? Donna Haraway, with courageous and almost 
mocking determination, suggests that the only way to avoid being 
swallowed by the post-Fordist wolf is to throw yourself at it, to 
fully­embrace­the­artificial­perspective­and­to­play­the­card­of­
hybridity­and­impurity­that­it­offers­us.­“This­chapter­is­an­effort­
to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, 
and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, 
than­as­reverent­worship­and­identification.­[...]­At­the­centre­of­
my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg,” she 
declares in the opening of her Cyborg Manifesto.84 She goes on: 
“I­am­making­an­argument­for­the­cyborg­as­a­fiction­mapping­
our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource 
83­ Ibid.,­157.
84 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature­(New­York:­Routledge,­1991),­149.
133suggesting some very fruitful couplings. Michael Foucault’s bio-
politics­is­a­flaccid­premonition­of­cyborg­politics,­a­very­open­
field.”
What’s­in­this­“open­field”?­Firstly,­the­“confusion­of­boundaries”,­
Haraway says. She indicates three fundamental cessions that are 
at the base of the cyborg condition: the lines between animal and 
man, between organism and machine and between physical and 
nonphysical have all been violated. These boundary cessions that 
took­place­with­the­direct­influence­of­science­and­technology­
with­regard­to­social­relations­create­fluctuation­and­uncertainty­
in­traditional­identities­(for­example,­“feminine”­identity),­that­
today­become­transitory­and­fluid,­and­must­be­constantly­
negotiated with communications technologies, and life.
Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the 
crucial tools recrafting our bodies. […] Technologies and 
scientific­discourses­can­be­partially­understood­as­formal-
izations,­i.e.,­as­frozen­moments,­of­the­fluid­social­inter-
actions constituting them, but they should also be viewed 
as instruments for enforcing meanings. The boundary is 
permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, 
historical systems of social relations and historical anatomies 
of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, 
myth and tool mutually constitute each other.85
In fact “the cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled 
postmodern collective and personal self, the one that feminists 
must­code”.­This­fluid,­test­vision­of­society­and­the­relations­it­
produces between its members, and between those members 
and their objects of knowledge and intervention, is what allows 
Haraway to see conceptual categories and practices of inter-
vention in constant movement, and not in a frozen static 
nature. And therefore allow the new “cyborg subjects” to insert 
themselves in the joints between the concepts and modular 
85­ Ibid.,­164.
134 protocols­that­define­the­world­in­order­to­overthrow,­even­
locally, this movement’s leadership and to impose new relations, 
new knowledge, new practices. To overthrow the “informatics 
of domination” in the pleasure of living. If we must no longer 
talk of organisms, but of “biotic components,” if the strategies 
of control concentrate on interfaces and not on the “integrity of 
natural objects,” if “any component can be interfaced with any 
other,” then it is these processes of communication and pas-
sages of information that make up the biopolitics of the twenty-
first­century,­and­not­a­clash­between­identities­well-defined­or­
otherwise. Talk always starts with a location, with a situation, 
with a condition, with a body, there is no disembodied discus-
sion, no absolute and no clear-cut point of view. Our knowledge 
is always “situated knowledge.” And if, in order to reconstruct 
Haraway’s discourse, I reduce to a minimum the references made 
on the condition of women and the internal debate on fem-
inism from which that discourse was born, it isn’t to ignore these 
determinations­or­to­strip­them­of­their­“bias;”­on­the­contrary,­
it­is­to­show­that­only­a­reflection­originating­from­a­historically­
determinate condition, one that is aware of this, may produce 
“exportable”­indications­and­effective­methodologies­for­the­
comprehension and involvement of reality.
The key point of Haraway’s discourse on cyborgs is that the 
processes of hybridism with technology exonerate the bodies 
and subjects from the need to relate to a “founding myth,” to a 
yearning for a collective or individual identity. The myth of one’s 
origins isn’t just about capitalism and patriarchy, it ’s also about 
antagonism in the progress toward modernity. “Feminisms and 
Marxisms have run aground on Western epistemological imper-
atives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective 
of an oppressive hierarchy and/or a latent position of moral 
superiority, innocence and a greater closeness to nature.”86­But­
the­cyborg­has­no­“origins;”­it­is­a­fluid­and­experimental­element­
86­ Ibid.,­176.
135in constant mutation. This is where its strength lies, in its being 
unfamiliar with the myth of language transparency, in its ability 
to speak a language rooted in its body without having to refer it 
to a presumed native dimension, in maintaining within a language 
that extra-linguistic and corporeal trace that the informatics of 
domination tends to eliminate.
Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle 
against perfect communication, against the one code that 
translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of 
phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insists on noise 
and advocates pollution, rejoicing in the illegitimate fusions 
of animal and machine. […] Without the original dream 
of a common language or original symbiosis promising 
protection from hostile “masculine” separation, but included 
in­a­text­that­lacks­a­definitive­privileged­reading,­a­history­
of salvation, to recognize “oneself” as fully implicated in the 
world­frees­us­of­the­need­to­root­politics­in­identification,­
vanguard parties, purity and mothering. […] Cyborg imagery 
can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we 
have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is 
a­dream­not­of­a­common­language,­but­of­a­powerful­infidel­
heteroglossia. It is the imagination of a possessed feminist 
who manages to strike fear into the circuits of the super 
saviors of the new right. It means to both build and destroy 
machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories. 
Though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would rather be 
a cyborg than a goddess.87
Donna­Haraway’s­“bodily,­literary,­figurative,­non-metaphor-
ical”­theory­(as­defined­by­Rosi­Braidotti­in­her­introduction­to­
the­Italian­edition)­is­thus­at­the­service­of­a­political­project:­the­
rebirth­of­a­radical­and­socialist­feminism.­But­it­is­well­rooted­in­
a complex and articulate vision of relationships between science, 
technology, society and bodies: rapidly changing relationships 
87­ Ibid.,­181.
136 in­which­it­is­not­possible­to­guess­a­“direction,”­only­a­“field­
structure.” Where the Frankfurt School’s tired followers saw 
only impending destruction and catastrophes and death’s ines-
capable victories, Donna Haraway was capable of seeing contra-
dictions,­trials,­conflicts:­a­whole­field­of­possibilities.­Perhaps­
the moment has come to start an inquiry into how this concept of 
“possibilities” came about in late modernity. This is what we will 
attempt­to­do­in­the­next­(and­conclusive)­chapter.
[ 9 ]
Cyborg Ecstasy
The twentieth century was the century of the possible. This claim 
can­be­interpreted­in­numerous­different­ways,­all­linked­to­each­
other:­as­always,­philosophers­do­not­reflect­on­an­unchangeable­
abstract world, but on the historical reality that surrounds them.
From the point of view of what’s been done, in human experience 
the area of the “impossible” appears to have gotten progres-
sively smaller. More than in any other era, the last century saw 
technology accomplish things considered quite impossible in 
previous­centuries:­from­human­flight­(including­the­one­against­
the­planet’s­gravitational­attraction)­to­transmissions­via­ether­or­
cable of images and data, to the manipulation of genetic codes. 
Yes,­man­did­indeed­aspire­to­such­things,­or­at­least­he­tried­to.­
The­difference­consists­in­the­fact­that­although­man­aspired­to­
such things and not being possible at that time in history, they 
were transferred to worlds and dimensions separate from daily 
experience.­With­regard­to­myth­(Greek­myth,­being­one­of­the­
foundations­of­western­civilization),­divine­beings­fly,­project­
their­simulacra­onto­battlefields,­and­mate­with­humans­to­
create­offspring­that­are­half-man­and­half-god.­But­when­a­man,­
138 Daedalus,­invents­flight,­his­son­crashes,­and­on­this­hypothetical­
technology it ’s as though a ban was declared. Despite the life of 
man,­once­separated­from­the­gods,­life’s­suffering­was­lessoned­
thanks­to­the­miserable­knowhow­like­fire­and­metallurgy,­the­
price was high nonetheless: the heathen Prometheus, chained 
to­a­rock­in­the­Caucasus,­and­his­liver,­gnawed­daily­by­Zeus’s­
eagle. Over a long and torturous journey through the centuries, 
the­blooming­of­a­new­technical­era­from­(to­use­Mumford’s­term)­
a paleo-technical one transformed the status of these myths into 
everyday­experiences.­But­why­is­it­that­today­Icarus’s­wings­do­
not melt in the sun, while poor Prometheus’s liver continues to be 
eaten by the eagle?
From the point of view of thought, the burgeoning of new and 
previously unheard of possibilities has ended up causing the 
notion of what is necessary to falter. Matter has evaporated into 
components to which our senses have no direct access, and 
whose­behavior­does­not­correspond­to­that­of­sensible­objects;­
and the only way in which thought can think of them is to have 
recourse to mathematical instruments that need years and years 
of specialist training, and an understanding that is increasingly 
more radically separated from common sense. As far as quantum 
physics­is­concerned,­perhaps­what­is­required­is­a­logic­different­
not only to Aristotle’s but also to Frege’s and Russell’s, and 
Brouwer’s.­And­the­Leibnizian­dream­of­transforming­thought­
into calculus shattered on the theorems of Gödel. Modernity, 
that opened with the Kantian distinction between analytic and 
synthetic truths, closes on Quine’s corrosive criticism of this dis-
tinction­and­on­the­dissolution­of­“scientific­method”­first­used­by­
Kuhn and then Feyerabend.
Regardless­of­these­profound­theoretical­flutterings,­man’s­
body has continued to distance itself from the “state of nature,” 
enjoying­and­enduring­its­artificiality.­And­fulfilling,­in­his­new­
cyborg condition, the old dream of the shamans and mystics: to 
leave oneself. On the Siberian steppes or in a Rimini discotheque, 
loaded with heavy metal and glittering spangles, it matters little.
139God’s Still Unconscious Intentions
It might seem that the undeniably widening gap of experience 
(albeit­simulated,­vicarious,­“virtual”)­allowed­modern­and­
late-modern man by technological advancement has nothing 
to­do­with­the­modification­of­the­relation­between­possible­
and­impossible.­But­the­possible­appears­to­be­an­evanescent­
and ambiguous concept, ever since Aristotle:88 how does one 
establish a secure criterion of demarcation between possible and 
impossible, if not by empirically controlling that which, amidst 
everything­considered,­has­effectively­been­achieved?­But­the­
moment in which an objective, a process, an event are realized, 
they­cease­to­be­purely­possible:­they­are­already­real,­effectual.­
And the “possible” therefore appears to dissolve into the real. In 
effect,­Aristotle,­in­discussing­the­passage­from­power­to­action,­
seems to perceive “impossibility” to be logical impossibility, con-
sidering the number of times he falls back on the example of the 
diagonal of the square, and seems instead to consider “possible,” 
on the operative level anyway, as a relatively extensive concept, 
and too liberal at that.89­However,­putting­logical­aporia­aside­(for­
now),­it­is­evident­that­in­common­thought­the­notion­of­what­is­
possible­and­what­is­not­possible­to­do­(in­the­operative­sense,­
not­the­ethical)­is­dependent­on­the­technical­patrimony­available­
at a determinate moment. It is also clear that the idea of “pos-
sibility” is linked to that of a “project:” what doesn’t exist is still 
possible, provided there exists a will to realize it. In this case the 
88 “ ’Possible,’ then, means in one sense, as we have said, that which is not nec-
essarily­a­lie;­in­another,­that­which­is­true;­and­in­another,­that­which­may­
be true.” Aristotle, Metaphysics­5.1019b.
89 “[I]t is impossible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable 
with the sides, because such a thing is a lie, whose contrary is not only true 
but inevitable. Hence that it is commensurable is not only a lie but nec-
essarily a lie. And the contrary of the impossible, i.e. the possible, is when 
the­contrary­is­not­necessarily­a­lie.”­Ibid.­Besides:­“Now­if,­as­we­have­said,­
that is possible which does not involve an impossibility, obviously it cannot 
be true to say that so-and-so is possible, but will not be, this view entirely 
loses sight of the instances of impossibility.” Aristotle, Metaphysics­9.1047b.
140 ethical concerns are more than present. At least this is the point 
of view of one of the twentieth century’s most decisive “pos-
sibilistes”, Robert Musil:
But­if­there­is­a­sense­of­reality,­and­no­one­will­doubt­that­
it­has­its­justifications­for­existing,­then­there­must­also­be­
something we can call a sense of possibility. Whoever has it 
does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, 
will­happen,­must­happen;­but­he­invents:­Here­this­or­that­
might, could, or ought to happen. If he is told that something 
is the way it is, he will think: Well, it could probably just 
as well be otherwise. […] Such fools are also called ide-
alists­by­those­who­wish­to­praise­them.­But­all­this­clearly­
applies only to their weak subspecies, those who cannot 
comprehend reality or who, in their melancholic condition, 
avoid it.  These are people in whom the lack of a sense of 
reality­is­a­real­deficiency.­But­the­possible­includes­not­
only the fantasies of people with weak nerves but also the 
as yet unwakened intentions of God. A possible experience 
or truth is not the same as an actual experience or truth 
minus­its­“reality­value”­but­has­–­according­to­its­partisans,­
at­least­–­something­quite­divine­about­it,­a­fire,­a­soaring,­
a readiness to build and a conscious utopianism that does 
not shrink from reality but sees it as a project, something 
yet to be invented. After all, the earth is not that old, and 
was apparently never so ready as now to give birth to its full 
potential.90
Who could doubt that the call to consider reality as an invention, 
and not as something given once and for all, isn’t one of the con-
stants of twentieth century thought and action? Didn’t Raymond 
Roussel­suggest­bending­reality­to­fit­the­project­(or­to­the­
paranoia­of­dreams)­with­an­erratic­and­atypical­use­of­science­
90 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities.
141and technology, subordinate to the logic of a play on words?91 
Didn’t the pyrotechnics of Dadaism insist on suspending life in 
order to hand the keys of reality’s castle to the allied forces of 
nonsense, irrationality and sarcasm? Didn’t the Surrealists make 
a desperate attempt to have a never-seen-before but potentially 
already present heterogeneity rise up from the slums of daily 
life, and have subconscious automatisms emerge to create a new 
“common­sense”­unadulterated­by­blinding­habit?­But­we­must­
not forget that all this would not have been possible if the Earth’s 
damned had not decided their mother’s womb was not only not 
blessed, but was also decidedly cursed, and if they hadn’t made 
numerous attempts through the century to bless it their own 
way: by attacking the sky and, if possible, plundering it. Their 
repeated defeats during the twenties and thirties, and again in 
the­sixties­and­seventies,­in­no­way­signified­the­condemnation­
of their “utopian awareness:” they reveal, certainly, the limits of 
the theoretical and operative tools of the workers’ movement 
from its birth to the present day, and the uselessness, or rather 
the damage, of committing to every type of historical philosophy, 
the only result of which being to create a superfetation of 
organizational­procedures,­that­(pending­palingenesis,­as­desired­
as­it­is­impossible)­easily­develops­into­useful­elements­of­man-
agement­of­that­reality­that­they­should­have­surpassed.­But­the­
fact that the only “accomplishments by Utopia” over recent years 
can be attributed to technology is simply an illuminating paradox 
that signals a vitality perhaps unexpected by capitalism, but 
doesn’t authorize it to declare the contradictions extinct, or the 
story­“finished.”
I feel that Musil’s quote above signals however the reversal of a 
traditional­and­well-rooted­prejudice­in­Western­culture­that­finds­
in­Aristotle­its­first­great­expression:­the­devaluation­of­the­pos-
sible, of the potential, with respect to the actual, the devaluation 
91 See the posthumous Comment j’ai écrit certains des mes livres [How I wrote 
some of my books].
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have been realized, that have become “actual.” In Aristotle, as in 
all classical Greek culture, this devaluation should probably be 
connected to the fear of apeiron,­in­other­words­the­infinite­or­
unlimited, of what has no boundaries, “in the sense of the untrav-
ersable.”92 Starting from the radical acknowledgement of the 
finiteness­of­the­human­condition­and­of­human­means,­Greek­
philosophy advises caution in consciously accepting this limited-
ness;­this­pre-eminence­given­to­the­principle­of­reality,­that­
touches­on­every­western­culture­at­least­until­the­identification­
between real and rational worked by Hegel, constitutes however 
a possibly excessive limitation for the history of a species that 
makes this very access to possibility its peculiarity and its 
principle condition of survival.
Naturally, history is littered with passages from the potential to 
the actual, but also, as previously mentioned, with obstinate and 
generous­attempts­by­subjectivity­to­bring­some­still­unfulfilled­
plan of God to light. The last attempt, made during the pre-
vious century, was to overcome capitalism thanks to the devel-
opment of a “natural” antagonist to capital, natural because it 
was generated within the growth process of capital itself: the 
proletariat. In this sense it certainly wasn’t Marx who failed, 
but­Marxism;­or­rather­some­of­the­Marxisms­that­developed­
starting from the gigantic work by Trier’s philosopher, that unfor-
tunately represented, at the level of society, the near totality of 
the heritage of that philosophy. It is evident that only the most 
short-sighted or the most deeply prejudiced had to wait until 
1989­before­being­aware­of­that­failure,­when­it­was­already­quite­
clear with the defeat of the U.S.’s revolutionary trade-unionism 
92 Aristotle, Metaphysics­11.1066b,­that­continues:­“Again,­how­can­the­infinite­
exist­independently­unless­number­and­magnitude,­of­which­infinity­is­an­
attribute,­also­exist­independently?­And­further,­if­the­infinite­is­accidental,­
it­cannot,­qua­infinite,­be­an­element­of­things;­just­as­the­invisible­is­not­
an element of speech, although sound is invisible. It is clear also that the 
infinite­cannot­exist­actually.”
143between the end of the twenties and start of the thirties, the 
despotic establishment of so-called “socialism” in the USSR after 
1926,­and­then­in­Spain­in­1936,­and­so­on.­This­Marxism­was­a­
failure not because it did not get us out of God’s particular con-
figuration­called­capitalism,­but­on­the­contrary­it­appears­to­
have strengthened it, building an illusory alternative made up 
of a system of states proclaiming themselves “non-capitalist,” 
but who in reality were a variation of an even more oppressive 
and­dictatorial­capitalism.­And­after­1989,­capitalism,­profoundly­
transformed by those cycles of workers’ struggles that for more 
than twenty years challenged and maligned it, today appears, in 
its post-Fordist version, as the planetary victor, the only horizon 
possible and therefore the scourge of every possibility ever 
written within its own boundaries.
Possibility’s opportunity appeared to come, paradoxically, from 
another direction. In the second half of the twentieth century, a 
somewhat utopian dimension appears to have surfaced not in the 
realm of politics—increasingly shackled by its own mechanisms, 
its ideals discredited, prisoner of that moral autonomy it had 
once proudly claimed, from Machiavelli onwards, and throughout 
the­modern­era—but­directly­in­the­field­of­technology.­It­is­
the advent of digital technologies that appears to suddenly 
open­what­can­literally­be­defined­as­an­“era­of­the­possible,”­a­
redefinition­of­that­same­principle­of­reality;­digital­simulation­
can exit the purely mental environment and speak directly to 
man’s senses, and thus “make a possible world.” The paradox is 
not­only­in­the­sudden­autonomy­of­a­dimension­(technology)­
that Western thought had always considered ancillary and sub-
ordinate to more spiritual or theoretical or cognitive dimensions, 
but also in a change of the paradigms of those same tools 
fundamental to technology, in the passage from analogical to 
digital. The multiplication of the possibilities and the expansion 
of virtual spheres, and the accelerated step from virtual to actual 
(or­the­difficulty­in­detecting­stable­borders­between­reality­and­
imaginary),­derive­in­fact­from­a­process­that­would­instead­look­
144 initially like a terrible impoverishment of reality, the process of 
digitalization, a process in which the symbolic tools necessary 
not only to represent the world, but to rebuild it, or to build 
new ones, are drastically reduced to a combination of just two 
elements,­conventionally­the­0­and­the­1.­The­fact­that­the­power­
of calculation is linked to the humble tool of the discrete, and not 
to the superb conceptual constructions of the continuum, has 
been known for some time. What is new is that the advent of the 
computer, with its explosive increase in the power of calculation, 
has made it possible to compute any problem, a huge leap for-
ward from using nothing but the human sensorial system. The 
“millions of colors” present in our computer’s palette are way out 
of reach of even our most perceptive capabilities, and yet they 
are the indispensable condition for that “realism” of images and 
virtual­worlds,­the­consequence­of­which­is­(another­paradox!)­
what many judge to be the radical irrealism that surrounds us.
Possibility and Necessity
The advent of the digital era was not unexpected. In some 
ways, the entire twentieth century had prepared for it. On a 
theoretical plane, the digital age is the child of that “revenge” 
of­the­discrete­over­the­continuum;­one­that­was­produced­
in­the­logical­reflection­on­mathematics­between­the­end­of­
the­nineteenth­century­and­the­first­decades­of­the­twentieth.­
From the establishment of the theory of real numbers and the 
foundation­of­set­theory­by­Greg­Cantor­after­1870,­the­ques-
tion of the “principles of mathematics” became one of that 
discipline’s fundamental lines of research. Whether it dealt with 
Peano axioms, Hilbert’s space, or Frege and Russell’s still more 
ambitious and radical objective logistics, their aim being to 
reduce all mathematics to a question of logic, at the start of the 
twentieth century no one could have denied the importance of 
natural­numbers­(the­discrete)­for­the­foundation­of­the­principle­
instrument­of­mathematical­analysis,­namely­real­numbers­(the­
continuum).
145It is true that from the theoretical point of view this revenge 
creates more problems than it solves.93­In­1902,­Russell,­reflecting­
on the logical system explained in Frege’s Arithmetic Principles, 
pointed out, with the famous antinomy that bears his name, that 
the principle of comprehension was too extensive, too powerful, 
and his application to the classes of all classes led to a contra-
diction­(regarding,­in­his­case,­the­class­of­all­classes­that­do­not­
contain­themselves­as­an­element);­Russell­demonstrated­that­
his antinomy was analogous to others that had emerged in the 
nineteenth century and others even older, already known to the 
Megarians and the Stoics, like that of the liar, otherwise known 
as­Epimenides­the­Cretan­(Epimenides­of­Knossos,­the­land­
where­everyone­lies,­affirms:­“I­lie”).­According­to­Russell,­they­
were­all­bound­to­self-reference,­in­other­words­to­the­difficulty­
of­defining­their­own­communes­to­all­the­members­of­a­certain­
class by referring to the totality of the class itself. In short, the 
Greeks’ apeiron came back to haunt the philosophers’ dreams. 
Then­in­1931,­Gödel’s­famous­treatise­“On­formally­indescribable­
propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems 
I”94 administered the coup de grâce to the formal theory and 
numbers programs, and to Hilbert’s program in particular, dem-
onstrating not only the synthetic incompleteness of arithmetic, 
but more generally the impossibility of demonstrating the con-
sistency­of­a­logical­system­within­the­system­itself­(if­the­latter­
is­powerful­enough­to­formulate­the­arithmetic):­to­escape­the­
swamp,­Baron­Münchhausen­cannot­extract­himself­from­it­by­
pulling on his own ponytail.
But­the­research,­naturally,­doesn’t­stop­because­of­the­impos-
sibility of a formal demonstration of coherency. And neither does 
the practice allow itself to be halted by the subtleties of theory. 
Calculation technologies use all the theoretical instrumentation 
93 See William C. Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford­
and­New­York,­Oxford­University­Press,­1962).
94 Kurt Gödel, Collected Works. Volume 1, 1929–1936­(Oxford­and­New­York:­
Oxford­University­Press,­1986).
146 of the extraordinary period that opened up for formal logic, but 
without being paralyzed by the irrefutable, by Hercules’ pillars 
that­Gödel­defined­in­theory.­Apeiron does not frighten the 
English technicians who during the Second World War succeed 
in breaking German codes, thus giving rise to the practical 
realization of that “universal machine”, the calculations of which 
Turing­had­already­formulated­a­theory­in­1936.­At­the­start­of­
the­fifties,­von­Neumann’s­computer­allows­the­discrete­to­enjoy­
further revenge over the continuum, in a manner somewhat 
different­from­that­dreamed­of­by­Hilbert­and­Frege,­but­just­as­
powerful, if not more so. And so a technology apparently based 
on­a­reduction­of­possibilities­(everything­is­reducible­to­0­or­1,­
without­exception)­succeeds­instead,­via­the­combinatory­power­
of its applications, to expand the horizon of possibilities in a way 
never­seen­before,­obliquely­reviving­and­fulfilling­(in­a­distorted­
and­contorted­way,­sometimes­akin­to­a­nightmare)­dreams­
that were once those of the artistic avant-garde, of linguistic 
and literary experimentation, and even of political and social 
opposition. Technology accomplished the only successful rev-
olution of the twentieth century, which perhaps suggests that we 
should use the word “revolution” more sparingly.
I can’t help but suspect that there is some underground link, 
which­a­story­on­scientific­and­philosophical­thought­of­a­materi-
alistic nature should investigate, between a cultural and historical 
mood that rendered possible the birth of informatics, and the 
discussion­on­the­difference­between­analytical­and­synthetic­
truth­that­took­place­in­the­first­half­of­the­twentieth­century­
and is still with us today, but to which Willard van Orman Quine 
strongly railed, his attack one of the most severe against the 
concept­of­necessity,­exactly­fifty­years­ago.­Like­the­term­“pos-
sibility”,­“necessity”­is­also­a­word­that­suffers­from­a­dangerous­
semantic indeterminacy that didn’t stop it from becoming, over 
the centuries, a pivotal concept of philosophy. For Aristotle two 
most­“philosophical”­meanings­of­the­term­“necessary”­(“Fur-
thermore, we say that anything which cannot be otherwise in 
147a given situation is necessary”95;­and­“Again,­demonstration­is­
a “necessary” thing, because a thing cannot be otherwise if the 
demonstration­has­been­absolute.”) 96 proceeds from the most 
usual meanings of the term: necessity as “[t]hat without which, 
as­a­concomitant­condition,­life­is­impossible;­e.g.­respiration­and­
food are necessary for an animal” and necessity as in coercion, 
like­“something­inexorable;­for­it­is­opposed­to­motion­which­
is in accordance with purpose and calculation.”97 Paradoxically, 
Voltaire recognizes the contingent character of necessity in 
the sense that “what is necessary for one man to live, … from 
the moment that what is necessary for one man is not always 
necessary­to­the­other;­rice­is­necessary­to­an­Indian,­meat­is­
necessary to an Englishman,” and concentrates more on “what is 
necessary to all men”, before concluding with a negative con-
ception of necessity: “I clearly recognize what is false, and know 
little about what is true.”98
Necessity, from Kant onwards and especially in the twentieth 
century, within the sphere of logical empiricism, was meant 
as­logical­necessity,­and­necessary­truths­were­identified­with­
analytical truths, assertions that say nothing about the world, 
that have no empiric content, only linguistic. Empirical truths, 
with regard to our knowledge of the world, are instead syn-
thetic assertions that express contingent truths, going back to 
Leibniz’s terminology, they are true only in some of the “possible 
worlds”­(including­ours­for­sure),­not­in­all­of­them.­The­necessary­
truths, on the other hand, must be so in every possible way. The 
philosophical­program­of­logical­empiricism­(Rudolf­Carnap’s,­for­
example)­assumes­this­distinction,­since­it­provides­philosophy­
with the task of building a solid “logical syntax of the language”, 
leaving the task of broadening our knowledge of the world to 
empiric­science.­But­in­1951,­Quine,­the­forty-year-old­American­
95 Aristotle, Metaphysics ?­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
96 Aristotle, Metaphysics­5.1015b.
97­ Ibid.,­5.1015a.
98 Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique­(1764).
148 philosopher who had worked with Carnap, in the essay “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism”99 took the ideas of logical positivism in an 
unexpected direction. Sharing the idea that a line of demarcation 
between facts and language may only be drawn when analyzing 
linguistic behavior, Quine pointed out that within the language it 
is impossible—if not based upon extralinguistic assumptions and 
therefore­“unverifiable”­with­language­itself—to­say­where­the­
reference to empiric reality ends and where the linguistic treat-
ment of the empiric content begins. Therefore, he concluded, it 
needs to recognize that there is no line between analytical and 
synthetic­affirmations,­and­that­the­exigency­to­draw­such­a­line­
is “a non-empirical dogma of the empiricists, but a metaphysical 
article of faith.”
Putnam, while discussing the proposal to introduce a “quantum 
logic” that allows the “empiric facts” of quantum mechanics to 
be handled without paradoxes, commented: “The laws of logic, 
on this perspective, are as empirical as the laws of geometry, 
only more abstract and better protected. Logic is the last thing 
we shall everrevise, on Quine’s view, but it is not immune from 
revision.“100 Quine did not mean to abandon the notion of neces-
sity completely, but he weakened it considerably, turning it into 
a­type­of­pragmatic­requisite­(these­statements­are­“necessary”­
because, without them, the “cost” to the system they belong 
to­would­be­far­too­great).­To­close­this­brief­and­fragmentary­
review of the “revenge of the possible” during the twentieth 
century, one must take note of how the attempt to save the 
99 Willard van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in The Philosophical 
Review­60,­no.­1­(1951):­20–43.­For­the­discussion­that­took­place­of­the­
following decades on the problem established by Quine see also Hilary 
Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge:­
Cambridge­University­Press,­1975).
100 Hilary Putnam, “Possibility and Necessity,” in Realism and Reason: 
Philosophical Papers, vol.­3­(Cambridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­1983),­
51.­It­is­worth­noting­the­analogy­of­Quine’s­positions­with­regard­to­the­
criticism of empirical logic in the thirties by Popper, and then with the devel-
opments of “post-Popper” epistemology.
149notion­of­necessity­from­twentieth-century­modal­logic­(and­from­
Kripke­in­particular)­went­through­the­notion­of­possibility:­the­
necessary assertions, from this point of view, would be valid in 
all possible worlds. Without arguing the solidity of this notion 
of necessity, and without entering into the delicate question of 
the­definition­of­“possible­worlds”­(a­concept­that­has­become­
far­more­sophisticated­since­the­first­formulations­by­Leibniz),­
it is evident that in this way necessity is, somehow, no longer a 
“primitive” modal category, because the role of the fundamental 
modal notion shifts over to the concept of possibility.
To Leave Oneself
The cyborg is one of the more radical and astonishing “pos-
sibles”­that­have­emerged­from­the­contemporary­magma;­here,­
we­have­tried­to­show­that­it­is­one­of­its­key­figures.­However,­
the­cyborg­is­not­a­definitive,­fully­established­figure,­it­is­more­
a process, one of the many processes of hybridism character-
izing late modernity: physical and cultural, material and com-
municative­hybridism­between­different­species,­between­living­
and non-living, between organic and inorganic, and thus between 
man­and­machine.­The­process­to­artificialize­the­body­that,­as­
we have seen, is innate to the process of human evolution, has, in 
the last decades, registered such an acceleration that one is led 
to suspect that there has been a real surge of quality, a passage 
(some­might­say)­from­human­to­posthuman.
Naturally, the hybrid is not an invention of modernity, nor of late 
modernity. On the contrary, we could almost say that today’s 
proliferation of hybrids is no more than the resurgence of a dis-
tant age largely populated by these beings, the time of myth, and 
to remain more in touch with our cultural roots, namely Greek 
mythology.­But­beyond­the­“raw­material,”­the­components­
of­this­figure­(animal­or­machine),­there­exists­a­substantial­
difference­between­the­Greek­hybrid­and­its­contemporary­
counterpart that is underlined by the etymology of the name. 
150 In fact, the root of “hybrid” comes from the Greek hýbris, that is 
insolence,­arrogance,­excess,­challenge;­to­put­it­simply,­like­that­
of Capaneus at the walls of Thebes, as described by Dante as well. 
And against whom is the insolence of the hybrid, of arrogance, 
intended?­In­the­case­of­the­“mixed”­figures,­of­the­proud­mix­of­
man-animal, it is directed against the order of the cosmos that 
established the separation between men and gods, between 
one species of animal and another. The centaur and the chimera, 
with the arrogant composition of their bodies, challenge this 
order, want to escape Ananke’s dominion, the steely necessity to 
which­even­the­other­gods­must­bow.­They­are­figures­that­take­
us back to primordial chaos, to the intolerable immoderation of a 
still disorderly world. In some way, they too are connected to the 
apeiron,­to­infinite­wickedness.­And­are­thus­inevitably­destined­
to lose.
In the era of possibility, Ananke’s grip is no longer so strong. 
The­contemporary­hybrids­walk­the­streets­of­New­York­and­
Rome, of Los Angeles and London, without fear of harassment. 
Of course, particularly “scandalous” biological-cultural hybrids, 
like sexual hybrids on the transgender road, are still vulnerable 
to reproach, if not disgust, from the more traditionalist, who are 
probably still in the majority in industrial and post-industrial 
urban­cultures.­But­there­is­a­place­for­them­too,­seeing­that­they­
perform a role in the underground economy of transgression, 
reproached by the media and tolerated in private. So con-
temporary hybrids have somehow won the right to citizenship, 
no matter how formal. Their existence is more or less guaranteed 
by the repressive tolerance that pervades late capitalism. The 
possibility, even the most “monstrous” and perverse, now has 
a degree more legitimacy with respect to the past. Naturally, all 
this comes at a price: social irrelevancy. If deviance, even hybrid 
deviance, loses its “oppositional” nature in order to embrace the 
more bourgeois and modest practice of “transgression”, it is tol-
erated and even encouraged by managers who run the various 
outlets­of­entertainment,­from­discotheques­to­sex­shops;­in­
151some measure, transgression is integrated into the broader 
mechanisms of social reproduction, precisely because it doesn’t 
interfere with the more profound workings of the social machine 
as such.
Is the contemporary hybrid, therefore, no longer capable of 
challenging society, of standing out, of causing cracks in the 
cosmos? One should not be too sure. The hybridism between 
man and technology that takes place in the cyborg produces a 
truly new situation, heralds an undeniable discontinuity in the 
process­of­artificiality.­Technology­now­penetrates­the­skin­at­
every level and with every possible modality, as much in the 
electro-mechanical cyborg as in the genetic one. In both these 
extreme cases, and in their every conceivable intermediate 
gradation, a displacement between internal and external is 
produced, one that works on the conditions and modalities of 
experience.­The­cyborg­is­a­figure­that­leaves­itself,­much­like­a­
religious mystic or devotee of religious tradition, but in a literal 
and physical manner, not only mentally and imaginatively. Its 
ecstasy­(or­ekstasis,­to­be­outside­oneself,­to­leave­one’s­body)­
is no longer an exceptional and extraordinary experience, it 
is a daily condition, permanent, despite being reversible in 
some ways. This is why its experience cannot be the same 
as the traditional man. This, not something else, denotes the 
posthuman perspective: the cyborg lives with its brain outside its 
head and its nerves outside its skin, to quote McLuhan, and no 
longer knows the meaning of “inner” with respect to “outer,” and 
lives in a state of continual ecstasy.
Undoubtedly, all this creates a state of destabilization, new con-
tradictions between individual and collective. It seems to me 
there­are­two­principles.­The­first­regards­the­cultural­processes­
of humanization. The presence of a stable frontier between 
internal and external, as far as the body is concerned, has always 
been one of the stronger mechanisms of cultural stabilization. In 
societies lacking the art of writing, that frontier—the skin—could 
and should only be passed through at particular moments, like 
152 the­initiation­ceremony,­with­a­highly­visible­artificiality­of­the­
body involving lacerations, wounds, insertion of various objects, 
all symbols of the “humanization” of the body, that only then 
could,­once­the­difference­with­the­animal’s­body­had­been­
affirmed,­recover­and­reaffirm­one’s­place­in­the­cosmic­order­on­
the­basis­of­this­difference.­But­when­the­line­between­the­body’s­
interior and exterior is passed through every time, as much with 
surgery as with piercing, this act might not lose its traumatic 
effect­(plastic­surgery,­like­the­application­of­a­pacemaker,­is­
painful­nonetheless),­but­it­definitely­loses­its­cultural­nature.­The­
cyborg­cannot­affirm­its­“humanity”­once­and­for­all­(or­the­equiv-
alent­of­humanity­for­a­cyborg­of­that­sort),­it­has­to­continuously­
renegotiate it socially: its life becomes a permanent ritual of 
initiation,­a­journey­constantly­renewed­by­a­mobile,­fluctuating­
frontier. This, I believe, is the characteristic that convinced Donna 
Haraway­to­make­it­the­central­figure­of­her­process­of­liberation.
The second contradiction concerns appropriation procedures 
and the use of technology. The individual dimension has become 
preponderant in the new information and communication 
technologies. The consumption of products of the imaginary, 
in particular, has shifted unequivocally from the collective rites 
and,­in­some­measure,­from­the­film­community­to­the­more­
familiar world of television, and to those of the drastically 
individualized computer. Nonetheless, the telematics networks 
develop new forms of communication, of contacts between 
different­subjectivities­that­escape­the­uniformity­of­television,­
to the reduction of the subject to a passive receptor of messages 
conceived, packaged and distributed centrally. Almost naturally, 
the networks evoke the image of a “collective intelligence”. 
The prevalent form that this collective intelligence currently 
assumes­is­for­the­moment­that­of­financial­instruments­of­eco-
nomic globalization, of business-to-business contacts that in a 
few nanoseconds decide the destiny of exchange rates, stock 
markets, the economies of entire nations. All this has little to do 
with the angelic intelligence evoked by the telematics optimism 
153of Pierre Lévy. Once again the collective nature of the networks 
appears to rise up against the individual like a new version of 
the state’s alienating power, a monument to impersonality, to 
the control of the masses and the formalism of “dead” labor 
against pulsating individuality, the autonomy and existential 
wealth of “living” labor. However, the word “labor” has over the 
past­twenty­years­lost­much­of­its­significance,­rendering­its­
use­very­difficult­when­describing­such­dissimilar­realities­like­
Fordist labor and post-Fordist labor. This is another, even more 
insidious term for “cyborg ecstasy.” Can the collective power 
of the networks become a general intellect aimed to build up 
liberation practices or is it destined to reproduce mechanisms of 
alienation and of other-directed means disguised as individual 
choice? How can I “re-enter myself” after leaving myself, how 
can­I­recover­the­intelligent,­emotional­and­affective­wealth­that­
I helped to construct in the exteriorization phase, having left 
my own dimension? How can I conserve and enrich my body 
after temporarily abandoning it to the networks, after having 
experimented with sophisticated technological, but seemingly 
immaterial, versions of the same? How can I return home if, 
instead of one home, I have numerous homes, virtual dwellings 
of my hybrid and telematic existence? These questions will stay 
with us for a long time, well into the opening century of the new 
millennium.
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From the Cyborg to the 
Posthuman
The term “posthuman” gained the attention of the cultural media 
with the “Post Human” exhibition organized by merchant and 
critic­Jeffrey­Deitch­of­Lausanne’s­FAE­Musée­d’Art­Contemporian­
in­June­1992,­before­being­housed­over­the­following­years­at­
Turin’s Castello di Rivoli and other European contemporary art 
museums and institutions. Taking another look at it today, the 
exhibition appears far less “posthuman” than one might expect. 
The­star­of­the­exhibition­was­Jeff­Koons,­whose­work,­created­
during his marriage to Cicciolina, Deitch preferred to describe 
as posthuman, in so far as the highly realistic sculptures of the 
couple’s union or the reproductions of superheroes seemed to 
be more in line with cheap pop art or frenzied name-dropping. 
Not even the exhibition works of Mike Kelley, Charles Ray, 
Paul McCarthy, Kiki Smith, Janine Antoni and others showed 
any particular tendency towards theriomorphic or mechanical 
hybridism, as already seen in the works of Stelarc or Orlan. 
However,­the­exhibition­not­only­enjoyed­significant­success,­
it­also­provoked­discussion­and­reflection­that­concurred­with­
158 the problems mentioned by Deitch in the catalog’s introductory 
remarks.
In­this­prologue,­Deitch­focused­on­the­new­possibilities­offered­
by biotechnology in order to look into various aspects of our 
body and personality: “There is a growing sense that we should 
take control over our bodies and our social circumstances rather 
than just accepting what we inherited.” 101 The chance to inter-
vene in the genetic patrimony to ensure us and our descendants 
particular physical, mental and behavioral traits, led Deitch to 
affirm­that­we­are­going­from­a­Darwinian­evolution,­or­“natural­
evolution”,­to­an­“artificial­evolution”.­Broadly­speaking,­to­rebuild­
the conceptual history of Western modernity from the point of 
view­of­its­own­models­of­self-construction­(even­when­assisted­
by­the­history­of­art),­Deitch­gives­particular­significance­to­1968­
(“when­the­culture­of­modernism­reached­both­its­culmination­
and­its­collapse”)­and­the­importance­of­feminism.­The­critic­
argued that the new ways of the organization of personality 
involved as a consequence the annulment of privileged models 
of self from the point of view of “fair play” or of the truth. The 
“collapse of absolutes” applied not only to personality models, 
but to political and social models as well: the collapse of com-
munism in the Soviet Union, the puncture of Japan’s bubble 
economy, and the crisis of the modern corporation’s social 
functions­were­more­examples­of­this­final­aspect­of­the­process.
What is interesting to note is that Deitch made a point of 
underlining the connection between these fragmented and 
multiple models of self and the debilitation of rationality but the 
push towards irrationalism came about without scandal, and the 
condemnation­of­the­negative­collateral­effects­of­the­process­
was expressed with relative coldness:
101­ Jeffrey­Deitch,­“Post­Human­Exhibit­Catalog­Essay­1992–93”,­http://www.
artic.edu/~pcarroll/PostHuman.html.
159The structure of thinking is changing, and it appears that 
the quality of thinking is changing as well. Patterns of 
thinking are becoming less rational. With the collapse of 
many of the modern era’s hierarchical belief systems, and 
their replacement by multifaceted alternatives, people 
are moving away from hierarchically structured rational 
thinking to a more perceptual. less structured outlook and 
a more irrational mode of thought. An irrational outlook 
in fact might be a more appropriate approach to a world 
that seems to have outgrown its modern utopian faith in 
rational solutions. This feeling of irrationality is furthered 
by the sense that the explosive new technologies may 
also be unleashing some explosive new pathologies. We 
are experiencing a surge of seemingly untamable viruses: 
biological, social, environmental, and computer viruses as 
well. There is a sense that we are advancing but not progres-
sing,­mired­in­a­swirl­of­unexpected­side­effects­that­have­
undermined our belief in a rational order and moved us 
closer to embracing an irrational model of the world.102
In­other­words,­the­idea­that­Deitch­conveyed­was­sufficiently­
optimistic: it was the conviction that the storm of post-modern 
(of­which­the­posthuman­represented­an­ulterior­articulation­and­
in-depth­analysis)­was­no­more­than­the­premise­for­a­succes-
sive, imminent theoretical and practical rearrangement of the 
relationship between man and the world: “The modern era might 
be characterized as a period of the discovery of self. Our current 
post-modern era can be characterized as a transitional period 
of the disintegration of self. Perhaps the coming “post-human” 
period will be characterized by the reconstruction of self.103
Despite­the­scarce­sympathy­(or­scarce­interest)­for­the­more­
truly­scientific­thematics,­those­ideas­were,­however,­also­the­
result of a seemingly endless debate developed in the previous 
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
160 decade­on­scientific-technological­research.­Since­the­eighties,­
the most radical and extreme positions have emerged in the 
field­of­AI,­like­those­of­Eric­Drexler­(Engines of Creation,­1986)­
and­Hans­Moravec­(Mind Children,­1988),­visionary­scientists­
convinced that the new frontiers of research would soon have 
allowed individuals to control and modify their own morphology. 
The­first­struggled­to­foresee­revolutionary­developments­in­
nanotechnology, meant to supply nanorobot agents at an atomic 
and molecular level, as much to construct apparatuses and 
automatic machines so as to intervene in the capillary workings 
of­the­human­body­(the­so-called­“assemblers”,­a­line­of­research­
that­until­now­does­not­appear­to­have­had­much­success),104 
the second, director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Carnegie 
Mellon University at the time, boldly announced that within a 
short­period­of­time­“the­human­race­(would­be)­swept­away­by­
tide­of­cultural­changes,­usurped­by­its­own­artificial­progeny.”105 
In­fact,­Moravec­predicted­that­in­less­than­fifty­years­(about­
2030),­research­would­be­capable­of­producing­robots­at­least­
as intelligent as humans, and that science and technology would 
permit a human being’s mental capacity to be transferred to a 
machine­(a­sort­of­backup­or­download­of­the­human­brain­to­a­
machine;­“mind­uploading”­the­author­called­it).­In­one­way­or­
another, willy-nilly, the human race would step aside in favor of 
its mechanical or, more likely, its organic-mechanical heirs. In 
their­own­different­way,­both­Drexler­and­Moravec­brought­up­
man’s age-old dream of immortality.
We certainly couldn’t have done without someone reprising this 
old dream. Though perhaps not in such an apocalyptical fashion. 
The­year­in­which­Moravec’s­book­was­published­(1988)­coincided­
with the release of Extropy Magazine’s­first­edition,­run­by­Max­
More and Tom Morrow. The Extropy Institute was founded four 
104 K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation: The coming era of Nanotechnology­(New­
York:­Anchor­Press/Doubleday,­1986).
105 Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence 
(Cambridge,­MA:­Harvard­University­Press,­1988),­2.
161years­later­in­1992.106 The component “extropic” of the trans-
humanist movement was born, in the wake of ideas by Fereidoun 
M.­Esfandiary,­a­sociologist-futurologist­of­New­York’s­New­School­
for­Social­Research.­In­1973,­he­published­UpWingers: A Futurist 
Manifesto, predicting an era of continuous technological progress 
until the conquest of immortality.107­The­year­1998­saw­instead­
the birth of the World Transhumanist Association,108 another 
component­of­this­line­of­thought,­thanks­to­Nick­Bostrom­and­
David Pearce. The transhumanist movement, in all its facets, 
takes the posthuman concept very seriously. For transhumanists, 
hybridity with technology is rapidly turning human beings into a 
totally new biological species, placing natural evolution alongside 
a “cultural evolution”. “What is a posthuman?” is one of the FAQs 
on the Extropic site, and the answer is: “A posthuman is a human 
descendent who has been augmented to such a degree as to be 
no longer a human”. It is even clearer on the American site:
“Posthuman” is a term used by transhumanists to refer 
to what humans could become if we succeed in using 
technology to remove the limitations of the human con-
dition. No one can be certain exactly what posthumans 
would­be­like­(there­may­be­many­differing­types,­and­they­
may­continuing­changing)­but­we­can­understand­the­term­
by contrasting it with “human”: Posthumans would be those 
who have overcome the biological, neurological, and psy-
chological constraints built into humans by the evolutionary 
process. Posthumans would have a far greater ability to 
reconfigure­and­sculpt­their­physical­form­and­function;­
106­ http://www.extropy.org.­The­Extropy­Institute­was­closed­in­2006.­The­web­
site works as the archive of this transhumanist component, while the mailing 
list­(on­the­same­site)­remains­active.
107­ In­acknowledging­his­conviction,­Esfiandiary­later­changed­his­name­to­
FM-2030­to­indicate­that­his­hundredth­birthday­would­be­in­2030.­Unfor-
tunately,­FM-2030­died­of­pancreatic­cancer­in­2000.­His­body­is­still­kept­in­
cryogenic suspension until technology might perhaps bring him back to life. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FM-2030.
108 http://transhumanism.org.
162 they­would­have­an­expanded­range­of­refined­emotional­
responses, and would possess intellectual and percep-
tual abilities enhanced beyond the purely human range. 
Posthumans would not be subject to biological aging or 
degeneration.109
The transhumanists’ insistence on improving their morphology 
and­physical­appearance­(like­their­scrupulous­attention­to­the­
managerial aspects of all their intellectual and organizational 
activities)­is­a­sign­of­their­strong­roots­in­North­American­
culture. Max Moore, who is of English origin, does not ignore the 
connections of his futuristic platform with the utopic European 
tradition, but declines it in an unequivocally “reasonable” 
form, taking great care to distance himself from every banally 
ufological,­science­fiction­aspect,­and­from­every­reference­to­
contingent political debate. The liberalism of the transhumanists 
is a moderate liberalism, just as their utopia is one that treads 
carefully and refuses every eschatological perspective:
It would be unrealistic to expect posthumans to be “perfect” 
by our standards. What we can reasonably say is that 
posthumans would have greater potential for good or bad, 
just as humans have greater potential than other primate 
species.110
To be convinced of this, one simply has to check the titles of the 
seven “Principles of Extropy”111: perpetual progress, self-transfor-
mation, practical optimism, intelligent technology, open society 
(information­and­democracy),­self-direction,­rational­thinking.­
Nevertheless, the utopic tension of transhumanist thought is 
beyond question, just like its syncretic ambitions to reconnect the 
cul-de-sacs­of­Western­thought­to­the­main­highway­of­scientific­
and technological progress. “We have achieved two of the three 
alchemists’ dreams,” More writes in On Becoming Posthuman. “We 
109 http://www.extropy.org/faq.htm.
110 Ibid.
111 http://www.extropy.org/principles.htm.
163have­transmuted­the­elements­and­learned­to­fly.­Immortality­is­
next.”
The transhuman, in keeping with his name, looks upon himself 
“as a transitional stage between our animal heritage and our 
posthuman future.”112 In this setting, even experimenting with 
new expressive and communicative forms is envisaged. 
Transhumanist Artists embrace the creative innovations of 
transhumanity.  
We­are­ardent­activists­in­pursuing­infinite­transformation,­
overcoming death and exploring the universe.113
But­the­transhumanists­naturally­give­their­all­when­it­comes­
to short/medium term forecasts: essentially, they remain 
futurologists­seduced­by­the­principles­of­a­strong­AI,­and­firmly­
convinced­of­the­postulates­that­govern­this­discipline­(firstly,­the­
algorithmic nature of intelligence and therefore its dependence 
on­biological­support,­namely­from­the­body).­In­this­sense,­
one of the more interesting and paradigmatic characters in this 
movement is Ray Kurzwell, futurologist and successful inventor, 
as well as brilliant propagator of the quality improvement we 
expect in the near future.
Having graduated in Computer Science and Literature from 
MIT­in­1970,­Kurzweil­has­a­notable­career­as­a­technologist­and­
entrepreneur,­especially­in­the­field­of­optical­character­rec-
ognition­(OCR),­in­music­synthesizers­and­in­technologies­for­
the arts in general.114 Kurzweil’s ideas on the future of humanity 
are presented in three books: The Age of Intelligent Machines, 
112 Ibd.
113 “Transhumanist Art Statement”, http://www.transhumanist.biz/trans-
humanistartsmanifesto.­This­was­edited­by­Natasha­Vita-More­(www.
natasha.cc)­in­1982­and­revised­in­2003.­“Transhumanist­Art­Statement”­is­
not very rich, and consists of a few performances and some videos made in 
the eighties and nineties predominantly by Natasha Vita-More herself.
114 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Kurzweil.
164 The Age of Spiritual Machines and The Singularity is Near.115 The 
concept­of­“technological­singularity”­(the­term­is­borrowed­
from­mathematics­and­physics)­was­first­used­in­1983­by­science­
fiction­writer­Vernon­Vinge­in­the­magazine­Omni, based on ideas 
by statistician I. J. Good during the mid-sixties.116 Elaborated 
by­Kurzweil,­the­term­indicates­a­highly­rapid­(but­not­discon-
tinuous)­rise­in­AI­and­its­fusion­with­human­intelligence­towards­
the­middle­of­the­twenty-first­century­(the­author­dates­it­2045).­
Kurzweil explained in an interview:
Within a quarter century, nonbiological intelligence will 
match the range and subtlety of human intelligence. It will 
then soar past it because of the continuing acceleration 
of information-based technologies, as well as the ability 
of machines to instantly share their knowledge. Intelligent 
nanorobots will be deeply integrated in our bodies, our 
brains, and our environment, overcoming pollution and 
poverty, providing vastly extended longevity, full-immersion 
virtual­reality­incorporating­all­of­the­senses­(like­“The­
Matrix”),­“experience­beaming”­(like­“Being­John­Malkovich”),­
and vastly enhanced human intelligence. The result will be 
an intimate merger between the technology-creating species 
and the technological evolutionary process it spawned. 
[…] [After which] nonbiological intelligence will have access 
to its own design and will be able to improve itself in an 
increasingly rapid redesign cycle. We’ll get to a point where 
technical progress will be so fast that unenhanced human 
intelligence will be unable to follow it. That will mark the 
Singularity.117
115 The Age of Intelligent Machines (New­York:­Viking,­1990);­The Age of Spiritual 
Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New­York:­Viking,­
1998);­The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology­(New­York:­
Viking,­2005).
116 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity.
117 http://www.singularity.com/qanda.html
165Kurzweil pursues and generalizes Moore’s law on technological 
acceleration, maintaining that the passage from a linear change 
or­polynomial­tax­to­an­exponential­one­(what­he­calls­the­“law­
of­accelerated­returns”)­induces­such­a­situation­that­we­can­
no longer use traditional categories to interpret “the cycle of 
human life, including death itself. Understanding the Singularity 
will­alter­our­perspective­on­the­significance­of­our­past­and­the­
ramifications­for­our­future.­To­truly­understand­it­inherently­
changes one’s view of life in general and one’s own particular 
life.”118 The change that he outlines from here to the middle of 
the­twenty-first­century­(in­a­little­less­than­forty­years)­includes­
radical transformations due to the combination of the three great 
sectors of technological innovation: genetics, nanotechnology 
and­robotics.­This­involves­a­profound­and­definitive­change­
not only in our daily routine but also in the human body, and 
overcoming its traditional limits, like aging and death. Like 
other transhumanists, Kurzweil considers death to be the great 
bogeyman. Except that now we have the means to defeat it:
In my view, death is a tragedy. It ’s a tremendous loss of per-
sonality, skills, knowledge, relationships. We’ve rationalized 
it as a good thing because that’s really been the only 
alternative­we’ve­had.­But­disease,­aging,­and­death­are­
problems we are now in a position to overcome.119
It­is­significant,­when­Kurzweil­describes­the­future,­that­not­only­
is technology the prime factor taken into consideration, but that 
every­reference­and­debate­between­human­intelligence­(and­
biological­in­general)­and­AI­is­made­exclusively­on­the­basis­of­
reasonably simple measurable dimensions, typically speed and 
the power of calculation or, more in general, the treatment of 
information. Not that other dimensions are absent from this dis-
course, but it all comes down to technological fact. In principle, 
transhumanists do not ignore the inherent risks and dangers in 
118 Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near,­7.
119 http://www.singularity.com/qanda.html.
166 the exponential advance of technology, but think that all things 
considered, the latter together with the problems generates 
the solutions too. They don’t pretend to identify the array of 
human experience with “solving the problems,” but believe that 
in­the­final­analysis­the­first­is­reduced­to­the­second.­Therefore,­
we are faced with radically reductionist thought with regard to 
human beings, and radical optimism concerning the potential of 
technology.
Naturally, not everyone looks with the same regard upon the 
prospect of a growing integration between man and machine, 
nor the enthusiasm for such a catastrophic and shattering 
“technological singularity”. Others see the cyborg’s perspective—
given the current conditions of technologies’ pervasiveness 
that render it possible—as a restraint on individual and social 
freedom, and as a demonstration of violence on the part of the 
techno-scientific­and­economic­elite­who­sustain­the­planet’s­for-
tunes. Here is what was said by Jaimie Smith-Windsor, a political 
science scholar at the University of Victoria in Canada, after 
seeing her daughter spend months in an incubator following her 
premature­birth­in­2003:
In a sense, all of humanity has become disembodied from 
the womb. The genesis of a cyborg goes well beyond the 
physical union of machine with body. The day I gave birth 
to a cyborg, I began to understand how every human has 
become a collaboration of mechanic and biological matter. 
The human condition is mediated by technology. The meta-
narrative of being cyborg ignores ethical questions. The 
machine can’t ask: What would the world look like without 
mothers? Or, for that matter, fathers? Technology is, quite 
literally, beginning to rewire the way we do family, the way 
we know humanity. The ultimate violence of technology is its 
ability to generate its own invisibility, to circulate undetected 
in and through the physical body, to become manifest in the 
human consciousness as epistemic reality. Conditions of pos-
sibility other than becoming cyborg are thus, hidden from 
167the human condition. Once technology has been internalized 
and operates upon us through invisible episteme, it becomes 
the only way of being human. Engaging in a binary relation-
ship with technology is merely one means of engaging 
with new conditions of possibility for the human condition. 
However, human/machine symbiosis simultaneously negates 
the possibility for narrative of “being in the world” and 
simultaneously­forgets­all­of­the­moments­of­differentiation­
and deferral that work to inform the human essence.120
The­debate­on­posthumanism­has­also­started­in­Italy.­In­2005,­
from January to April, the Faculty of Communication Sciences 
at University of Rome “La Sapienza”, hosted a seminar on this 
subject that saw the participation of numerous internal and 
external lecturers, whose speeches were then collected in a 
book.121­Another­convention­was­organized­in­2007­at­the­State­
University of Milan and at the University of Languages and Com-
munication Sciences in Milan.122 And other initiatives took place 
at other locations, including the masterclass for Pietro Ingrao’s 
birthday­held­by­Pietro­Barcellona­at­Rome’s­Centro per la Riforma 
dello Stato­(CRS)­in­2007,­also­collected­in­a­book.123 It was here 
where­Barcellona­elaborated­on­a­position­of­a­Marxist­matrix­
opposed and violently critical of the prospect of posthumanism 
that nonetheless is worth looking at with attention. The starting 
point was the political crisis and the defeat of the communist 
movement at the end of the twentieth century:
Tronti­is­right­when­he­affirms­that­the­end­of­the­com-
munist movement is at the same time the end of politics, 
120­ Jaimie­Smith-Windsor,­“The­Cyborg­Mother:­A­Breached­Boundary”,­C-Theory 
2/4/2004,­http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=409#bio
121 Mario Pireddu and Antonio Tursi, eds., Post-umano. Relazioni tra uomo e 
tecnologia nella società delle reti­(Milan:­Guerini­e­Associati,­2006).
122 “Post-umano. Percorsi di soggettività attuali,” Università degli Studi di 
Milano,­Facoltà­di­Lettere­e­Filosofia,­Dipartimento­di­Filosofia­/­IULM,­
22-23/10/2007.
123­ Pietro­Barcellona,­L’epoca del postumano­(Troina:­Citta­Aperta,­2007).
168 understood­as­man’s­huge­effort­to­create­an­autonomous­
space compared to biological-naturalistic production and 
reproduction of the species: the aim of the creation of 
sense, of the individual and collective goals that lend dignity 
to human action. If in principle the bourgeois is the natural-
biological man, in principle the politician is his antagonist.
Barcellona­defends­the­modern­project­with­determination,­
diligence­and­pride,­and­identifies­his­aims­with­the­philosophical­
assumptions and values of a dualistic and anthropocentric 
perspective and with the political management of society by 
the­political­left.­And­with­these­assumptions­he­sees­in­the­’68­
movements­(given­the­reductive­label­of­the­“youth­protest”)­the­
antecedent and embryo of what he considers a catastrophe: “the 
regression of the individualistic ideal to a form of infantile narcis-
sism, aimed solely at satisfying every need”. The posthuman is 
seen as the turning point that dissolves all dignity and human 
awareness,­that­“offers­a­representation­of­humanity­much­closer­
to that of the primate than to the spiritual longing for a relation-
ship with the divine. The communist crisis signals the end of 
the humanistic illusion and opens the door to the posthuman 
scene”. The process of the modern subject’s dissolution is quickly 
identified­with­the­transformation­of­the­capitalist­economy­in­
the post-Fordist sense and with the abandonment of the dualist 
mind/body hypothesis:
Pluralization of subjectivity to extreme singularity, dissemi-
nation of the productive cycle to the denial of any territorial 
relation, criticism of subjectivity’s humanistic model founded 
on­the­dualism­of­mind­and­body;­these­are­the­elements­of­
the new constellation.124
Barcellona’s­first­misunderstanding­is­in­accepting­the­bourgeois­
claim of being a “natural man”, of capitalism being a “natural 
method of production”, of the market being a “natural model of 
124­ Ibid.,­20–21­[trans.­Robert­Booth].
169human relations.” Naturally, not one of these claims is grounded: 
bourgeoisie, capitalism and market are not “natural,” they are 
historical­constructions­and­therefore­contingent,­and­finally­
subject­to­social­change­and­the­logic­of­conflict—and­Barcellona­
knows­this­only­too­well.­But­none­of­it­authorizes­him­to­con-
ceive of “authentically human” processes that transcend nature 
and biology, as they do not authorize a vision of politics and 
communism in a post-biological dimension. In this recovery and 
“leftist” exasperation with the anthropocentric model there is 
a­basic­misunderstanding:­in­effect,­this­upswing­is­possible­
only if one accepts what one claims to criticize, which is the 
identification­of­capitalism­with­nature,­of­the­bourgeois­with­the­
“human essence”. The presumed naturalism of the bourgeoisie 
is thus set against the belief in the transcendence of man, whose 
only foundation, as we have seen, is no more than a dualist sep-
aration between mind and body.
The transcendence of the biological is no more than a spiritual 
or idealistic position that pops back in through the window 
after being shown the door. What does it mean to call upon 
the “ought”, “value,” to a “principle of validity as opposed to 
the immanent normativity of economic progress?” It means 
admitting to the fact that when it comes to satisfying survival 
needs,­in­the­field­of­pure­“biology,”­capitalism­has­already­won.­
To­overcome­capitalism­one­must­transcend­that­field­and­place­
oneself on a higher, more worthy plane—one that overcomes 
biology. However, to refuse posthuman in the name of a “return 
to­human,”­of­a­proudly­reaffirmed­anthropocentrism­as­the­only­
possible setting for the production of sense, can only mean an 
idealistic refusal of the new conditions of associated life and of 
social production, only from whose interior can practical and 
experimental research be developed to overcome the existent.
To­choose­the­path­of­opposition­between­“communist”­finalism­
and “naturalist” automatism of the economy means reintroducing 
a separation of man from the kingdom of the living which 
paradoxically reduces his autonomy. If “philosophy of history and 
170 philosophy of the subject, from this point of view, coincide within 
the era of the establishment of modernity’s inaugural space,” 
then­the­criticism­of­finalism­and­the­recognition­of­artificiality­of­
every telos is at the same time the criticism of the subject and of 
its­claim­to­separate­from­its­own­processes.­Barcellona’s­horror­
at the “posthuman” perspective coincides paradoxically, in the 
prior assumptions, with the transhumanists’ excitement over 
the­same­perspective.­Man’s­separation­from­biology­(feared­or­
desired,­it­doesn’t­matter)­is­possible­only­if­it­starts­from­a­fis-
sile conception of human nature, from an essentialism that sees 
in the human being the possibility of identifying a collection of 
individualistic, positive and distinctive traits: but every attempt 
of this type inevitably leads to mistaking a collection of character-
istics and determinate historic properties for “human nature,” 
a particular “state of art” that is destined to transform itself 
through cultural evolvement and mutation. There is no other dis-
tinctive trait, no other possible way of describing “human nature” 
if not by its extreme and variable adaptability, its acceptance of 
the possible, its relational and hybrid vocation that, starting from 
an­undeniably­biological­specificity,­branches­off­culturally­in­the­
most varied and diverse ways. Essentialism, however disguised, 
leads inevitably to anthropocentrism and, once again, it is in this 
context­that­joyous,­naïve­technological­optimism­and­dark,­pes-
simistic catastrophism come face to face without recognition.
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